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PREFACE 
The relation between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States over 
various confrontational issues during the recent years has become the subject of 
discussion and concern for the region of West Asia and the international 
community at large. Many of the debates have been passionate and extremely 
partisan, due in some part to the high likelihood of war and great bloodshed. 
However, it is an obvious fact that these issues have become most emblematic of 
the gulf between the two countries. The present-study is a brief effort in the 
process of identification and analysis of salient trends in US-Iran relations since 
1979. In this study attempt is made to understand the relations between the two 
states which were close allies of each other before the Iranian revolution of 1979 
and became adversaries after the revolution to the point that the possibility of 
war cannot be ruled out. Hopefully this may add to our knowledge of 
contemporary political relations of both the countries under study. 
The First Chapter is an attempt to introduce the West Asia along with its 
nomenclature, geo strategic importance and brief history in order to make the 
research conducive to understand. Because, Iran's geo-strategic and historical 
importance are the major determinants of its foreign policy and without having a 
proper picture of its neighboring states it will be difficult to determine it. 
Similarly the United States approach towards West Asian and its interest in the 
region is analyzed as they have either positive or negative impact on the relations 
between the US and the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
The Second Chapter is intended to expose historically the obvious and intriguing 
relations between the two countries prior to the Islamic Revolution of 1979 in 
Iran and its effect upon the political fate of both the nations and the region as 
such. This chapter also traces the history of nuclear development in Iran during 
the pre-Islamic Revolution period to properly understand and comprehend the 
present nuclear crisis. 
The Third Chapter investigates the roots and dimensions of their bitter relations 
by analyzing the records of different crises in Islamic Republic of Iran and its 
neighborhoods. The study analyses the fact that the past 40 years of US harsh 
policy toward Iran has proved to be counterproductive and ineffective. Special 
attention has been given to different war-time relationship between the two 
countries such as- the Iran-Iraq War of 1980, Iran Contra Affairs of 1980s, the 
Gulf War of 1991, the Afghanistan Crisis of 2001, and the Iraq War of 2003. The 
study also explains the ever- ending Peace Process in the West Asian states and 
its surrounding politics played by the United States and Iran. 
The Fourth Chapter endeavors to understand Iran's nuclear calculus. It 
focuses on Iranian position on the question of WMD vis-a-vis the positions of the 
West especially the US. It also makes attempt to analyze how the contentious 
issue of nuclear program can be dealt with to avoid violence and bloodshed in 
Iran and the region. 
After analyzing the above chapters on US-Iran relations since 1979, the 
study concludes in the fifth chapter with suggesting that the confrontational 
issues can only be solved through amicable ways and not by threat and warnings. 
In order to resolve the nuclear issue the US must stop its various illogical 
supports to Israel which enjoys adversarial relations with to Iran and the West- 
Asian states. Similarly, Iran must stop furious public speeches which make their 
rivals suspicious. Therefore, they should sit together for discussion and consider 
each-other's problems with seriousness in order to normalize the relations 
between the two countries. 
In preparing this work I have consulted the available literature on the 
subject. Generally books and periodicals are consulted. To opinions and mistakes 
in the study I take the sole responsibility. 
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The Westgsia and'the 
VnitedStates 
THE \VEST ASIA AND THE UNITED STATES 
What constitute, West Asia is a contestable issue. The region geographically 
and culturally has been used in different context and purposes. Confusion 
prevails among adiiunistrators, statesmen and academicians about the 
composition of West Asia and its characteristics. l or the purpose this studies 
what is required to understand the region as such: its strategic, political, 
economic and cultural significance. To understand the region it has to he 
historically looked upon to relate it to Iran and the United States of ,America 
in the contemporary context of their relationships. 
The region of West Asia is also called by different names like Western Asia, 
\Vest Asia. Southwest Asia or Southwestern Asia. These terms are partly 
coterminous with the Micklle Fast - which describes geographical position in 
relation to Western Europe rather than location within Asia. They are 
sometimes used interchangeably. 'l-he term Middle last is, however, a 
Misnomer and the legacy of an era when points on the `.;lobe were identi lied 
with reference to the location of the seats of power of the European Empire.1 
Most of the scholars in Asia refer to the region as West Asia.2 On the other 
haled, most scholars 11-on1 Europe and America refer the region as Middle,'Near 
East and use \'liddle Near Eastern Studies or oriental studies. Due to this 
perceived I:uro centrism. international organizations such as the United 
Nations, have replaced Middle East and Near East with Western Asia. This 
region and Europe are collectively referred to as Western Eurasia.3 Therefore, 
it is invariably called the region as West Asia. The countries which come 
under the West Asian territory are Syria, Arab Republic, Lebanon, Palestine. 
Israel. Jordan, Iraq, Islamic Republic of Iran. Kuwait, Kingdom of Bahrain. 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. State of Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Sultanate of 
Oman, Yemen (Fig. 
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This region was one unitary unit as part of the old Ottoman Empire before the 
First World War. With the defeat of Ottoman Empire by European countries, 
this region was carved out into the separate states and boundaries as existent 
today except for Israel which emerged as the homeland of the Jewish people 
and as an independent country in 1948. To comprehend the geo-strategic 
importance of the region in Global politics and economy, the general 
characteristics of the region need to be identified so as to have a better 
assessment of the region. 
GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS: 
The population of West Asia is distributed unevenly over the region. Given the 
extreme aridness of large parts of the landscape, the relative availability of 
water tends to determine the pattern of population density. The valleys of the 
Tigris and Euphrates Rivers are heavily populated. Also of importance are the 
highland areas and adjacent plains which receive sufficient rainfall to maintain 
extensive agricultural centers. Coupled with the normal increase in city 
populations, the movement from the rural areas has resulted in a tremendous 
expansion of urban centers over the past few decades. In fact this has been the 
region which gave birth to three great religions, Islam, Christianity and 
Judaism. And today Islam is the religion of approximately 90% of the area's 
population and there are significant numbers of Christians and Jews living 
there as well -- approximately 6 to 8% Christians, 2% Jews, and 1% other.5  
The population of Muslims is largely Sunni. Muslims are divided into two 
rival sects: the Sunni Muslims and the Shiite Muslims. Although the Sunnis 
have remained more uniform in their beliefs, differences in interpretation of 
religious law, the Sharia, led to the adherence to one or the other of the four 
"schools of law": Hanetite, Malikite, Shafite, or Hanbalite. The Sunni division 
of Islam is predominant throughout Syria, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. Shiite 
Muslims are also divided in many sects. Shiism is the state religion of Iran.6 
However, the people of the region are classified as groups and subgroups 
based on physical type, language, religion, social order, means of livelihood, 
and national beliefs. The classification of the people of the region on any 
single criteria can be misleading, since languages cross religious and social 
lines, and races cross linguistic and national boundaries. Since gaining 
independence, West Asian people are now generally classified along 
nationalistic lines, Nevertheless, the criteria of languages, religions, and ways 
of life still do not necessarily correspond neatly with each nation's boundaries. 
The major linguistic groups in West Asia are Semitic and Iranian. Each of 
these groups, in turn, contains several distinct languages and an even larger 
number of dialects. Semitic languages originated in West Asia and are spoken 
by the majority of the area's population. Arabic, a Semitic language, spread 
n u 
from the Arabian Peninsula during the Arab conquests that followed the rise of 
Islam in the seventh century.? 
The Koran (Quran), the Islamic bible, standardized literary Arabic, but the 
spoken language splintered into many dialects. Arabic-speaking people 
probably constitute 55% of the West Asian population. The major Arabic 
dialects are generally referred to as Syrian, Iraqi, and Arabian. There are, 
however, extensive variations in grammar, vocabulary, and pronunciation 
within each of these subgroups. Farsi (Persian) is the language of the largest 
number of Iranians and is the official language of Iran! Although not 
considered part of the Semitic language group, it is written in a modified 
Arabic script. Other languages of this group are Kurdish, spoken in Iran and 
Iraq, and Baluchi, also spoken in Iran. Hebrew, which at one time virtually 
disappeared as a living language, was revised and modernized by Jewish 
settlers in Palestine. It is now the official language of Israel 9 
Traditionally, West Asia has been divided into three life styles: those of the 
nomadic herdsrnen, the farmers, and the city dwellers. The ancient social 
structure of life styles has been significantly altered in modern times. Prior to 
independence, modernization emerged as the result of military intervention, 
economic and political influences, missionary activity, educational 
institutions, and formal programs of change and development that were 
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established by Europeans or Americans and instituted by various heads of 
state. Since independence, the national modernization process has continued 
more extensively in the oil-rich countries of West Asia. The comparison of 
modernization to traditional elements varies considerably from one country to 
another. Relatively large westernized elements exist in Lebanon and Israel 
and within the small modernized elite in the oil-producing countries. Despite 
this process of modernization, a constant struggle continues between the 
modernizers and the traditionalists in each of the countries. The religious 
institution has been progressively overshadowed by political authority. 
Education and economic development have expanded opportunities and have 
altered family unity. These and other factors have caused an expansion of the 
middle class. This has resulted in the shifting of power away from a small 
segment of the upper class and in the transfer of control of major economic 
resources and wealth to middle class dominated governments. Modernization 
has not, however, won out over traditionalism. In many parts of West Asia 
there are signs of religious assertiveness. Some fundamentalists are 
challenging contemporary regimes and calling for a return to ancient society. 
Others advocate a greater involvement of Islam in the political and social 
structures of the nation.10 
The West Asian boundaries are defined to the north by the southernmost 
ridges of the Caucasus Mountains and the Caspian Sea, to the west by the 
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Mediterranean Sea, to the south by the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea, and 
to the east by the eastern border of Iran. Most of West Asia is arid and flat 
and contains some of the largest and most barren deserts on earth. Many areas 
around the seacoasts, however, are mountainous and receive adequate rainfall 
for agriculture. One major river systems which traverse the West Asia land 
mass is the Tigris-Euphrate flowing from the north in a southeasterly 
direction through Syria and Iraq. The Tigris and Euphrates Rivers join at Al 
Qurnah, Iraq, about 193 km from the Persian Gulf, to form the Shatt al Arab 
(Waterway of the Arabs). Fed by rains and snows, this river valley provides 
favorable locations for human settlement and development. The shorelines of 
the region are generally rugged and dominated by cliffs or mountain ranges. 
Coastal plains are found along the Caspian Sea, the Persian Gulf, and the 
eastern Mediterranean. 
The climate of \Vest Asia has a long, intensely hot surnmer and a mild winter. 
Temperatures vary with the location, but they may. as an example, climb to 
45 degrees (0)  centigrade (C) in Saudi Arabia and Iran in the summer. Winter 
temperatures in West Asia range from 4.50 C in the north to 10°  C in the 
south. The temperatures in the higher mountains often drop below -17°  C in 
the winter. Many parts of the 'Vest Asia, especially along the shores of the 
Mediterranean and Caspian Seas, receive an annual rainfall of about 75 
centimeters (cm) attributed mostly to winter rains. Inland, the average rainfall 
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drops sharply. The northern countries receive about 25 cm and the plateaus 
about 8 to 10 cm a year. The southern and southwestern parts of Saudi Arabia 
lie in the monsoon zone and receive rainfall during the months of July, 
August, and September. Irrigation systems in the river valleys also provide 
for agriculture and sustain some of the most densely populated areas in the 
world. Geographically, West Asia is generally categorized into three zones: 
north, central, and south." 
The northern sector is a zone of rugged mountains connected to the Turkish-
Russian Mountains on the west and to the Himalayas on the east. It is a 
tangled belt of ranges running generally east to west and encloses the 
extensive plateau of Iran. The highest peak, Mount Dantavand (5,602 meters) 
in the Elburz Range of northern Iran, is covered with snow in the summer as 
well as in the winter. Moist air from the Mediterranean and Caspian Seas 
flows into these mountain ranges and provides sufficient precipitation in the 
western area. The interior plateaus present striking contrast to the coastal 
plains, varying from semi desert to barren deserts of salt and alkali.'3  
The central zone is more complex. It extends from the coastal area of the 
Sinai Peninsula, through northern Arabia and south of the Iranian Plateau, and 
down to the lowlands along the Persian Gulf. The Persian Gulf and its basin 
represent an area that holds the world's richest known deposits of petroleum. 
On the whole, this sector is less climatically harsh than the northern and 
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southern areas. The Lebanon Mountains along the eastern Mediterranean 
coast absorb most of the precipitation from the prevailing easterly winds. The 
Zagros Mountain Range of western Iran also absorbs some of this moist air 
leaving less precipitation for the Iranian Plateau. The interior areas vary from 
scattered evergreens and shrubs to grasslands and semi desert.'' 
The southern zone is the most uniform. The Arabian Peninsula rises from 
the southeast to the northwest. The Asir Range in western Saudi Arabia and 
Yemen are the mountains that parallel the Red Sea. Southern mountains also 
run along the coastal area of Yemen paralleling the Gulf of Aden. The Hajar 
Mountains of Oman on the eastern side of the peninsula are an extension of 
the Iranian Zagros Range. Except for the high mountains of Yemen and 
Oman, the southern area is generally the most barren land in West Asia. 
Strategically the importance of the region has been tied to its location and 
international waterways. The seas and gulfs which intrude deeply into the 
landmass of West Asia have been routes of trade, transport, and military 
operations for centuries. Control over the narrow straits that connect the 
waterways with each other and with the oceans is a matter of international 
concern. ►, 
The Mediterranean Sea lies between Europe, Asia, and Africa with the 
Strait of Gibraltar connecting the western Mediterranean with the Atlantic 
C) 
Ocean. In the southeast, the Suez Canal allows ships to sail from the 
Mediterranean into the Red and Arabian Seas and the Indian Ocean. The 
Mediterranean reaches its deepest point (4,594 in) in the Ionian section south 
of Italy, it is about 300 in deep at the Strait of Gibraltar. This has been an 
important avenue for cultural and commercial exchange between West Asia 
and the Western world for many years. Today, oil-consuming nations rely on 
the international waters of the Mediterranean for movement of petroleum 
from the pipeline terminals of West Asian countries. The US and other 
aligned nations have naval fleets operating in this important area on a year-
round basis. The former USSR also had a naval fleet in this area, however, 
the USSR was abolished in December 1991. This country is presently referred 
to as the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The Independent State 
of Russia will probably take over the former Soviet Navy. The future strategy 
of the CIS or Russian Navy remains to be seen." 
The Arabian Sea lies between Arabia and India and is considered part of the 
Indian Ocean. It is bordered by Iran and Pakistan on the north. The Red Sea, 
Gulf of Aden, Persian Gulf (Arabian Gulf to the Arabs), and Gulf of Oman 
are considered extensions of the Arabian Sea. Several islands in the Arabian 
Sea are used as naval and air bases. Socotra, a possession of Yemen, had been 
a port of call for the former Soviet Navy. Masirah Island off the coast of 
Oman presently serves as an Omani military base, and the US has access to 
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the Masirah air base facilities. The US has similar access to the Omani 
mainland port of Salalah for its naval vessels.17 
The Red Sea separates the Arabian Peninsula from Northeast Africa. It is 
about 2,253 km long and is no wider than 354 km. It has an average depth of 
about 600 in and covers 433,462 kin. large reefs, which are present except in 
a center channel in the southern half, make the sea dangerous for vessel 
navigation. The shore is barren with high mountain ranges on the east. Low 
sand hills and rocky tablelands line the west coast which is bordered by many 
coral reefs. 
The Persian Gulf separates Iran from Arabia. It is connected to the Gulf of 
Oman by the Strait of Hormuz. The gulf is about 805 kin long and 370 kin 
wide at its widest point. The principal islands in the gulf are the Bahrain 
Group and Qeshm. The Persian Gulf is one of the largest and oldest sources 
of the world's pearl supply and ranks as one of the principal oil-exporting 
areas. 
The Suez Canal is the longest restrictive waterway in the area. It is about 160 
kin long and flows from the upper Red Sea into the eastern Mediterranean. 
The canal is located entirely within Egypt and is owned by the Egyptian 
Government. The two excavated sections of the canal are separated by the 
Great Bitter Lake and Lake 'l'imsah. The Ismailia Canal joins the Suez at 
Ismailia and runs westward into the Nile. The Suez Canal is the most 
convenient and rapid water route between Europe and the East. 
The Strait of Tiran marks the junction of the Gulf of Aqaba with the Red 
Sea. Although of little importance to world shipping, it is vital to the interests 
of Israel and Jordan whose southern ports lie at the head of the gulf. The 
Israeli port of Eilat serves as a terminal for a pipeline which transports oil to 
the Mediterranean. Enterprise Passage, the only safe channel, is about 1.2 km 
wide and can be controlled easily from either Sinai or Tiran Island. Egyptian 
occupation of Tiran Island on 1 Jun 67 was the final straw for Israel. It 
directly resulted in Israeli decision to attack the Arabs on 5 June 1967} 
The Strait of Bab at Mandeb is located at the southern end of the Red Sea. 
It is bordered by Yemen on the east and Djibouti on the west. The strait is 
divided into two channels by Perim Island, a 13 km' rock belonging to 
Yemen. The western channel has a width of I(i km and is the main route for 
transiting ships. The western channel is considered an international waterway 
and is governed by international law. The Strait of Bab al-Mandeb, along with 
the Suez Canal, is important to world shipping and provides the most direct 
route from the Mediterranean Sea to the Indian Ocean. The Soviets operated a 
naval base at Aden on the southern coast of Yemen, in 1989-90, the Soviets 
began withdrawing from Aden. Across the Gulf of Aden, naval facilities at 
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Berbera, Somalia, serve as a base for the US Navy.19 
The Strait of Hormuz lies at the southern end of the Persian Gulf and is 
bordered by Oman on the west and by Iran on the east. The 274 km strait 
averages about 80 km in width from Oman, around the tip of the Musandam 
Peninsula, and broadens to about 129 km at the Tunbs Islands in the Persian 
Gulf. Iran located its Silkworm antiship missile batteries around Hormuz (in 
80 km range from Oman). Oil tankers, which make up most of the traffic 
through the strait, carry about 50% of the world's oil requirements. The Strait 
of Hormuz is a chokepoint at which shipping from the Persian Gulf could 
conceivably be blocked at any time. Because the strait is too deep and wide to 
be blocked by sunken ships, naval and air power would be required to close it. 
As an international waterway, closer would impact severely on the world 
market. It would curtail oil shipping from Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the 
United Arab Emirates (UAE). Relatively good port and air facilities exist 
throughout West Asia. The international waterways provide avenues for 
surface movement from all parts of the world to West Asian countries.20 Air 
facilities have expanded significantly and have become another major means 
of transportation. 
Economically, throughout its history, 'Vest Asia has been dependent on 
agriculture for its economic survival. This situation was altered considerably 
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during the second half of the 20th century when the oil industry expanded 
substantially and became the single most important factor in the economy of 
West Asia. The large petroleum fields in Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, 
Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, and UAE have about two thirds of the world's known 
oil reserves. In addition, modest oil discoveries were made in Syria and 
Yemen. For many years the development of West Asian oil resources was 
accomplished by European and US companies which held the concessions 
and provided the capital for production. This included control over the 
exploitation, rates of development, production schedules, and pricing of oil. 
In 1960 the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) was 
formed by the oil-producing countries of West Asia and by Venezuela in an 
effort to increase their bargaining power with the oil companies. Following 
the Arab-Israeli War of 1973, the OPEC governments assumed control of the 
industry, including the setting of prices and rates of production. In most cases, 
oil production was nationalized.'' Obtaining a greater share of the revenues 
was a major factor in the drive for control by the oil countries. The revenues 
derived from this major industry have been devoted to modernizing the oil-
producing countries and have been used as a means for investing in the 
economies of the Western nations. This allocation has created an imbalance in 
the area's economy, both regionally and within individual countries. Several 
nations of West Asia have little (Syria and Yemen) or no oil (Israel, Jordan, 
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and Lebanon) wealth, others have extensive wealth derived from the 
production of oil products. Within the oil-rich countries, two distinct 
economies exist: a highly developed oil industry sector, and a marginal sector 
of farmers, unskilled workers, and minor industries. A concerted effort is 
being made to lessen these imbalances and to develop diversified economies. 
The ever-increasing demand for oil and the subsequent flow of wealth have 
given the oil-producing nations of West Asia significant world political and 
economic leverage. The US is partially dependent on West Asian oil, and 
Europe and Japan have established almost total dependence. The Russians 
have shown an increasing interest as well. Holding the majority of the world's 
proven oil reserves makes West Asia of major concern to all industrial 
nations. 
Historically since the times of ancient Mesopotamia, Egypt, and Anatolia, 
West Asia has always been of extraordinary geo strategic importance. This 
centrally located region stretches from Atlantic coast of North Africa to the 
western edge of Central Asia and lies between the southern littoral of the 
Mediterranean and north western shores of Indian Ocean. It should he clear 
why it was so strategically vital. When the "known world" was restricted to 
the Africa, Asia, and Europe land masses. This was because the West Asia 
contained or bordered on the land bridges, passage ways, and narrows- the 
Sinai Isthmus, the Caucasus, the Strait of Gibraltar, the Dardanelles, Babel 
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Mandeb, and the Strait of Hormuz- and the sheltered seas- the Mediterranean, 
the Black Sea, the Caspian Sea, the Red Sea, and the Persian-Arabian gulf 
that provided the best routes connecting the different extremities of the vast 
Eurasian/ African continent. In addition to that unique asset resulting from the 
location of this region, the land in the rich river valleys of Egypt and 
Mesopotamia, which came to be known for good reason as fertile crescent 
was so productive that, in the case of the Egypt it constituted the granary of 
empire from the Roman to Ottoman, and was an important source of cotton 
for the British and French textile industries well into the 20'" century's 
The West Asia was historically vital to inter and intraregional trade, 
manufacture the passage of armies and fleets, finance and the transit of people 
and ideas. The growth of the world's first cities was made possible by the 
wealth produced by the region's rich agriculture and most importantly because 
of its central position astride a series of important passage ways and choke 
points. It was thus not surprising that a sequence of major states and empires 
grew up in and around this region. These started with the first known states 
which produced some of the greatest empires in early human history, in 
Mesopotamia, Egypt and Anatolia, and continued through the apogee of 
Phoenician, Persian, Greek, Carthaginian, Roman, Byzantenian, and Islamic 
Empires. All of which aspired to dominate the West Asia, whether in terms of 
trade or conquest.23  
N 
However West Asia was not important just because it was conducive to 
entrepreneurship, wealth and opulence of the traders, merchants, artisans, and 
manufactures of the ancient world, because of the lengthy development of its 
urban civilizations, the power its centralized states, its vast natural wealth, and 
diversity, its geographical centrality, and the ease access to land through this 
region. But West Asia was also the cradle of important works of law, religion, 
sciences, and the arts, some of the greatest products of human mind and spirit. 
The three monotheistic religions and much of the sciences and philosophy, 
literature and art, of the ancient world originated here and spread throughout 
this region, and from here eventually to other parts of the world.2' 
West Asia was among the first areas of the world to develop civilization. Many 
empires sought control of the area because of its important location. It became 
a battleground from 3100 to 2500 B.C. when Egypt and Mesopotamia ruled 
the entire region. The area was dominated in turn by the Assyrians (910-612 
B.C.), the Persians (539-331 B.C.), the Romans (200 B.C.-100 A.D.), and 
again by the Persians (200 A.D.). The Arab conquest occurred in 630-640 
A.D. and was followed by the arrival of the first European Crusaders in 1097 
and the revival of Arab power in 1200. Mongol devastation of the region 
followed in the 1200s. The Ottoman Turks then ruled the region from the 
1500s to the early 1900s. It was during Muslim Caliphates of the Middle Ages 
that first unified the region as a distinct region and created the dominant ethnic 
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identity that persists today." Most of the countries in North Africa necame a. 
peripheral area to the main Muslim centers in West Asia. By 17th century, 
Europe had overtaken the Muslim world in wealth, population and—most 
importantly—technology. The balance of power had shifted decisively in 
favour of the west. And in the Balkan Wars of 1912-13 the Ottomans were 
driven out of Europe altogether, except for the city of Constantinople and its 
hinterland. By 19th century the Ottoman Empire was known as the "sick man 
of Europe', increasingly under the financial control of the European powers. 
Eventually, the French annexed Algeria in 1830 and Tunisia in 1878. The 
British occupied Egypt in 1882, though it remained under nominal Ottoman 
sovereignty. The British also established effective control of the Persian Gulf, 
and the French extended their influence into Lebanon and Syria. In 1912, the 
Italians seized Libya and the Dodecanese islands. just off the coast of the 
Ottoman heartland of Anatolia. The Ottomans turned to Germany to protect 
them from the western powers, but the result was increasing financial and 
military dependence on Gennany.26 
With the outbreak of World War I came the disintegration of Ottoman control 
of West Asia and the expansion of European influences. The Turks joined the 
side of the Central Powers (Germany and Austria-Hungary) in hopes of 
regaining and controlling some of the lost Ottoman provinces. Meanwhile, the 
Allied Powers (Britain, France, and Italy) encouraged the Arabs to revolt 
18 
against Turkish rule by promising them independence. The majority of World 
War I fighting in West Asia took place in the Arab provinces of the Ottoman 
Empire. Arab nationalists rose in revolt against the Turks and sought the aid of 
the British. The British responded with military and financial aid, along with 
promises of independence after the war. At the same time, however, the British 
were concluding secret treaties with their French, Italian, and Russian allies for 
the division of the Ottoman Empire. They were also negotiating with the 
leaders of the Zionist movement on the Palestine issue. In 1917 Britain issued 
the Balfour Declaration supporting in principle a national homeland in 
Palestine for the Jewish people.27 Post World War I peace settlements 
established a mandate system of British and French rule in preparation, it was 
promised, for eventual self-government in the conquered Arab provinces. Only 
in the Arabian Peninsula was Ottoman rule replaced by independent Arab 
governments. Initially, the Arabs in Syria and Iraq resisted the mandates but 
were forced into submission. At this point of West Asian history, with virtually 
the entire area under direct or indirect foreign rule, nationalist forces began to 
reverse the tide. Turkish nationalists defeated foreign and domestic opponents, 
forced the allies to negotiate a new peace treaty, and established a nationalist, 
secular republic. Persia (later renamed Iran) refused to ratify the British treaty 
of 1919. A military coup in 1921 overthrew- the Persian ruler and instituted a 
strongly nationalistic and modernizing regime the first shah of the Pahlavi 
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Dynasty of Iran. 
With the disintegration of Ottomans, Britain and France soon established 
control over West Asia and re-arranged it to suit themselves.28 Syria and 
Lebanon became French protectorates thinly disguised as a League of Nations 
Mandate. Iraq and Palestine became British mandated territories. Iraq became 
the "Kingdom of Iraq" and one of Sherif Hussain's sons, Faisal, was installed 
as the King of Iraq. The eastern half of Palestine became the "Emirate of 
Transjordan" to provide a throne for another of Hussain's sons, Abdullah. The 
western half of Palestine was placed under direct British administration. The 
already substantial Jewish population was allowed to increase. Most of the 
Arabian Peninsula fell to another British ally, Ibn Saud. Saud created the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1932. From about 1927 to 1935, a temporary 
calm prevailed between West Asian nationalism and European imperialism. 
Young Arab nationalism had failed to eject the "imperialists" and was 
therefore compelled to accept European control of Arab internal affairs. 
Although the imperial powers had conceded independence to Turkey and Iran 
and allowed the exercise of self-government by the Arab-speaking successor 
states of the Ottoman Empire, this was done with varying degrees of safeguard 
for the strategic and economic interests of the imperial powers. West Asia 
ceased to be a major source of international tension during this period except 
for Palestine where Jewish-Arab rivalry led to the start of violent outbreaks. In 
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1938 the British Government sought a settlement of the Palestine problem 
through a conference with the Jews, Palestinian Arabs, and representatives of 
other Arab states. In this time period, the advancing menace of war in Europe 
preoccupied the concerns of Britain. When the conference ended in a 
deadlock, the British issued a White Paper promising independence for 
Palestine in 10 years and limiting Jewish immigration to Palestine. The Jews 
denounced the White Paper as incompatible with the Balfour Declaration and 
the Palestine Mandate of 1917. World War II, however, pushed this issue aside 
until 1948.29 
During World War lithe majority of the countries of the region displayed little 
enthusiasm for participation in the war, preferring to remain neutral. Some of 
the countries declared war on the Axis powers when identity of the victors 
became evident. Their primary concern was gaining independence. By the end 
of World War 11, virtually all of West Asia had formal independence, but the 
British still had significant economic, political, and military influence in a 
number of Arab states. It was not until a new wave of more radical 
revolutionary governments, often led by the military, overthrew the 
conservative parliamentary and monarchical regimes that the special position 
of the British ended. Just after World War II the Palestinian issue came to a 
head. The Arabs and Zionist created a situation the British could neither 
resolve nor extricate themselves from. The rise to power of German dictator 
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Adolf Hitler in Germany had created a new urgency in the Zionist quest to 
immigrate to Palestine and create a Jewish state there.30 In 1947 the British 
turned the Palestinian problem over to the United Nations (UN). A UN special 
committee recommended ending the British mandate and partitioning Palestine 
into an Israeli and an Arab state. Although the majority of Arab countries 
rejected any idea of partition, the proposal obtained the necessary two-thirds 
majority in the UN General Assembly. As British forces were rapidly 
withdrawing in 1948, the Palestinian Arabs and the Israelis became locked in 
guerrilla warfare. The Palestinian Arabs were no match for the largely 
European-trained Jews, who not only gained independence for Israel, but 
ended up with more land than the UN had negotiated. A major outgrowth of 
the Arab-Israeli conflicts, and one of the most persistent problems that has 
continued to the present, is that of the Palestinian refugees. With no land to 
call hone, they have been displaced throughout various countries in West Asia 
in refugee camps. Militants among the refugees have formed guerrilla and 
terrorist groups known collectively as the fedayeen "men of sacrifice." Their 
primary goal is to prevent Israel and the Arab countries from negotiating a 
peace settlement that does not provide for a Palestinian homeland.`' 
Another turning point in the history of West Asia came when oil was 
discovered, first in Persia in 1908 and later in Saudi Arabia (in 1938) and the 
other Persian Gulf states, and also in Libya and Algeria. West Asia, it turned 
out, possessed the world's largest easily accessible reserves of crude oil, the 
most important commodity in the 20th century industrial world.32 It has been, 
particularly in the second half of the 20th century, of paramount economic 
importance to the world because of its vast oil resources. The region as well 
emerged as one of the conflict prone areas of the world. Prior to 1945 conflict 
took the form of world wars and the Ottoman suppression efforts. Since 1945 
at least 20 conflicts have occurred: 15 between West Asian nations and 5 
internal struggles. The major war happened in 1980s between Iran and Iraq 
with many implications for the region. The Iraqi occupation of Kuwait in 1990 
and the subsequent regional and international responses changed the political 
scenario with serious implications for the region and outside. The other issue 
which dominated the political discourse is the Palestinian problem. The Arab-
Israeli conflicts, with the participation of the majority of the surrounding Arab 
nations, have persisted throughout this period. Encouraging developments in 
the quest for peaceful solutions came about during the Camp David accords 
between Israel and Egypt. The contest for leadership of the Arab world and the 
search for some form of Arab unity have been effective only when the internal 
affairs of the individual nations have appeared to be affected by outside 
influences. Otherwise, the Arab nations have had little success in unity and 
have even resorted to warring among themselves on occasions. Issues of the 
past few decades have evolved around access to the oil regions, the Arab- 
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Israeli conflicts, and the pressures of the international system caused by the 
rivalry of interested powers. The single most obvious and worrisome issue, 
however, continues to be access to West Asian oil.33  
The rivalry between the former USSR and the West for influence in the area 
has placed this strategic crossroad of the world in the forefront of international 
tension. Several Arab nations have openly sided with the former USSR, while 
others sought to seek the aid and attention of the US. Soviet intervention in 
modern West Asian history stemmed from the World War II (WWII) era with 
its attempts to regain borderlands from Iran that were rebuffed by the US 
through the Truman Doctrine. The Soviets occupied the five northern provinces 
of Iran during WWII. After the war, the Shah tricked the Soviets into 
withdrawing and they were afraid of US/UK intervention should they attempt 
to reoccupy. After Khrushchev came to power, Soviet policy gradually became 
oriented to more active support of various West Asian nationalist regimes and 
to siding with the Arabs in their conflict with Israel. An underlying factor in 
former Soviet interests has always been a desire to cutoff NATO access to the 
oil and to secure warn water ports, not only for trading purposes but to support 
the ever-increasing and widely dispersed former Soviet Russian navy fleets. 
The invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviets was interpreted as the first stage in 
a new era of Soviet involvement in West Asian affairs. The USSR was 
abolished in December 1991 and the CIS was formed with Russia and the 
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Ukraine arguing over the control of the former Soviet fleet. CIS orientation 
toward West Asia is presently unclear and it needs to be seen if the CIS pursues 
farmer Soviet interests. It seeks to gain some influence in the region with its 
some support to Iran including Syria. However the Russia of the clay has been 
marginalized to play any influential and effective role in the region.34 
The fall of the Soviet Union and the collapse of communism in the early 1990s 
had several consequences for West Asia. It allowed large numbers of Soviet 
Jews to emigrate from Russia and Ukraine to Israel, further strengthening the 
Jewish state. It cut off the easiest source of credit, armaments and diplomatic 
support to the anti-western Arab regimes, weakening their position. It opened 
up the prospect of cheap oil from Russia, driving down the price of oil and 
reducing the West's dependence on oil from the Arab states. It discredited the 
model of development through authoritarian state socialism, which Egypt 
(under Nasser), Algeria, Syria and Iraq had followed since the 1960s, leaving 
these regimes politically and economically stranded turning them to Arab 
nationalism as a substitute for socialism. The region continues to exits with all 
its problems which make it potentially conflict prone. The region also remains 
dominated by the United States of America with no counter power to challenge. 
Though China tries to make inroads in the region, the US supremacy runs writ 
large with some opposition from regional players like Syria and Iran.15 
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Iranian position in West Asia: An Overview 
For centuries Iran has been referred to as Persia (Pars or Fars, a province in 
southern Iran) by the Europeans, mainly due to the writings of Greek 
historians. The country, however, has been known to people as Iran (land of 
the Aryans). In 1935 the Iranian Government specified that it should be called 
Iran. In 1949 it allowed both names to he used. However, since 1979, Iran is 
an Islamic Republic. Majority of the Iranian population is Muslims. It is about 
over 85 million. About 90% of Iranians are Muslims of the Shiite sect. The 
remainder, mostly Kurds and Arabs, are Sunnis. Iran's central position has 
made it a crossroads of migration, the population is not homogeneous, 
although it has a Persian core that includes over half of the people. 
Azerbaijanis constitute almost a quarter of the population. The migrant ethnic 
groups of the mountains and highlands, including the Kurds, Lurs, Qashgai, 
and Bakhtiari, are of the least mixed descent of the original Iranians. In the 
Northern provinces, Turkic and Tatar influences are evident, Arab strains 
predominate in the southeast. Iran has a large rural population, found mainly in 
agrarian villages, although there are nomadic and semi nomadic pastoralists 
throughout the country. The principal language of the country is Persian 
(Farsi), which is written in Arabic characters. Other languages are Turkic 
dialects, Turkish, Kurdish, Annenian, and Arabic. Among the educated 
classes, English and French are spoken.36 
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Iran is a country of mountains and deserts. Geographically it is bordered on the 
north by Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and the Caspian Sea, on the east 
by Afghanistan and Pakistan, on the south by the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of 
Oman, and on the west by Turkey and Iraq. The Shatt al Arab forms part of the 
Iran-Iraq border. The Iranian Plateau constitutes the heart of the country that is 
surrounded by the Zagros Mountains. The capital city, Tehran, lies in the 
southern slopes of the Elburz Mountains. It is the largest city and the political, 
cultural, commercial, and industrial center of the nation. Between the "core" of 
the West Asia and Central Asia and between Persian Gulf and Caspian Sea 
geographical position of Iran makes this country one of the most important 
political actor in this region. Iran controls the entire corridor between the 
Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf. It holds the most important military-
strategic position, at the same time being West Asian, Caucasian, Central-
Asian and Caspian state, washed by the waters of Persian and Oman Gulfs 
of the Indian Ocean." All the local pain spots are connected to Iran somehow. 
All of these problems could have been seemingly solved only with Iranian 
help: be it purely domestic problems of certain parts, ethnic, religious, 
military, economic, refugee or drug trafficking question, problems 
of terrorism. Iran is a heartland of the West Asia. Being situated between the 
Caucasus and the Indian Ocean, Iran is a strategic springboard, which, being 
controlled gives an ability to control the Gulf, Caspian area, Afghanistan and 
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Pakistan. It shows that Iran is the rupture-point in the chain of American 
outposts of the West Asia. Moreover, Strait of Hormuz, vital artery in the 
system of Arabic Oil transportation is situated in Iranian territorial waters. 
If this artery is blocked (which has actually happened before), about 40% 
of the global oil deliveries would be interrupted. Currently, existing alternative 
routes of oil transportation can compensate 53% of all tank transit through the 
Strait at most. This position of Iran in West Asia is of immense importance 
which in matters of the region cannot be overlooked. By virtue of its 
geographic location in the region it is bound to play a significant role.38  
Economically Iran is not very strong. However after the devastation of Iraq 
war it has rebuilt itself economically but still remains a weak one. In regional 
paradigm it is a strong economy. There are number of sectors which contribute 
it its economy. About 10% of the land in Iran is arable, agriculture contributes 
just over 20% to the gross national product and employs a third of the labor 
force. Of the variety of natural resources found in Iran, petroleum (discovered 
in 1908 in Khuzestan province) and natural gas are by far the most important. 
The chief oil fields are found in the central and southwestern parts of the 
Zagros Mountains, in west bran. Oil also is found in north Iran and in the 
offshore waters of the Persian Gulf. Domestic oil and gas, along with 
hydroelectric power facilities, provide the country with power. The petroleum 
industry is Iran's economic mainstay, oil accounts for 80% of export revenues, 
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and Iran is a member of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC). Major refineries are located at Abadan (site of the country's first 
refinery, built 1913), Kermanshah, and Tehran. Pipelines move oil from the 
fields to the refineries and to such exporting ports as Abadan, Bandar-e 
Mashur, and Khark Island. It is believed that [ran to have 10% of the world oil 
deposits and 15% of gas deposit. According to the explored oil deposits, Iran 
is on the 3rd 	4th position in the world. Total amount of oil at its territory 
is estimated to be around 370 billion barrels (50 billion tons). Total deposits 
of natural gas in Iran reached 33.1 trillion cubic meters. This makes Iran the 
second largest gas producer in the world right behind Russia. Extracted natural 
gas amount have grown from 12 trillion 750 billion cubic meters in March 
of 1978 to 29 trillion 610 billion cubic meters in March of 2008. As of 2010, 
Iran was on the fifth place in the list of world oil exporters. Textiles are the 
second most important industrial product, Tehran and Isfahan are the chief 
textile-producing centers. Besides crude and refined petroleum, Iran's chief 
exports are carpets, fruits, nuts, hides, and iron and steel, its chief imports are 
machinery, metals, military supplies, food, and chemicals. Iran's chief trading 
partners are Japan, Germany, and Italy. Khorramshahr, on the Shatl at Arab, is 
the country's chief general cargo port, Bandar-e Anzali is the chief Caspian 
port. These give Iran a strong economic hase.39 
Iran has a long and rich history. Some of the world's most ancient settlements 
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have been excavated in the Caspian region and on the Iranian plateau, village 
life began, there, 4000 BC. In around 2000 BC successive Indo-European 
(Aryans) invaders settled in Iran and were divided into various tribes, most 
famous of them were the Persians (Parsa), and the Medes (Mada). For more 
than half a century they ruled over a vast empire with borders stretching from 
Afghanistan to Turkey. The Persians achieved unity under the leadership of 
Achaemenes, whose descendant Cyrus brought the Achaemenian Empire onto 
the centre stage of world history. The conquest of Persia by Alexander's 
armies left the Persian army in disarray. The Greeks were then in possession of 
the ancient world from Egypt to Indus, and from Oxus to the Danube. 
Alexander followed a policy of integration between the Greeks and the Persian 
communities, encouraging marriages and applying the formula of 
magnanimity and generosity, which had formerly brought success to Cyrus 
II.40The Persian Empire founded (550 BC) by Cyrus the Great was succeeded, 
after a period of Greek and Parthian rule, by the Sassanid in the early 3d cent. 
AD and which stretched as far as the Indus. Their control was weakened when 
Arabs took (636) the capital, Ctesiphon, it ended when the Arabs defeated the 
Sassanid armies at Nahavand in 641.The conquest of Persia continued with the 
fall of Afghanistan (651) and then Transoxiana (674).'' With the invasion of 
Persia the Arabs brought Islam. The Turks began invading in the I 0th century 
and soon established several Turkish states. The Turks were followed by the 
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Mongols, led by Jenghiz Khan in the 13th century and'I'imur in the late 14th 
century. 
In 16'" century the Safavid dynasty (1502-1736) was founded by Shah Ismail, 
restored internal order in Iran and established the Shiite sect of Islam as the 
state religion, it reached its height during the reign (1587-1629) of Shah 
Abbas I (Abbas the Great). He drove out the Portuguese, who had established 
colonies on the Persian Gulf early in the 16th cent. Shah Abbas also 
established trade relations with Great Britain and reorganized the army. 
Religious differences led to frequent wars with the Ottoman Turks, whose 
interest in Iran was to continue well into the 20th cent. The fall of the Safavid 
dynasty was brought about by the Afghans, who overthrew the weak shah, 
Hussain, in 1722. An interval of Afghan rule followed until Nadir Shah 
expelled them and established (1736) the Afshar dynasty. After Nadir Shah 
assassination in 1747, the Afshar dynasty was followed by the Zand dynasty 
(1750-94), founded by Karim Khan. who established his capital at Shiraz and 
adorned that city with many fine buildings. His rule brought a period of peace 
and renewed prosperity. However, the country was soon again in turmoil, 
which lasted until the advent of Aga Muhammad Khan who established the 
Qajar dynasty (1794-1925). This long period saw Iran steadily lose territory to 
neighboring countries and fall under the increasing pressure of European 
nations, particularly czarist Russia. Under Fath Ali Shah (1797-1834), Persian 
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claims in the entire Caucasian area were challenged by the Russians in a long 
struggle that ended with the Treaty of Gulistan (1813) and the Treaty of 
Turkmanchai (1828), by which Iran was forced to give up the Caucasian lands. 
Herat, the rich city on the Hari Rud, which had been part of the ancient Persian 
Empire, was taken by the Afghans. A series of campaigns to reclaim it ended 
with the intervention of the British on behalf of Afghanistan and resulted in the 
recognition of Afghan independence by Iran in 1857.42 
The discovery of oil in the early 1900s intensified the rivalry of Great Britain 
and Russia for power over Iran. Internally, there was civil war between the 
rival Zand and Qajar factions. The Qajar monarchs were incapable of 
establishing a sound fiscal policy, and to compensate for this, they 
progressively disposed of Iran's economic resources to foreign powers in 
return for small sums of money that satisfied their immediate financial needs. 
Increasing dissatisfaction with the incompetence and corruption of the 
government together with resentment of foreign political and economic 
control, led to the formation and revolts by various secret societies and 
religious groups. This social unrest ultimately focused on the demand for a 
constitution, which was signed by Muzzaffer-ud-Din Shah on December 30'" 
1906. This led to the formation of the first "Majlis" (parliament). In October 
1907 the new king signed the Supplementary Fundamental Law. Together, the 
two documents funned the core of the Iranian Constitution. 43 Meanwhile, the 
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British-Russian rivalry continued and in 1907 resulted in an Anglo-Russian 
agreement (annulled after World War I) that divided Iran into spheres of 
influence. The period preceding World War I was one of political and financial 
difficulty. During the war, Iran was occupied by the British and Russians but 
remained neutral, after the war, Iran was admitted to the League of Nations as 
an original member. In 1919, Iran made a trade agreement with Great Britain 
in which Britain formally reaffirmed Iran's independence but actually 
attempted to establish a complete protectorate over it. After Iranian recognition 
of the USSR in a treaty of 1921, the Soviet Union renounced czarist 
imperialistic policies toward Iran, canceled all debts and concessions, and 
withdrew occupation forces from Iranian territory. In 1921, Reza Khan, an 
army officer, effected a military coup who subsequently (1925) elected 
hereditary shah, thus ending the Qajar dynasty and founding the new Pahlevi 
dynasty. Reza Shah Pahlevi abolished the British treaty, reorganized the army, 
introduced many reforms, and encouraged the development of industry and 
education. In August 1941, two months after the Gennan invasion of the 
USSR, British and Soviet forces occupied Iran when it refused to expel 
German nationals. They arrested and exiled Reza Shah, and took control of 
Iranian communications and railroad. However, the British and Soviet 
authorities constrained constitutional government and permitted Reza Shah's 
son, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, to succeed to the throne on September 
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16, 1941.'' During same time around American troop entered Iran to handle 
the delivery of war supplies to the USSR. In January 1942 Britain and Russia 
signed an agreement with Iran to respect Iran's independence and to withdraw 
their troops within six months after the end of the war. In 1943 Tehran 
Conference US reaffirmed this commitment. The USSR withdrew its troops in 
May 1946, this episode was one of the harbingers of the emerging Cold War. 
Iran's political system began to mature. Political parties were organized, and 
the 1944 Majlis elections were the first genuinely competitive elections in over 
20 years. In 1951, the National Front movement, headed by Premier 
Mussadiqh, a militant nationalist, forced the parliament to nationalize the oil 
industry, then controlled by Britain45 and form the Iran's own National Iranian 
Oil Company (NIOC). The British blockade led to the virtual collapse of the 
oil industry and serious internal economic troubles but Mussadiqh continued 
his nationalization policy. Openly opposed by the shah, Mussadiqh was ousted 
in 1952 but quickly regained power. The shah fled Iran but returned when 
monarchist elements forced Mussadiqh from office in August 1953 wit covert 
US activity which was largely responsible for Mussadigh's ousting. However 
he became a folk hero of Iranian nationalism. In 1954, Iran allowed an 
international consortium of British, American, French, and Dutch oil 
companies to operate its oil facilities, with profits shared equally between Iran 
and the consortium. Iran began to establish closer relations with the West, 
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joining the Baghdad Pact (later called the Central Treaty Organization), and 
receiving large amounts of military and economic aid from the United States 
until the late 1960s. Iran's pro-Western policies continued into the 1970s, 
however, opposition to such growing Westernization and secularization was 
strongly denounced by the Islamic clergy, headed by the Ayatollah Ruhollah 
Khomeini, who had been exiled from Iran in 1964. Internal opposition within 
the country was regularly purged by the Shah's secret police force (SAVAK), 
created in 1957. In the context of regional turmoil and the Cold War, the Shah 
established himself as an indispensable ally of the West. He suppressed and 
marginalized opponents with the help of Iran's security and intelligence 
organization, the SAVAK, using arbitrary arrest, imprisonment, exile and 
torture, and exciting profound and widespread discontent which rallied around 
the Ayatollah Khomeini."' 
In 1970s Iran's relations, especially in the economic sphere, were established 
with Communist countries, including the USSR. However, relations with Iraq 
were antagonistic for much of the late 1960s and early 1970s, in great part due 
to conflict over the Shatt al Arab waterway. A number of armed clashes took 
place along the entire length of the border. In April 1969, Iran voided the 1937 
accord with Iraq on the control of the Shatt al Arab and demanded that the 
treaty, which had given Iraq virtual control of the river, be renegotiated. In 
1971, Britain withdrew its military forces from the Persian Gulf Concerned 
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that Soviet-backed Arab nations might try to fill the power vacuum created by 
the British withdrawal, [ran increased its defense budget by almost 50%, and 
with the help of huge US and British defense programs, emerged as the 
region's strongest military power. Although Iran renounced all claims to 
Bahrain in 1970, it took control (November, 1971) of three small, Arab-owned 
islands at the mouth of the Persian Gulf. Iraq protested Iran's action by 
expelling thousands of Iranian nationals. In March, 1973, short of the end of 
the 25-year 1954 agreement with the international oil-producing consortium, 
the shah established the NIOC's full control over all aspects of Iran's oil 
industry, and the consortium agreed (May, 1973) to act merely in an advisory 
capacity in rctum for favorable long-tern oil supply contracts. In the aftermath 
of the Arab-Israeli War of October, 1973, Iran, reluctant to use oil as a 
political weapon, did not participate in the oil embargo against the United 
States, Europe, Japan, and Israel. However, it used the situation to become a 
leader in the raising of oil prices in disregard of the Tehran Agreement of 
1971. Iran utilized the revenue generated by price rises to bolster its position 
abroad as a creditor, to initiate domestic programs of modernization and 
economic development, and to increase its military power. Opposition to Shah, 
however, continued to grow to turn into an Islamic Revolution of 1979 
organized around Khomeini. An anarchic situation gripped Iran. It was soon 
plagued by ethnic unrest as Kurds, Arabs, Turkomens and other minorities 
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demanded varying degrees of autonomy. Shah fled Iran in the beginning of 
1979. Clerics delivered extremist and threatening speeches against the United 
States and against its Persian Gulf allies.47 Khomeini returned and led religious 
revolutionaries to the final overthrow of the shah's government on February 
l I, 1979.The new government represented a major shift toward conservatism. 
It nationalized industries and banks and revived Islamic traditions. Western 
influence and music were banned, women were forced to return to traditional 
veiled dress, and Westernized elites fled the country. A new constitution was 
written allowing for a presidential system, but Khomeini remained at the 
executive helm as Supreme Leader. The same year in November, Iranian 
militants seized the US Embassy in Tehran, taking 52 American hostages, 
Khomeini refused all appeals, and agitation increased toward the West with the 
Carter administration's economic boycott, the breaking of diplomatic relations, 
and an unsuccessful rescue attempt (April, 1980). The hostage crisis lasted 444 
days and was finally resolved on January 20, 1981, the day Ronald Reagan 
was inaugurated as US president a8. Nearly all Iranian conditions had been 
met, including the unfreezing of nearly $8 billion in Iranian assets. 
The following year in September (1980), Iraq invaded Iran primarily over the 
disputed Shalt al Arab waterway. Fighting crippled both nations, devastating 
Iran's military supply and oil industry, and led to an estimated 500,000 to one 
million casualties. Chemical weapons were used by both countries. Khomeini 
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rejected diplomatic initiatives and called for the overthrow of Iraq's president, 
Saddam Hussein. In November, 1986, US government officials secretly visited 
Iran to trade arms with the Iranians, in the hopes of securing the release of 
American hostages being held in Lebanon, because Iran had political 
connections with Shiite militants in Lebanon. On July 3, 1988, a US navy 
warship mistakenly shot down an Iranian civilian aircraft, killing all aboard. 
That same month, Khomeini agreed to accept a UN ceasefire with Iraq, ending 
the war.a9 
Iran immediately began rebuilding the nation's economy, especially its oil 
industry. Tensions also eased at that time with neighboring Afghanistan, as 
Soviet troops there began withdrawal (completed in 1989), after a presence of 
nearly 10 years. During the Soviet occupation, Iran had become host to nearly 
3 million Afghan refugees. Khomeini died in 1989 and was succeeded by 
Iran's president, Sayid All Khamenei. The presidency was soon filled by Ali 
Akhar Rafsanjani, who sought improved relations and financial aid with 
Western nations while somewhat diminishing the influence of fundamentalist 
and revolutionary factions and embarking on a military buildup. When Iraq 
invaded Kuwait in August, 1990, Iran adhered to international sanctions 
against Iraq. However, Iran condemned the use of US-led coalition forces 
against Iraq during the Persian Gulf War (1991), and it allowed Iraqi planes 
fleeing coalition air attacks to land in the country. As a result of the war and its 
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aftermath, more than one million Kurds crossed the Iraqi border into Iran as 
refugees. The United States suspended all trade with Iran in 1995, accusing 
Iran of supporting terrorist groups and attempting to develop nuclear weapons. 
Several European Union countries began renewing economic ties with Iran in 
the late 1990s. the United States, however, continued to block more 
normalized relations, arguing that the country had been implicated in 
international terrorism and was developing a nuclear weapons capacity.5O 
Iran has a long, creative and glorious history. It has been one of the richest 
and oldest cultures in the world. For more than three thousand years Persia was 
a inciting pot of civilizations and demographic movements between Asia and 
Europe. Under Cyrus the Great, it became the centre of the world's first 
empire. Successive invasions by the Creeks, Arabs, Mongols and Turks 
developed the nation's culture through rich and diverse philosophical, artistic, 
scientific and religious influences. Being located at the center of the world's 
largest pool of energy, it straddles prominently the global oil and natural gas 
checkpoints at the Strait of Hormuz. With over 9% of the globe's oil reserves 
and 15%-17% of worldwide reserves of natural gas, the hydrocarbons 
resources of the Gulfs most populous state are tremendous. It provides the 
cheapest and the shortest transit route at the heart of the ancient Silk Road for 
the transport of energy resources from the Caspian Sea basin to the world 
markets through the Persian Gulf, and it is the most populated country with 
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one of the largest industrial bases in the vast region stretching from the 
Caspian Sea to Eastern Mediterranean St Thus, over the past several decades, 
history, geography and natural resources have contributed to the rise of Iran 
as a prominent regional power despite the fact that it has faced the difficult 
moments of history. A vast land area, rich resources and strategic location 
impart to Iran a special standing in political calculations and greater scope to 
attain a genuine position as a regional power as compared with other countries, 
like Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. Iran's geo-politic, which links Asia to West 
Asia, Central Asia to the Persian Gulf and serves as a connecting point of tour 
sub-regions, is a strong point that can-not be denied by any regional and global 
power. This situation has long invited the interference and competition of 
foreigners seeking to put government they desire in power.'2 
By studying Iran's history it becomes observable that how Iranians have 
usually felt deeply affiliated to their national, social, ethnic and religious 
heritage. Iran's political and social movements in its contemporary history 
have been concentrated on keeping national sovereignty and independency. 
The Islamic Republic of Iran has emerged in recent years as the de facto leader 
of the West Asian region, which according to some western analysts also 
includes Syria and prominent non-state actors such as Hamas and Hezbollah 
that created anti-American camp. Notwithstanding its close security ties to the 
United States, Qatar has also aligned itself with the "resistance" camp on 
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some issues in recent years. And, the rise of the Justice and Development Party 
and declining military involvement in Turkish politics have prompted an 
intensification of Turkey's diplomatic engagement in West Asia, in ways that 
give additional strategic options to various actors in the "resistance" camp .53  
It is largely being perceived that the West Asia today is deeply divided 
between two camps a reality that some commentators describe as a new 
regional "Cold War'. On one side of this divide are those states willing to 
work in various forms of strategic partnership with the United States, with an 
implied acceptance of American hegemony over the region. This camp 
includes Israel, those Arab states that have made peace with Israel (Egypt and 
Jordan), and other so-called moderate Arab states (for example, Saudi Arabia 
and the rest of the Gulf Cooperation Council). On the other side of this divide 
are those West Asian states and non-state actors that are unwilling to 
legitimize American (and, some in this camp would say, Israeli) hegemony 
over the region.54 
Like the emergence of the West Asia's new Cold War, the Islamic Republic's 
rise has occurred during a still ongoing period of tectonic shifts in the region's 
strategic environment. These shifts include the effective collapse of the 
traditional Arab- Israeli peace process, the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the US 
invasion and occupation of Iraq, the rise of Hezbollah and Hamas as political 
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actors in their national and regional contexts, the assassination of former 
Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq al- Hariri, the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza 
and subsequent Israeli military campaigns in Lebanon and Gaza, structural 
changes in global energy markets and a tremendous transfer of wealth to major 
West Asian energy producers. All of these shifts are playing out against what 
is increasingly perceived, in West Asia and elsewhere, as a decline in 
America's relative power and influence. But notwithstanding these strategic 
gains, Iran continues to face serious national security and foreign policy 
challenges, both regionally and internationally.'5 Iran's geographical position, 
size, economic stature and military muscle give it the potential to play a 
leading or pivotal role in a number of regional configurations: the Persian 
Gulf, Greater Central Asia and the Caspian basin, and in the West Asia. The 
collapse of the Soviet Union gave rise to a new awareness in Iran of the 
possibilities presented by the combination of the country's strength relative to 
other West Asian states and its geographical location at the heart of the 
Eurasian continent. 
United States and the West Asia: An Overview 
The United States became heir to a complex relationship that developed 
between Islamic society and the West over a period of 14 centuries. Although 
the various Islamic empires that existed during that lengthy period were 
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sometimes allied with one or more European states, Islamic-western relations 
tended to be a story of conflict: the early Arab conquests after the emergence 
of the Islamic religion, the European-led crusades from the 11th to 13th 
centuries, the expansion of the Ottoman Turkish empire into southeastern 
Europe in the 15th and 16th, and the establishment of colonial or quasi-
colonial regimes over much of the Arab world by France, Britain, and to a 
lesser extent Italy in the 19th and early 20th. As Arab states acquired full 
independence following World War II, their citizens continued to harbor 
strong sensitivities over anything that suggested "western imperialism.— Iran, 
occupied by Britain and the Soviet Union during World War 11, retained 
similar sensitivities toward any form of interference from external powers. 
The United States, a latecomer to the West Asia, enjoyed a more favorable 
image in the region than did its European counterparts in the 19th and early 
20 k`' centuries. With the brief exception of the Barbary wars, the United States 
was not involved in any regional conflict and had no discernable colonial 
ambitions in the region. US visitors, mainly educators, travelers, and 
diplomatic envoys, were well received on the whole. A high point in regional 
perceptions of the United States may have been reached at the end of World 
War I, when inhabitants of the West Asia welcomed President Woodrow 
Wilson's call for self-determination and some of them saw in the United States 
a potential counterweight to the colonial ambitions of France and Britain.~6 
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This period of minimal US involvement in West Asia came to an end after 
World War 11, as the United States undertook expanded worldwide 
commitments and acquired three major interests in this region: maintaining 
access to the region's oil resources, blocking Soviet attempts to achieve 
hegemony, and safeguarding the security of the newly created state of Israel. 
Pursuit of these interests compelled the United States to become an active 
player in the regional affairs and adopt periodically conflicting policies that 
were sometimes resented in the region. US interests in the region continued to 
grow to extent that it became an indispensable player in the regional politics 
affecting the course of events there. Ever since 1945 the United States has 
enjoyed an effective strategic predominance over this region. In the pursuit of 
this strategic objective, the United States has not only promoted and supported 
the authoritarian and monarchial regimes in the region but did not hesitate in 
resorting to military interventions and even full scale wars like Gulf War I in 
1991 and Gulf War II in 2003 against Iraq to prevent regional hegemony 
emerging which might challenged its interests. The regional countries which 
became the close US ally to serve its strategic interests at one time or other 
have been Saudi Arabia from the very beginning. Egypt after 1978. Iran before 
1979 and many smaller nations like Gulf Sheikhdoms, Jordan, and Tunisia. 54 
The US continues to be vitally interested in the future of West Asia as it 
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continues to remain dependent on foreign energy resources and primarily on 
oil generated by the OPEC countries. The centerpiece of this organization is 
Saudi Arabia, by far the principal provider of US oil and the country which 
holds about 25% of the world's total proven reserves. The US Congressional 
Budget Office has estimated that the loss of Saudi Arabian oil for one year 
would reduce the gross national product (GNP) of the US by approximately 
$300 billion, increase our unemployment rate by 2% and radically accelerate 
US inflation. It would also impact severely on the economies of Europe and 
Japan. For these reasons the US and its allies have a vital strategic and national 
interest in the oil-producing countries of 'Vest Asia. Since the revolution in 
Iran, the political balance in West Asia has been in a state of flux except for 
the position of Saudi Arabia. This has increased the importance West Asia for 
the US. Sixty percent of the free world's oil supply is shipped through the 
Strait of Hormuz, and any threat to this flow could jeopardize world peace.58 
The US cannot afford to ignore these facts. The relationship of the US to the 
area will continue to be influenced by West Asian countries and the concern 
for possible Iranian, or outside intervention into West Asia that would be 
counter to vital US interests in the region. In this whole scenario the strategic 
position of Iran in the region and the role it has played in history and might 
play in future is of much significance for the events which might unfold in 
future. 
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~fA2xIE~,-II 
VS-Iran Wflations: 
ftep-1979 Pefiod 
US-IRAN RELATIONS: PRE- 1979 PERIOD 
The present history of international relations between the United States and 
Iran (formerly known as Persia and presently recognized as the Islamic 
Republic of Iran) is strain fully unfriendly and adversarial. However the 
relations between them have not always been this way and the two countries 
used to enjoy a positive and largely friendly relationship until up to 1979 
Islamic Revolution in Iran. In order to have an appropriate assessment and 
understanding of US-Iran Relations, the contours of their relationship 
historically have to be explored. 
Political relations between Persia (Iran) and the United States "began when the 
Shah of Persia, Nassiruddin Shah Qajar, officially dispatched Persia's first 
ambassador, Mirza Abolhasan Shirazi, to Washington D.C. in 1856.' Samuel 
Benjamin was appointed by the United States as the first official diplomatic 
envoy to Iranian 1883.2  However the non-official relations began before 1856. 
US citizens used to travel to Iran since the early-to-mid 1880s. The nature of 
their relationship in the beginning was socio-cultural and religious. As early as 
1829 the first American missionaries were sent to Rezaiyeh to work among the 
Christian Assyrians and were followed by others who preached Christianity 
and established churches. For this purpose Justin Perkins and Asahel Grant 
were the first missionaries to be dispatched to Persia in 1834 via the American 
Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions.3 More importantly, they built 
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schools and hospitals in Azerbaijan and other provinces. These early activities 
created base for subsequent educational and cultural relations between Iran and 
the United States in spite of Reza Shah's nationalist onslaught against foreign 
schools during the interwar period. They stimulated Iranian interest in the 
American educational system, have been followed during the 1960s and 1970s 
by the establishment of Iranian schools and colleges after American models, 
and have constituted the historical background for the education of many 
thousands of Iranian students in American institutions. During the I 970s, their 
number had reached the all time high of 15,000 students in the United States.4 
Amir Kabir, Prime Minister under Nasiruddin Shah, also initiated direct 
contacts with the US government. By the end of the 19th century, negotiations 
were underway for an American company to establish a railway system from 
the Persian Gulf to Tehran. The good will toward the United States created as 
the result of American private educational efforts was reinforced subsequently 
by W. Morgan Shuster's gallant resistance to Russian pressure in December 
1911 while in the service of the Iranian government, by the American 
championship of Iranian nationalist self-assertion against the Anglo-Iranian 
agreement of 1919, and by the American economic mission headed by Dr. A. 
C. Millspaugh during 1922-27, and by the sacrifice of I toward Baskerville in 
1909, who lost his life supporting the Constitutionalists during the 
Constitutional Revolution of 1905-1911 while fighting the Royalists and the 
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forces of the Qajar king, Mohammad All Shah's elite Cossack brigade and is 
remembered as saying: the only difference between me and these people is 
my place of birth, and this is not a big difference.''6This tradition of good will 
between the two countries fitted in well with a long established pattern of 
Iranian foreign policy, namely, preservation of Iran's independence by reliance 
on a third power as a lever against the encroachments of Britain and Russia. 
But the Iranian interest in involving the "distant and disinterested" United 
States in Iran in the early 1920s as a counterweight against the two rival 
powers failed to materialize largely because of American isolationist 
tendencies during the interwar period. 
The decade between the German invasion of Russia and the nationalization of 
the oil industry in Iran was on the whole marked by the reluctance of the 
United States to become too deeply involved in Iran on the one hand and the 
desire of Iran to involve the United States as deeply as possible on the other. 
Although Reza Shah's plea to President Franklin D. Roosevelt for American 
intercession against the Anglo-Russian invasion failed, the Iranian and 
American positions drew closer to each other subsequently. The United States 
responded sympathetically to the Iranian plea for British and Soviet assurances 
for Iran's territorial integrity and political independence, for evacuation of the 
Allied forces after the war, for consultation with Iran about the peace 
settlement, and for economic aid after the war as evidenced by Secretary 
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Cordell Hull's influence on the Tripartite'Ireaty (1942) between Iran on the 
one hand and the Soviet Union and Britain on the other, and by the decisive 
American role (particularly the part played by President Roosevelt) in the 
formulation of the Tehran Declaration (1943)' 
More importantly, the United States moral support of the Shah's government 
against blandishments and pressures of the Soviet Union for oil concessions in 
1944, and particularly the American diplomatic support of Iran within and 
outside the United Nations in favor of the evacuation of Soviet troops from 
northern Iran and against the Soviet interference in Iran's domestic affairs in 
1945-46 left indelibly favorable imprints on the relations of Iran and the 
United States. Whether or not President Truman in fact did give Stalin an 
"ultimatum" to withdraw Soviet troops from Iran, the fact still remains that the 
role of the United States in bringing about that result was decisive. Iran's quest 
for American involvement transcended efforts at the diplomatic level. Every 
Iranian government sought to expand relations with the United States in 
military, technical and economic fields as well, in spite of opposition by the 
Soviet Union and by an odd mixture of domestic forces including some of the 
nationalists, communists, merchants and members of the landed aristocracy. 
The failure of Dr. Millspaugh's second mission was rooted not only in the 
opposition by these forces, but also in the ambivalent attitude of the United 
States government toward the American economic mission."Until World War 
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II, relations between Iran and the United States remained cordial. As a result, 
many Iranians sympathetic to the Persian Constitutional Revolution came to 
view the US as a "third force" in their struggle to break free of British and 
Russian dominance in Persian affairs. American industrial and business leaders 
were supportive of Iran's drive to modernize its economy and free itself from 
British and Russian influence. 
The American ambivalence toward involvement in Iran was more graphically 
revealed by the United States' negative attitude toward Iran's repeated requests 
for credits during the crucial period between the Azerbaijan and oil 
nationalization crises. Under Secretary of State Acheson feared that if 
generous American aid was not forthcoming Iran might be dominated by the 
Soviet Union or divided into spheres of influence between Britain and the 
Soviet Union. But Washington. in Acheson's words, followed a "narrow 
concept" of economic policy toward Iran with the result that Premier Qavam's 
repeated requests and the Shah's own visit to the United States in 1949 
produced only a meager S25 million credit from the Export- Import Bank, one-
tenth of the Iranian request. To be sure, the reluctance to pour "money down a 
rat hole" disinclined the United States to extend substantial and prompt aid to 
corrupt elites anywhere, but the Kuomintang analogy was probably a less 
significant factor in the case of Iran than the American preoccupation with 
Western Europe at the time. Iran had to await the mid 1950s when the 
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American concept of security was extended beyond the NATO alliance to 
include the West Asia and when the United States was prepared to pay 
economically, as well as militarily, for creating an alliance system including 
Iran. In the meantime, the American failure to support Iran financially 
contributed to the complex of factors that led to the nationalization of the oil 
industry.9 
Ironically the path toward greater American involvement in Iran that the Shah 
had sought was paved by his rival Premier Muhammad Mussaddiqh. The 
veteran nationalist leader and his supporters had advocated within and out-side 
the :Vajli.s the doctrine of "negative equilibrium" in Iranian foreign policy 
before the nationalization of the oil industry. His opposition to the Soviet 
demand for oil concessions in 1944 was balanced by a crusade against the 
British subsequently. The doctrine of negative equilibrium theoretically 
disallowed reliance on any great power, including the United States. But in 
practice, Dr. Mussaddiqh, as his predecessors, relied during the early phase of 
the nationalization dispute with Britain and Washington as evidenced by his 
acceptance of the Harriman mediation, the extension of the American Point 
Four program and American military aid.10This contradiction between theory 
and practice subjected him to severe criticism by the communists as well as 
purist members of the National Front. 
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During the earlier decade the American attitude toward the Mussaddiqh 
government diverged from the British. According to Eden, the United States 
had believed that "the only alternative to Mussaddiqh was Communist rule," 
whereas Eden himself felt that if Mussaddiqh fell, his place "might well be 
taken by a more reasonable Government." Eden's success in narrowing the gap 
between the American and British positions subsequently led to the hardening 
of the American attitude. The United States limited aid to Iran as well as 
insubstantial technical assistance, in spite of grave economic problems facing 
the nation, dealt the crucial blow to the Mussaddiqh government. President 
Eisenhower's letter of June 29, 1953, flatly rejected Dr. Mussaddigh's urgent 
request for financial aid. his opportunity to play the United States against 
Britain and the two Western powers against the Soviet Union and the Tudeh 
party therefore disappeared as the American and British positions became 
nearly identical. Dramatic changes in the international system in general and in 
Iranian particular lay back of the American receptiveness to the British 
determination to bring down the government of Dr. Musaddigh. During the 
war the principal American interests in Iran had been (I) to aid the prosecution 
of the war against Germany, and (2) to help Iran maintain its independence and 
territorial integrity vis-a-vis Britain and particularly the Soviet Union. After 
the war the American interest in the preservation of Iranian independence 
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continued, but, as seen, preoccupation with the re-building of Western Europe 
overshadowed American concern with I ran." 
The oil nationalization crisis deepened American interest in Iran. By the time 
of the crisis the two poles of the international system had emerged sharply. 
The Cold War between Washington and Moscow intensified in the wake of the 
Communist takeover in Czechoslovakia, the Berlin Blockade, the Communist 
victory in China and the Communist aggression in Korea. The principal 
considerations underpinning the American concern in Iran were: 
(1) that the Anglo-Iranian controversy might lead to the stoppage of the 
flow of oil to Western European allies of the United States, 
(2) that the example of Iranian nationalization might have an adverse effect 
upon the United States oil interests in the Persian Gulf area, 
(3) that the British departure from the south of Iran would mean the 
diminution of Western influence in the area, and 
(4) that a breakdown of the Iranian economy in the face of turbulent 
domestic politics, particularly resulting from increasing Tudeh 
influence, might drive Iran to a "Communist coup d'etat" 
This last consideration was specifically related to the overall American interest 
in the containment of the Soviet Union and Communism. President Truman 
claimed that the United States had "no selfish interest" in the oil dispute, but 
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George McGhee, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern, South Asian and 
African Affairs, believed that quite apart from oil Iran was a "great and 
strategic prize," the control of which would put "the Soviet Union outside the 
communication routes connecting the free nations of Asia and Europe."t2 The 
United States as the leader of "free nations" did have strategic interests in Iran. 
As the result of the settlement of the oil nationalization dispute in 1954, 
however, the American strategic interest in Iran was matched by the 
emergence of direct American interest in Iranian oil. For the first time the 
United States oil interest cut across the Persian Gulf, encompassing the two 
great clusters of oilfields on the Arab and Iranian sides of the strategic 
waterway. For the first time also the Shah's government finally succeeded in 
deepening the American stake in Iran, but the result was quite different from 
what it would have been if American involvement had taken place in the early 
1940s. The difference was largely because of the changed international power 
con-figuration. The United States became involved in Iran not as a counter-
weight to Britain and Russia, but as the predominant superpower and the 
partner of Britain in a global East-West conflict. The rigid bipolar international 
system left no real room for a third great power on which Iran could rely to 
counterbalance the British and Soviet power. And the Shah's own traumatic 
experience with the Soviet-supported communist bid for the destruction of his 
regime in August 1953 seemed to foreclose at the time any other real option. 
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As seen from Tehran there was no viable alternative to an alliance with the 
West just as there seemed to be any better solution for the settlement of the oil 
dispute than entrusting the control of the oil industry to a consortium of 
Western oil companies? To be sure, this fell far short of Inns long-held 
aspiration for full control of its oil industry, but given the continued 
predominance of Western companies in international oil markets and Iran's 
own limited technical, financial and managerial capabilities, the arrangement 
with the consortium seemed to be the least of all evils under the circumstances. 
There was little doubt in the minds of Iranian leaders in 1954 that the 
cherished goal of control of the oil industry must be realized as soon as 
favorable circumstances would allow. As it happened, however, Iran had to 
wait nearly 20 more years before it could make a new bid for the control of its 
oil industry. In the meantime the Shah set the goal of transforming the 
National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) into an "integral international oil 
company" toward the long run goal of its becoming capable of running the 
industry when the time come.t3  
American penetration of the Iranian oil industry and Iran's alliance with the 
United States through the Baghdad Pact (1955), endorsement of the 
Eisenhower Doctrine, and a bilateral defense agreement (1959) were paralleled 
by unprecedented American aid to and investment in Iran. Although the 
beginnings of American technical-military and economic aid to Iran could be 
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traced back to World War II, massive aid began only after the downfall of the 
Mussaddiqh government. Until 1953 total American economic and military aid 
to Iran amounted to less than $30 million, whereas between 1953 and 1970 it 
exceeded $2.300 billion.'4 Besides aid, American investment in Iran began to 
climb rapidly only after American participation in the oil industry and the 
emergence of an US-Iran alliance. Investment by American firms had begun 
before, but the protection accorded them in 1955 by means of a comprehensive 
treaty between Washington and Tehran was unprecedented. Iran accepted, 
apparently without qualms, the American version of international law 
requirements that in case of expropriation or nationalization the compensation 
paid must be "prompt, adequate and effective." As a result American 
investment in Iran increased substantially, reaching a level of over $1 billion 
by 1975.'' 
The rigidity of the bipolar international system and its effect on the character 
of the US-Iran alliance allowed Iran little maneuverability in the conduct of its 
foreign policy. For example, Iran did try to settle outstanding financial and 
boundary problems with the Soviet Union in the 1950s, but as a matter of fact 
it had only limited success. The pre-nationalization Soviet- Iranian cold war 
was intensified after Iran's accession to the Baghdad Pact, and reached a new 
peak after the breakdown of Soviet-Iranian negotiations (1958-1959) for a 
non-aggression pact and the conclusion of an Iran-US defense agreement. On 
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two separate occasions afterwards Khrushchev attacked the Shah personally, 
charging that his agreement with the United States was to protect his throne 
against the Iranian people. Iran's regional relations fared no better. The Cairo-
Tehran cold war that intensified with Iran's participation in the Baghdad Pact 
culminated in the rupture of diplomatic relations between Egypt and Iran in 
1960. The "Arab Cold War" was matched by the Arab-Iranian cold war and 
the latter more than the former ebbed and flowed largely according to the 
vicissitudes of Soviet-American rivalry in the West Asia.16 
Overextension of American power and overdependence of Iran on the United 
States within the context of a rigid bipolar international system began to 
change increasingly in the 1960s with significant implications for US-Iran 
relations. In spite of increasing oil revenues and continued American aid, the 
Iranian economy was in the grip of rising prices, falling exchange reserves, 
pervasive waste, inefficiency and widely acknowledged corruption. The so-
called reform government of Dr. Amin finally collapsed under the pressure of 
a budgetary deficit of some $70 million. The Kennedy Administration was 
critical of the lack of basic socio-economic reforms and the heavy burden of 
the Iranian military establishment. Its refusal to bail out the Amin government 
partly contributed to its fall. The Shah's launching of the land reform 
programme was hailed by President Kennedy, it signaled the first of a six point 
reform program, labeled the "White Revolution" by the Shah's regime. Despite 
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pessimism in Iran and abroad, the combination of reform measures and 
particularly an economic stabilization program led to a significant upturn in 
the Iranian economy and the termination of direct American economic 
assistance to Iran in 1967. According to President Johnson, the termination of 
the aid program was "a milestone in Iran's continuing progress and in (US-
Iran) close relations."7 Not many years before 1967 the American military and 
economic aid programs in Iran had been regarded generally both in Iran and 
the United States as one of the "more inefficient and corrupted of American 
overseas aid efforts," but now the New York Times declared that Iran had 
reached "the take-off point."'g 
This remarkable beginning in Iran's economic recovery in the 1960s continued 
into the 1970s. For years before the explosion of oil prices Iran's increase in 
GNP in real terns averaged above 11 per cent. And after the sudden increase 
in oil prices it hit the spectacular rate of 42 per cent in 1974. The Fifth 
Development Plan (1973-78) envisaged at first$69.6 billion expenditure, but it 
had to be scaled down subsequently partly as the result of the drop in oil 
revenues to $17 billion instead of the $20 billion predicted. The slowdown in 
spending, however, is also aimed at cooling the "overheated economy," that 
has resulted from the fast pace of development, and at fighting inflation which 
has been running at the rate of about 20 per cent.'9 
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The two economic problems of continuing concern to American friends of Iran 
are the fast pace of development and the vial-distribution of wealth. Iranian 
planners argue that (1) the overheating problem is not as great as it would 
seem considering the sudden rise of income from $5 to 20 billion, (2) that the 
determination of "absorptive capacity" of the economy is a difficult "empirical 
problem," and (3) that Iran has been "bold," but not necessarily" adventurous" 
in plotting its economic development. Regarding the mal distribution of wealth 
problems the basic Iranian argument is that Iranian planners are aware of the 
problem, are working toward overcoming it by a variety of means including 
the allowance of workers' purchase of shares in factories up to 49 per cent, and 
that there is a real difficulty in avoiding economic imbalances of this kind in 
the current stage of Iran's economic development. Perhaps a more serious 
problem of daily concern to the masses is food shortages. In spite of progress 
in land reform and associated programs in rural cooperatives and farm 
corporations the problem of low productivity continues to haunt Iran.20 
In spite of the persistence of these and other economic problems the point of 
interest here is that not only has the Iranian economy continued to grow 
rapidly since the termination of the American aid program, but also that 
growth has (a) increased Iran's economic cooperation with the United States 
and (b) assisted parallel American interests in West Asia and South Asia. The 
single most significant agreement for economic cooperation between the two 
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countries was signed in March 1975, calling for $15 billion of non-oil trade 
including the sale of eight nuclear power plants to Iran. Although $5 billion of 
the total was the estimate of the value of American military sales to Iran over 
five years, the agreement envisaged significant economic activities including 
the establishment of an integrated electronics industry, the building of a major 
port, joint ventures to produce fertilizers, pesticides, farm machinery and 
processed foods, superhighways and vocational training centers. At the time of 
the signing of the agreement the United States also pledged cooperation to help 
Iran in setting up a financial center in Tehran for the West Asian region.`'' 
The consistent efforts of Iran at economic cooperation with Egypt, Syria and 
other countries cut across the Persian Gulf and the Arab-Israeli zones in the 
area. In the Gulf area Iran's medical assistance to 'Ajman, Fujayrah and Dubai 
and its commercial and economic efforts at cooperation with other Gulf states 
complement similar American activities during the 1960s and 1970s. More 
important, Iran's economic assistance to Egypt parallels American interest in 
assisting the process of economic liberalization and stabilization in that 
country. On the economic side it suffices to state here that its billion dollar 
agreement with Egypt in 1974 is to help finance the reconstruction of Port Said 
at the northern end of the Suez Canal, the widening of the canal, and the 
establishment of numerous joint ventures with Egyptian firms.22 
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The fourfold increase of oil prices during the 1970s introduced the most 
serious economic issue between Iran and the United States, Iran has been 
among the OPEC members favoring high oil prices. Iran's decision in 1976 to 
cut the official price of heavy crude was in full conformity with OPEC policy 
and practice. What is of interest, however, is the fact that in spite of the 
persistence of the controversy Iran and the United States have not so far 
allowed it to disturb their basic friendly relations. The principal reason for this 
is the overriding importance of the new form of their common interest in 
regional security and stability. 
However. Iraq's membership in the Baghdad Pact exacerbated the ancient 
Cairo-Baghdad differences, produced adverse effects within the Arab League, 
and at the same time placed Iraq in the camp of Secretary Dulles's "Northern 
"I'ier" states of Iran, Turkey and Pakistan. Iran's membership in the pact 
intensified Cairo-Tehran antagonism, pitted Damascus against Tehran, and 
simultaneously placed Iran, together with Saudi Arabia and Lebanon, in the 
camp of "reactionary" states. The destruction of the monarchy in Iraq in 1958 
and the subsequent defection of Iraq from the Baghdad Pact Organization 
(since then Central Treaty Organization or CENTO) marked the beginning of 
the processes of change in American and Iranian security interests in the 
Persian Gulf area. Iran and the United States had perceived the Soviet threat to 
the region primarily in terns of direct, overland and southward pressures 
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exerted against Northern Tier states, and by virtue of Turkey's membership in 
the Atlantic alliance, against the southern flank of NATO. Increasing Soviet 
rapprochement with the new regime in Baghdad, added to the Soviet arms 
sales to Egypt since 1955, increased the concern of the regional members of 
CENTO with its viability as a regional security organization. The United 
States willingness to sign three bilateral agreements with Iran, Turkey and 
Pakistan did little to overcome their security concern because the American 
undertakings in fact did not amount to increased commitments to their 
defense 23 
Iran's traditional dissatisfaction with American nonparticipation in the 
Baghdad Pact was intensified by the United States reluctance in the 1959 
bilateral agreement to go beyond its commitment under the Eisenhower 
Doctrine. The swift events of the 1960s and early 1970s added further to Iran's 
regional security concerns. The negative American attitude toward aid to 
Pakistan during its 1965 conflict with India lay back of the emerging 
conviction in Iran in the early 1970s that CENTO was a "nice club" for 
discussing economic projects but was "not an effective alliance," and hence 
Iran had to rely increasingly on its own strength for defense. In the meantime 
other regional developments contributed to Iran's security concern beyond its 
eastern flank in South Asia. American preoccupation with the war in Vietnam 
continued to raise doubts about the wisdom of reliance upon the United States 
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for security in regions of immediate concern to Iran. The British withdrawal 
from Aden in 1967 and the announcement in 1968 of the British decision to 
withdraw forces from the area "east of Suez" in 1971 intensified Iran's security 
concern in the Persian Gulf area. 
Iranians believed that Iraq's defection from the Baghdad Pact had removed it 
as a buffer against the anti-Shah regimes in Cairo and Damascus, had brought 
the threat of Arab radicalism to Iran's doorstep, and, more important, had 
brought Soviet influence to the Gulf. The British withdrawal from the Gulf in 
view of the dim prospects at the time for a new regional security arrangement 
seemed to expose the lower part of the Gulf and the strategic Strait of Honnuz 
to potential disruption. Iran's occupation of the islands of Abu Musa and the 
two Tunbs just before the British departure was followed by the ex-tension of 
the Iranian security perimeter to the Gulf of Oman and the Indian Ocean. Iran 
had watched with alarm the escalating Soviet naval visits to the Gulf ever 
since 1968, but the dismemberment of Pakistan as the result of the 1 97 1 war 
with India, the building of Soviet port facilities at Umm Qasr in Iraq, and the 
Soviet-Iraqi treaty of economic and political cooperation drew Iran's attention 
to the maritime spheres lying beyond the Gulf. In principle the Shah wished to 
see the Indian Ocean immune from superpower rivalry, but he favored an 
American presence in Diego Garcia so long as the Soviets had a naval 
presence there. 
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Developments in the Arab-Israeli conflict in the 1960s and early 1970s also 
began the processes of change in the Iranian conception of regional security 
with important implications for US-Iran relations. The Arab-Iranian rifts began 
to undergo dramatic changes with the Arab-Israeli war of 1967. To be sure, the 
prewar Iran-Israeli relations continued after the war, but a number of factors 
worked toward drawing Egypt and Iran closer together. Egypt's interest in 
undermining Iran-Israeli ties, in Arab and non- Arab oil money, and in 
pressuring Iraq by favoring Iran made President Nasir more receptive to 
mediation efforts of such countries as Kuwait for the resumption of diplomatic 
relations with Iran. Iran's interest in countering the enmity of the al-Bakr 
regime by reestablishing relations with Egypt, in neutralizing Soviet influence 
in Egypt, in encouraging Egyptian withdrawal from Yemen, in welcoming 
Egypt's increased interest in resorting to diplomacy as a peaceful means of 
settling the conflict with Israel, and in mollifying Egyptian opposition to its 
prospective occupation of the three Gulf islands were important considerations 
in softening the Iranian attitude toward Egypt. But Egypt's receptivity to the 
American initiative and finally the acceptance of the Rogers Plan were 
probably most influential in moderating the Iranian attitude in favor of Egypt. 
It was no coincidence that President Nasir and the Shah resumed diplomatic 
relations after a decade in 1970. Nor was it a coincidence that in the October 
1973 war Iran called for Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories, as it had 
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done previously, airlifted medical supplies to Jordan, sent pilots and planes to 
Saudi Arabia to help with logistical problems, and permitted the overflight of 
some Soviet planes supplying the Arabs. Iran has steadfastly supported 
Secretary of State Kissinger's peace mission in the West Asia, and has 
accepted the great responsibility of sending peacekeeping forces to the Arab-
Israeli zone of conflict as part of the United Nations Disengagement Observer 
Force.24 
Thus the convergence of American and Iranian interest in regional security and 
stability extends beyond the Persian Gulf area. Iran and the United States had 
common interests not only in the uninterrupted flow of oil from the Persian 
Gulf through the Gulf of Onian and the Indian Ocean to world markets, but 
also in encouraging forces of moderation and in neutralizing Soviet influence 
in the West Asia on the one hand, and in achieving a peace settlement between 
the Arab states and Israel on the other. Toward the achievement of these 
common objectives the United States has sought to assist in building up a 
"credible deterrent" by means of massive arms sales to Iran. The rigid bipolar 
international system during the 1950s had entailed overextension of American 
power in the world, overdependence of Iran on the United States, and 
overreliance of both upon an inflexible alliance. 
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As the result of Soviet nuclear parity, the rise of centers of economic power in 
Japan and Western Europe, the rebellion of De Gaulle within the Atlantic 
alliance, the "Osrpolitik" of Brandt, the SALT talks, the Chinese nuclear tests, 
the Sino-Soviet dispute, and the disastrous war in Vietnam, the United States 
began, in the 1960s, to perceive increasingly the emergence of a more flexible 
and complicated international system. The Nixon Doctrine took note of these 
new realities. Under it, the United States would honour its commitments to 
allies like Iran, would defend it if threatened by a nuclear power and at the 
some time would expect other nations, including Iran, to "assume greater 
responsibilities, for their sake as well as ours." This has made Iran a "Nixon 
Doctrine ideal' as it is apparently willing to defend parallel American interests 
in regions of immediate concern to Iran by reliance upon its own strength in 
situations short of nuclear war. To that extent American assistance to the 
Iranian military buildup is in effect to avoid direct involvement of the United 
States in the Gulf region"' 
US-Iran on Nuclear Issue: 
Long before their current nuclear crisis, the United States and Iran overcame 
concerns about proliferation and sovereign rights to negotiate a nuclear accord. 
Despite the attention given to recent Iranian nuclear activities, Tehran's 
interest in nuclear technology began in the years preceding the 1979 Islamic 
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Revolution when Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi sought a "full-fledged 
nuclear power industry," with the capacity to produce 23,000 megawatts of 
electricity, as part of his ambition to turn Iran into a powerful modern state. 
While the Shah professed not to want nuclear weapons, he was steadfast in 
Iran's "right" to the full complement of nuclear fuel cycle technologies. The 
newly created Atomic Energy Organization of Iran concluded nuclear deals 
with France and West Germany, but its dealings with the United States 
progressed slowly: Tehran proposed to purchase eight light water reactors 
from such US suppliers as General Electric and Westinghouse, while the US 
government encouraged the Shah to invest hundreds of millions of dollars in a 
US-based uranium enrichment plant being proposed by the Bechtel 
Corporation*26 
The Nixon administration had aligned itself closely with the Shah, his 
dictatorial rule and human rights abuses notwithstanding, so it did not help 
matters those only weeks after the Indian test, the Shah made statements that 
raised questions about Iran's nuclear intentions. When asked whether Iran 
would pursue nuclear weapons during an interview with a French journalist, 
the Shah was quoted as saying, "Certainly and sooner than one would think."Z' 
Iranian officials quickly denied the statement, suggesting, "I its Imperial 
Majesty actually said Iran is not thinking of building nuclear weapons but may 
revise its policy if other non-nuclear nations do." The Shah later confirmed 
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this position to a Le .blonde reporter, when he ridiculed the nuclear arms race 
and observed that if other nations in the region acquired nuclear weapons, 
"then perhaps the national interests of any country at all would demand the 
same."Zx 
The US ambassador to Iran and former director of central intelligence, Richard 
Helms, was satisfied with these corrections. In a cable to the State Department, 
lie wrote, "I want to emphasize to you personally that there has been no change 
in Iran's declared policy not to acquire nuclear weapons...29 But Defense 
Department and CIA officials were not certain about what the future held. 
Officials at the Pentagon's Office of International Security Affairs observed 
that in light of the Shah's "caveats" about changing circumstances, "It is 
inevitable that some in the press and the public will interpret an agreement to 
supply nuclear fuels as assistance toward a nuclear capability." CIA analysts 
further suggested, "If Iran has a full-fledged nuclear power industry and all the 
facilities necessary to make nuclear weapons (by the 1980s), and if other 
countries have proceeded with nuclear weapons development, we have no 
doubt that Iran will follow suit." Later accounts confirmed these suspicions. 
The diary of the Shah's minister of court, which was published in 1993, 
recounts that the Shah "has a great vision for the future of this country which, 
though he denies it, probably includes our manufacturing a nuclear 
deterrent. 
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Today, the international community is most concerned about Iran's effort to 
enrich uranium, but in the 1970s, the US government and others were most 
concerned about the Shah's interest in a domestic reprocessing facility. At that 
time, reprocessing did not have significant commercial potential, but it did 
enable scientists to recover plutonium from nuclear fuel once it had been used 
in a power reactor, and that plutonium could be used to manufacture nuclear 
weapons. During fall 1974, by which time Ford was the President, senior US 
officials recommended a general approach to nuclear negotiations with Iran. 
Trying to balance nonproliferation concerns with the priority of maintaining 
good relations with the Shah, they favored a position that was not so "strong" 
that it would encourage him to buy nuclear technology elsewhere, but not so 
"weak" that Congress would reject it. Of the four options for negotiating with 
Iran, State bureau chiefs recommended that Kissinger approve the second 
toughest, which would provide Washington with "veto rights" on how Tehran 
would deal with US supplied nuclear spent fuel, allowing the United States 
either to insist on "external processing and storage" of spent fuel or to set 
standards "for internal disposition and possible construction of a multilateral 
reprocessing plant." While these provisions might alienate the Shah and other 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) signatories, the officials suggested 
that US could take the position that it was setting a "new standard" for future 
agreements.31  
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Kissinger signed off on the recommended option, but it would undergo 
additional scrutiny before Ford approved a negotiating position. In early spring 
1975, before the Shah's scheduled May visit to Washington, Kissinger 
presided over an interagency review to determine the best possible approach to 
the reactor sale, one that would optimally balance proliferation "principles and 
objectives" with the swift conclusion of an agreement and the resulting nuclear 
exports. Agency representatives saw a "serious dilemma" in dealing with Iran 
because they wanted to impose tighter restrictions than US had required in 
other nuclear agreements. Recognizing that an "overly receptive US reaction" 
to Iranian interest in reprocessing "could detract from any efforts to discourage 
such developments" in Pakistan and elsewhere, agency officials believed it 
was important to seek a virtual veto of reprocessing US-supplied reactor fuel. 
Because US agencies saw the negotiations with Iran as a potential model for 
future understandings with other countries, they wanted to persuade Tehran to 
accept restrictive terms and not feel that US was abruptly taking a 
discriminatory approach on reprocessing, a possibility that worried Helms.32 
After reviewing a number of options, ranging from a veto over reprocessing to 
allowing Iran to "perform reprocessing" with adequate safeguards, Kissinger 
signed a National Security Decision Memorandum on April 22, 1975.;' The 
initial negotiating position on reprocessing outlined by the memorandum 
would be firm: "Continue to require US approval for reprocessing of US 
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supplied fuel," with the establishment of a multinational reprocessing facility 
an "important factor" for securing such approval. As a fallback position, the 
US would approve reprocessing of US material, even if it did not supply the 
technology and equipment, as long as the supplier was a "full and active 
participant in the plant." and the possibility of US involvement should be 
"open." Mutual agreement on '`safeguard ability" was essential. These 
positions were consistent with Helms's suggestion that Washington work for a 
tacit veto by acquiring "a voice in management decisions" in a reprocessing 
plant.i' 
When talks between US and Iran began in late April 1975, the Shah's 
representatives wanted more give on reprocessing. The Iranian negotiators 
reasoned that if Tehran made a "strenuous" effort to develop a multinational 
facility, but failed to get a supplier involved. Iran should not be penalized. The 
US response was that good intentions weren't enough: "The added assurances 
against proliferation which accompany supplier involvement depend on its 
actually being achieved."35 The concept of a multinational reprocessing 
facility continued to meet objections from Iran. To better explain Iran's 
concerns, Jack Miklos, the deputy chief of mission at the US Embassy in 
Tehran further analyzed the Shah's interest in nuclear power. He observed that 
no Iranian official had "satisfactorily explained how Iran expects to absorb 
23,000 megawatts-electric of additional power within the next 20 years."36 He 
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concluded that the Shah's motives were "not entirely clear," and he did not 
rule out the possibility that the "interest in acquiring nuclear know-how and 
plutonium is, in part, motivated by the desire to preserve the nuclear option 
should the region's balance of power shift toward the nuclear states." 
Regardless of the Shah's nuclear weapon intentions, Miklos argued that Iran 
undoubtedly wanted to develop uranium enrichment capabilities and to 
'`possess its own fuel reprocessing facility." Iranian opposition to proposals for 
a multinational reprocessing facility could be a consequence of Tehran's 
unwillingness to submit their plants to foreign surveillance."37 
Talks held in Vienna during September and October 1975 failed to bridge the 
disagreement, and Iranian atomic energy chief Akbar Etemad rejected US 
insistence on a multinational reprocessing plant with US involvement. For 
Etemad, who spoke for the Shah, US policy was too restrictive because it 
would "tie Iran's hands for 30 years." Iran would not buy US reactors "unless 
the United States was prepared to base cooperation only on principles of the 
NPT, and unless it was clear that Iran was not being treated as a second-class 
citizen.- He insisted that Tehran had to be able to make -the final decision" on 
reprocessing.;s  
Not ready to back down, in October, Kissinger asked Helms to explain US 
motives to the Shah and to make the point that "we are not in any way singling 
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out Iran for special, disadvantageous treatment", the issues at stake were 
"directly related to security and stability in the region." Worried about a 
"nuclear deadlock" that could hurt US-Iranian relations and deprive US 
industry of an opportunity, Helms cited the Shah's remarks in a Business Week 
interview, where he complained that the US position conflicted with Iran's 
sovereignty: Washington was asking for things 'that the French or Germans 
would never dream of doing." Given the Shah's nationalistic objections, 
Helms concluded that the proposal for a regional reprocessing facility was 
dead and that if Iran insisted on a plant it should be under joint US-Iranian 
control with "stringent safeguards." Nevertheless, in November, Etemad 
objected to "terms of conditions that go beyond Iran's NPT commitments if 
they are dictated by nuclear-have nations."39 
In early 1976, Robert Seamans, director of the Energy Research and 
Development Administration (the Energy Department's predecessor) traveled 
to Iran for meetings with the Shah to move negotiations along. Believing that 
the Shah would not accept an ultimate US veto" over reprocessing and that a 
multinational or bi-national reprocessing facility could also prove 
nonnegotiable, Seamans suggested the possibility of some level of US 
"consent' involving assignment of US personnel to a reprocessing facility and 
a "continuing requirement that we be satisfied the safeguards applied to these 
activities by the Intetnational Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are effective." 
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To increase US `leverage" against Iranian national reprocessing, some State 
officials were interested in a "buy-back" option to purchase spent fuel rods. 
Kissinger supported exploring this idea, but if it failed, he wanted US 
diplomats to try to negotiate other forms of leverage over Iranian decisions on 
reprocessing 40 
Besides negotiating a suitable US agreement with Iran, Kissinger also faced 
the prospect of Pakistan building a nuclear weapons capability and the 
consequences of West Germany's nuclear commerce with Iran, which also 
raised concerns about reprocessing. Believing that the Germans had not taken 
a tough enough position in their nuclear agreement with Iran, Kissinger told 
Germany's ambassador to the United States, Berndt Von Staden, "We had 
strongly urged that the Federal Republic of Germany not transfer reprocessing 
to Iran." Von Staden argued that Germany's agreement included safeguards 
designed to limit Iran's freedom of action, yet he conceded that the agreement 
did not prevent reprocessing. This prompted Kissinger to observe, "This 
agreement is not greeted with enthusiasm by the United States. We cannot 
avoid saying that we did not approve of this agreement."4t 
The prospect of a multinational reprocessing facility in Iran remained part of 
the US ncgotiating position throughout 1976, but by May, Kissinger already 
had serious doubts about it. While he observed that opposing reprocessing 
79 
made sense, in his mind, the multinational concept was contrary to US 
interests and a '`fraud." For example, a multinational reprocessing facility in 
Pakistan designed to serve countries in the region could he a "cover" for 
national reprocessing, while the Pakistanis would not want one located in Iran, 
outside of their control."We should not fall on our own swords to push others 
into multinational projects,' Kissinger opined. The negotiations with Iran, 
however, had gone too far to abandon the concept.42 
Hopeful that it could persuade the Shah to "set a world example by foregoing 
national reprocessing" as a "major act of nuclear statesmanship," the Ford 
administration was more interested in the "buy-back" concept as a fallback to 
the multinational facility option.47 By May 1976, the two sides appeared io 
converge on basic principles. Based on talks with Etemad, State and the 
Energy Research and Development Administration sent the US Embassy in 
Tehran a draft agreement. The key provisions concerned reprocessing and 
safeguards.44 
In keeping with the US interest in "consent," the draft stipulated that 
reprocessing spent fuel obtained from the United States must be "performed in 
facilities acceptable to the parties." Before Tehran could consider 
reprocessing, though, the United States would have the right to buy hack spent 
fuel, with payment in money or in the equivalent value of reactor fuel. 
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Alternatively, Iran could transfer spent fuel to another country or group of 
nations, as long as it was used for peaceful purposes under mutually acceptable 
safeguards. The US draft spelled out additional arrangements— above and 
beyond IAEA safeguards intended to prevent diversion into military 
applications—to support nonproliferation interests. Additionally, it stated that 
Washington would have the right to review the design of any reactor or other 
equipment and devices "determined to be relevant to the effective application 
of safeguards," and designated US personnel would have -access in Iran to all 
places and data necessary to account for special nuclear material." 
The agreement included a note designed to address "special" aspects of the 
US-Iranian relationship. If Washington did not exercise the buy-back option 
and Iran chose to establish reprocessing facilities, Tehran would be required to 
"achieve the fullest possible participation in the management and operation of 
such facilities of the nation or nations which serve as suppliers of technology 
and major equipment.*" Moreover, Iran would invite the United States to 
"participate fully and actively in the management and operation" of the 
facilities. If Iran's "strenuous" efforts to secure multinational participation 
failed for "reasons beyond its control," Tehran could develop reprocessing 
facilities "acceptable to the parties" that followed the agreement's rigorous 
safeguards. 
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In Iran's response to the US draft agreement. Etemad rejected a veto of Iranian 
reprocessing of US-supplied spent fuel: "Iran seriously intended to have 
reprocessing performed in facilities established in Iran. In all fairness 
Washington should be prepared to supply Iran with the means to establish all 
facilities which constitute an integral part of Iran's nuclear power program." 
He continued, "Iran should have the full right to decide whether to reprocess or 
otherwise dispose of or treat the materials provided under the agreement." 
Nevertheless, the Iranians left the US buy-back option on the table, if Iran 
chose not to reprocess, Washington could either provide financial 
compensation or enriched uranium "equivalent in energy value to the 
recoverable special nuclear material" contained in the spent fuel.45  
As far as Kissinger was concerned, the crux of any agreement with Iran would 
be the buy-back option. Ile was not willing to take any chances that Iran would 
someday use US technology to reprocess spent fuel. In early August, Kissinger 
met with the Shah in Tehran. While the record of their discussions is not 
available, Kissinger apparently let the Shah know that Washington could not 
accept a "purely national" Iranian reprocessing plant and that even a bi-
national plant would not he possible. Indeed, Kissinger later wrote that "we'll 
insist on processing in the United States "46 Whatever the Shah may have 
thought about Kissinger's stand on national reprocessing, when US officials 
traveled to Iran in late August, they found Eternad relatively cooperative, 
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while insisting that [ran would not "accept discriminatory treatment," he 
conceded that the key issue for Iran was an "assured fuel supply." US officials 
could not make such assurances, but they explained that they wanted the 
agreement to reflect "US intent to perform" within "practical and legal limits." 
"They also stressed that the bottom line of the US May 31 draft enables 
reprocessing in Iranian national facilities, thus ensuring that Iran is not 
foreclosed from every solution to reprocessing problem." In the ensuing 
discussion, the Iranians showed readiness to consider the alternatives to the 
°bottom line," e.g., the buy back ("fuel exchange") or third-country 
reprocessing. 47  
Helms saw these discussions as a "promising basis" for continuing 
negotiations with Iran. But the domestic pressure of the 1976 presidential 
elections forced the Ford administration to tighten its policy on reprocessing. 
Near the end of October, Ford belatedly responded to Jimmy Carter's 
criticisms about his nonproliferation policy. In keeping with the direction of 
the ongoing negotiations with Iran, Ford took a restrictive approach toward 
reprocessing: •It should not proceed unless there is sound reason to believe 
that the world community can effectively overcome the associated risks of 
proliferation." To support that judgment, Ford called for changes in domestic 
nuclear policies, cooperation between nuclear exporters on behalf of 
"maximum restraint in the transfer of reprocessing and enrichment 
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technology, and international cooperation to ensure that "customer nations 
have an adequate supply of fuel for their nuclear power plants," among other 
measures. Ford's new policy approach raised questions about the Iranian 
agreement. If reprocessing at home or abroad '`should not proceed," the 
provisions in the draft agreement allowing Iranian reprocessing under some 
conditions would likely require renegotiating. In any event, the 1976 
presidential campaign put the talks on hold, and the incoming Carter 
administration's nonproliferation policy review would produce further delay. 
Carter's likeliness to take a harder line against reprocessing than Ford may 
have influenced a February 1977 Iranian announcement that Tehran had given 
up the option of a national reprocessing facility and was, instead, looking at bi-
national and multinational options. In making this announcement, Etemad said 
that he assumed safeguards would be integral to the Carter administration's 
approach, but lie asserted that no country "has a right to dictate nuclear policy 
to another.°48 Officials at the US Embassy and Oak Ridge National 
Laboratory, who had been visiting Iran, did not entirely believe Eteinad's 
statements about reprocessing. When Oak Ridge officials received a briefing 
from Iranian officials about plans for the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center, 
they observed that its location reminded them geologically (between two 
mountains) of the US weapons laboratory at Sandia, New Mexico. According 
to the Oak Ridge scientists, the "unusually large" size of the facility `makes it 
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theoretically possible to produce weapon-grade material (plutonium)," 
although they were unable to make "categorical statements" and concluded 
that the facility could just as easily produce "mixed oxide appropriate for 
reactor cores." In any event, the scientists concluded that the facility "bears 
watching" because its plans included a "large hot lab," which would be 
capable of supporting the first steps toward reprocessing. The implication of 
this analysis was that as hard as Washington was willing to work to leverage 
nuclear sales for nonproliferation ends, Iran might circumvent an agreement 
and pursue weapons-related activities."' 
The Carter administration's policy review took longer than anticipated, but on 
April 7, 1977 it issued its first official policy statement on nuclear 
proliferation. The key announcement was the decision to defer "indefinitely" 
commercial reprocessing in the United States in order to discourage other 
countries from reprocessing. While acknowledging that nuclear exporters such 
as France and West Germany had a "perfect right" to reprocess spent fuel, 
Carter wanted to reach a -worldwide understanding" with them to curb the 
risks of widespread reprocessing capabilities. to show that Washington would 
be a reliable supplier of nuclear fuel, he announced that he would submit to 
Congress "legislative steps to permit us to sign supply contracts and remove 
the pressure for the reprocessing of nuclear fuels." In response to press 
questions about the multinational reprocessing option that the Ford 
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administration had considered, Carter said that he had not made a decision but 
that "regional plants under tight international control" were a possibility to 
explore.*° Carter amplified the new position in subsequent statements, and the 
tough line on reprocessing undoubtedly shaped his guidance on negotiations 
with Iran. Carter's ambassador to Iran, William Sullivan, presented his 
credentials to the Shah on June 18. Not wanting to look too "eager', Sullivan 
did not bring up the nuclear negotiations, but the Shah told him that he was 
ready to resume the talks and expressed hope that the reactors would be sold. 
The Shah also made a "specific disavowal of interest in reprocessing plant." 
Skeptical, an official at the Pentagon's Office of International Security Affairs' 
Iran desk drew a little picture of a bull next to that words.5j While State 
officials had hoped that early congressional action on White House 
nonproliferation objectives would expedite the agreement with Iran, Carter did 
not sign the Nonproliferation Act that codified his policies until March 1978. 
Either way, the act did not change anything in the negotiations with Iran 
because its provisions— i.e., the application of IAEA safeguards on nuclear 
exports and a prohibition of reprocessing US-supplied material without US 
approval—kept with the direction of the negotiations. 52 Indeed, US and Iranian 
officials had completed negotiations the month before, after a brief 
conversation between Carter and the Shah in Tehran in late December 1977 
had hastened the process. 
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During the weeks that followed Carter's visit, riots broke out in Tehran. In the 
first half of 1978, few were prescient enough to anticipate the looming 
revolution, and the two sides concluded the nuclear negotiations on the 
assumption that the United States would sell Iran eight reactors. During that 
summer, US and Iranian diplomats initialed the accord, signaling informal 
agreement, although neither Carter nor the Shah would ever sign it. As in the 
1976 draft, the final agreement retained a US veto on reprocessing but did not 
include options for buy back or a multinational plant. Under Article 6, Iran 
would not reprocess spent fuel or enrich uranium supplied by the US "unless 
the parties agree." 
The agreement's separate note was more detailed than in the 1976 draft. In 
addition to including language on physical security, expeditious US Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission action on licenses, and international fuel cycle 
studies, the note provided alternative suggestions for handling spent fuel 
resulting from both US-supplied fuel and reactors: storage in Iran, storage in 
the United States, or "storage, processing, or other disposition in accordance 
with internationally accepted arrangements." The latter could involve 
reprocessing in Britain. France, or "other mutually agreed states and return of 
recovered plutonium in the form of fabricated fuel to Iran, under arrangements 
which are deemed to be more proliferation resistant than those which currently 
.;3 exist. 
The bottom line of each of these possibilities was that Iran would not have the 
option of reprocessing US supplied material. Iran's spent fuel could be 
reprocessed in Western Europe but only if it was impossible to store the 
material in Iran, the United States, or Western Europe. During negotiations, 
Washington wanted reprocessing in Western Europe to be "an option of last 
resort," but Tehran wanted it to be an "equal choice" with the storage options. 
According to a State telegram, the Iranians feared a discriminatory outcome: 
The United States would strike a deal with others to allow commercial-scale 
reprocessing subsequent to US-Iran agreement." To accommodate the Iranians 
on this point, without sacrificing nonproliferation objectives, Washington 
agreed to include a separate paragraph in the agreement that spelled out 
circumstances under which nondiscriminatory treatment would be possible and 
reprocessing in Europe would be better than a "last resort." All options would 
be "subject to US law which includes determination of no significant increase 
in the risk of proliferation associated with approvals for reprocessing."'3  
Even though the agreement was premised on constraining Iran's freedom to 
operate nuclear technology, the Shah and his advisers accepted the conditions 
as part of the price of the nuclear reactors and, presumably, good relations with 
the US. Whatever the Shah's motives, domestic Iranian instability ballooned 
during August and September 1978, throwing the nuclear agreement and 
everything else up in the air. The US Embassy interpreted an editorial on 
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nuclear policy in the prestigious Kai•kan International newspaper as a sign that 
some officials in the government wanted to renegotiate the accord, partly 
because of the provisions on reprocessing." 
Not long after the Shah initiated martial law under a new prime minister, 
Jalfaar Sharif-Ema►ni, in August 1978, Ete►nad resigned his position as atomic 
energy chief. Major cutbacks in government capital investment programs, the 
US Embassy reported, had already "paralyzed the decision-making process in 
both (the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran) and Ministry of Energy on 
matters nuclear." Except for the four reactors under construction with the help 
of Germany and France, "nuclear activity has come to a halt." Iranian officials 
were nonetheless bullish about their country's nuclear prospects telling a local 
Westinghouse representative that they wanted to work with the US nuclear 
industry and that "the bilateral would certainly not be scrapped." '6This 
attitude proved to be wishful thinking. When the Shah's regime collapsed in 
1979, so did the nuclear power program, neither the French nor the Germans 
finished work on their reactor projects. 
The apprehension about nuclear proliferation in South Asia and the West Asia 
that may have encouraged the Shah to think about a nuclear option did not 
vanish with his overthrow, however. Significantly, the same nationalism that 
informed Iran's stance toward nuclear technologies under the monarchy and 
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emphasized tran's "full right" to reprocess and concerns about "second-class" 
status foreshadowed Iran's present-day claims about nuclear "rights" under the 
NPT 51And ironically, US enmity toward Iran after the 1979 Islamic 
Revolution has critically impacted the regime's security calculations, 
increasing its interest in nuclear deterrence. Understanding the background to 
Iran's initial quest of nuclear power technologies will not in and of itself create 
better negotiating positions for today's leaders, but a more comprehensive 
understanding of the motivations at play is essential if present negotiations are 
to succeed. 
A country that was seen for the most pail of the period after 1941 as an ally 
could also be seen as a hostile country with passing about three decades. In 
Iran throughout the late 1970's Shah Reza Pahlavi remained in power. In 1977 
he passed censorship laws which caused a massive demonstrations and 
dissents throughout the country. There were cal Is for a new regime along with 
human rights, more freedom, and more democracy. Within the Iranian 
revolution there were two distinct movements. The first was the religious 
movement headed by the Ulama, calling for the return to a society based on 
the Shari'ah and headed by an Uama administration. The second was a 
liberalization movement calling for Westernization along with greater 
democracy, economic freedom, and human rights. As the revolution 
proceeded, these two groups gradually merged to form a unified front.58  
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An influential leader within the Muslim faith was Ayatollah Khomeini, an 
exile from Iran. With cassette tapes of his sermons, his message was spread 
encouraging Iranians to fight for a Muslim republic. The spark that got the US 
to take more of stand on the Shah staying in power was a protest in Qumm on 
January 9, 1978. Students were protesting the visit of President Jimmy Carter 
and the government keeping Ayatollah Khomeini in exile. They demanded that 
Khomeini be allowed to return to the country. The Shah launched an attack on 
the protesters in response. His police opened fire  on the students and killed 
seventy.'S The Shah was losing control. Another massacre "Black Friday," 
happened on a Tehran demonstration killing several hundred people. The Shah 
declared martial law and imprisoned as many opposition leaders as he could 
lay hands on. Secretary of State Syrus Vance and President Carter agreed that 
the Shah had to go and his hand-picked successor would take his place. While 
the US was trying to solve this conflict, the Shah fell ill of cancer. Jimmy 
Carter reluctantly allowed the Shah into the United States to undergo surgical 
treatment at a New York Medical Hospital. On January 16, 1979, the Shah left 
Iran for good. On February 1, Khomeini returned to Iran to a welcoming 
crowd of several million people. The Revolution was over and Khomeini 
declared a new Islamic Republic.60 
In November of 1979 under the encouragement of Khomeini student 
protestors took sixty-nine American hostages. This is what became known as 
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the Iranian Hostage Crisis. Military action was too risky, so Carter tried to put 
pressure on Iran by economic sanctions, and froze its assets in the US 
throughout his term. Carters' approval ratings dived for he was facing the 
waterloo of his presidency. Finally, in Septemher of 1980, Khomeini s 
government decided to end this matter. There was no more advantage to be 
gained from further ongoing sanctions, making it harder to straighten out an 
already chaotic economy. There were rumors that Carter might pull out an 
"October Surprise" and get the hostages home before the election but he was 
not able to" 
Although the history of international relations between the United States and 
Iran can be traced back from the nineteenth century, yet the in the earlier 
period it was socio-cultural and diplomatic in nature. With the advent of 
twentieth century they involved in political relations which has a trend of 
constant ups-and-down. In fact, the United States' politically engaged with Iran 
with the concluding periods of World War II. Iran served as a catalyst which 
changed the American perception of the nature of Soviet policies in the 
postwar period and provided the first stimulus for a radical reorientation of US 
foreign policy and strategy. US-iran relations were formulated in stages 
corresponding to the events involving Iran, its close neighbors, and the Soviet 
Union. However, throughout the history the relationship has generally been 
close, but it has been punctuated first by the involvement of the CIA in the 
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coup of 1953 which overthrew a popular prime minister, Mohammed 
Mosaddiqh, and then by the Islamic Revolution of 1979, which led to a breach 
in relations that has not yet been repaired. Indeed, the two countries that were 
once close friends and allies now see each other, respectively, as the "Great 
Satan' and a member of an "Axis of Evil." 
At one time, Iran even viewed America as a key ally in helping them to 
overcome negative interference from the Russians and British 	which is 
something that America was keen to help Iran to achieve. In a nutshell, from 
1941-53, Iran sought United States as a protector and friend under the 
leadership of Shah. During the period from 1953 to the late 1960s (as the 
prime minister, Dr. Mosaddiqh was overthrown with the restoration of the 
Shah, as the result of a coup engineered in large part by the CIA and British 
intelligence), Iran was very dependent on American protection, support, and 
aid. This was quite a patron- client relationship, and in partnership relations the 
U. S. was the senior partner. Between the periods from 1973 to 1979, the 
relationship was seemed to he much more of partnership. The shah was much 
more stable at home, wealthier, and more adept at handling his foreign 
relations. He began to make demands. However, since the year of 1979, as the 
Islamic Revolution was broke out in Iran that targeted the very psychology as 
well as physiology of the United States, there has been a constant hostile 
relation existing between the two important countries. 
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CYfAPqtER-III 
t)3- Iran gi~p&tions.o 
Post-1979 
US-IRAN RELATIONS: POST-1979 
The British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill during the Cold War period 
described Russia as "a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma."' For 
many Americans and many Iranians, this phrase readily applies to how they 
perceive the other nation- as the complex politics, economics, culture and 
ideologies of both countries have stoked confusion and turmoil for the past 
forty years. These complexities are even more pronounced when examining 
how Iran and the United States interact with one another, as the on and off 
history of conflict between the two has created an intricate political legacy that 
defines the policies of both nations to this day. However, within this long and 
convoluted history, one element which had remained constant on both sides is 
a marked trend of political and strategic misperception. Both the United States 
and [ran have based their policies and strategies around very fixed, and often 
very inaccurate, images and assumptions regarding the others intentions. 
To understand the situation, this chapter instigated by the obvious and 
intriguing roots and dimensions of their bitter relations by analyzing the 
records of different crises in Islamic Iran and its neighborhoods. The study 
analyses the fact that the past 40 years of Western harsh policy toward Iran has 
proved to be counterproductive and ineffective. Special attention has been 
given to different war-time relationship between the two countries such as the 
101 
Iran-Iraq War of 1980, Iran Contra Affairs of 1980s, the Gulf War of 1991, the 
Afghanistan Crisis of 2001, and the Iraq War of 2003. The study also explains 
the ever- ending Peace Process in West Asian states and its surrounding 
politics played by the United States and Islamic Iran. However, prior to study 
in detail about these crises it would be helpful to have a brief sketch on the 
background of these events. 
The post- Islamic Revolution relationship between the United States and Iran, 
their foreign policies towards one another stem from decades of complex 
historical and political events. During World War 11, Iran served as an 
important strategic partner for the US and allied powers to defeat Nazi 
Germany. But with the help of the British, the United States staged a coup in 
1953 that overthrew Mossadigh, returned the Shah to power, and ensured a 
pro-Western, anti-Soviet government in Iran.Z Therefore, to many Iranians, it 
is the US which has long dominated their country, removing its elected prime 
minister Mossadcgh in 1953. sustaining the Shah in the decades that followed 
and then imposing sanctions and various forms of containment on the Iranian 
economy even since the 1979 revolution. To many, the US is seen as 
protecting and subsidizing the state of Israel, in its suppression of Palestinian 
national rights. Furthermore, many Iranians believe that the US was also 
involved in urging Iraq to attack Iran in September 1980.3  
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As discussed in the earlier chapter that the Shah had pushed Iran to social and 
economic reform and modernization during his rule. But his methods upset 
and alienated many members of society, including the Shia clergy. During this 
time, a prominent religious leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, was arrested 
for his criticisms of the Shah and exiled to Turkey from where he eventually 
moved to Iraq and finally Paris. Social unrest continued to rise in response to 
the Shah's increasingly oppressive rule, and Khomeini formed the Islamic 
Revolutionary Council while in Paris. In 1979, the Shah was finally forced into 
exile after protests and demonstrations. Khomeini returned to Iran, seized 
power, and declared himself leader of the new Islamic Republic of Iran. It may 
be noted here, that before the Revolution. Iran had an aristocratic society, in 
which the few had the majority of the power. After 1979, the Iranian 
government included more democracy and checks and balances, but the 
fundamental interpretation of Islam implemented by the government made 
many feel less than free. The voices from Iran usually heard in the United 
States at this time were the voices of those who prospered under the Shah, but 
left during the Revolution. This greatly skewed the perception of the Islamic 
Revolution in the US4 
Since the Islamic Revolution, the US-Iranian relationship has been one of the 
most bitter in the modem world. This hostility largely draws from the events of 
the early 1980s, where it was Iran which, more than any other third-world 
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power, humiliated the US in the hostage crisis of 1979- 1981.5 On November 
4, 1979, the revolutionary group Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Line 
occupied the American embassy in Tehran and took American diplomats 
hostage. The captors sought to send a message to the US on its support for the 
Shah and its opposition to the Islamic Republic. Their demands included 
sending the displaced Shah back to Iran for prosecution and that the US not 
interfere in Iranian affairs anymore.6 The hostages were held for almost a year 
and a half only to be released after extensive negotiations and the inauguration 
of the next US president, Ronald Reagan. The ordeal likely cost President 
Carter the reelection and forever tainted American perceptions of Iran.7 In Iran, 
the incident was seen by many as a blow against American influence in Iran 
and the liberal-moderate interim government of Prime Minister Mehdi 
Bazargan, who opposed the hostage taking and resigned soon after. The 
hostage takers felt that their action was connected to the 1953 American-
hacked coup against the government of Prime Minister Mosaddiyh. Sonic 
Iranians were concerned that the United States may have been plotting another 
coup against their country in 1979 from the American embassy.8  
In the United States, the hostage-taking was seen as a violation of a centuries-
old principle of international law that granted diplomats immunity from arrest 
and diplomatic compounds sovereignty in the territory of the host.9 Thus, the 
Iran Hostage Crisis further complicated the United States' relationship with 
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Iran. The images of the hostage crisis, combined with subsequent 
confrontational policies such as attacks on Persian Gulf shipping in the mid-
1980s and woeful tales of internal repression, solidified the image of Iran as 
that of 'a crazy outlaw nation whose acts were illegal, unpredictable and 
irrational. The effects of such characterizations run deep within American 
policy, every President from Ronald Reagan to Barrak Obama have vilified 
Iran. The US has found it possible to negotiate with East Asian states that have 
fought and killed tens of thousands of Americans but it has found it harder to 
find a minimal negotiating ground with, the country which, while not killing 
Americans, has inflicted humiliation on it. 10 
Therefore, the Islamic Revolution in 1979 has been considered as a turning 
point in Iran-US relations. Iran with its oil and gas resources, its geopolitical 
location and its special place in the region and the Islamic world has been 
viewed as an important regional and international player. Meanwhile Iran's 
domestic process is a vital and integrated part of social and political change in 
the West Asia, the whole Islamic world and developing countries. Meanwhile, 
the United States is seeking to impose a new regional order, between and, in 
some measure, within states in the West Asia and is also seeking to establish 
itself as a strategic, military and economic power in Central Asia. Yet in all of 
this Washington finds itself faced with the power of Iran, a country that has 
been, on and off, a hegemonic power in the region for three thousand years and 
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which, while it has abandoned some of the revolutionary zeal of the post-1979 
period, still has regional goals incompatible with those of the US.'1 However, 
this growing political conflict between Iran and the United States is only 
compounded by the high degree of suspicion and animosity on both sides, the 
belligerency demonstrated by each in statements about the other and not least, 
the ideological convictions held by the leaderships in both Tehran and 
Washington.12 
Four decades after the Islamic Revolution. Iran and the US continue to 
criticize and condemn one another. Time has healed very few wounds. Each 
side is saturated with myths and misconceptions about the other. Many Iranian 
officials continue to view the US as a satanic imperialistic bully determined to 
destroy Iran's Revolution, cripple Iran economically and transform the oil-rich 
Persian Gulf into an American lake. Yet despite their hostility toward US 
policy, and although hundreds of Iranians have been killed by US military 
action in the Gulf while less than a handful of Americans have died at the 
hands of Iran, the masses of Iranian people still hold warm feelings toward 
individual American citizens. With the partial exception of Iraq, public opinion 
surveys consistently reveal that Americans consider Iran to be the least popular 
country in the world. Anti-Iran feelings are nourished by propaganda 
disseminated by various groups with political axes to grind, such as the 
militant and anti-democratic Mujahidin-e-Khalq (National Council of 
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Resistance of Iran), an Iranian opposition group that has collaborated for years 
with Saddam Hussein, and a number of pro-Israel lobbies that seek to promote 
their own agendas by exaggerating the Iranian threat. Meanwhile, distorted and 
Simplistic mass media representations, such as the widely distributed 
Hollywood film "Not without my Daughter!," question the very civility and 
humanity of Iranians.'` Given Iran's overwhelmingly negative image in the 
US, American congressional leaders have little incentive to consider a serious 
dialogue with the Islamic Republic. The executive branch of the US 
government in general and the Department of State in particular enjoy more 
flexibility in foreign policy formulation than does the legislative branch. 
Nonetheless, recent presidents and secretaries of state have adopted a knee-
jerk, unimaginative and hard-line policy toward Iran. 
The Iran-Iraq War and US-Iran Relations: 
The Iran-Iracl War and events throughout the 1980s further strained US-Iran 
relations. Iraq's Sunni minority, of which Saddam Hussein was the head, 
interpreted the Shia uprising in this neighboring state as a threat to his power. 
The Islamic Revolution in Iran made him worried, especially after the greatly 
oppressed Kurds expressed support for Iran. In 1980, seeking to catch Iran's 
new government off guard, Saddam Hussein invaded Iran. This action led to 
an eight year war and the deaths of millions of Iraqis and Iranians. The 
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differences between the two peoples: Persians vs. Arabs, Shias vs. Sunnis only 
added to the horror of the war. While the United States supplied both Iraq and 
Iran with weapons, it tended to favor Iraq and established diplomatic relations 
with the nation. The war ended in 1988 when Iran and Iraq signed a U.N. 
brokered ceasefire agreement.'4 
Moreover, American Secretary of State of that period Alexander Haig have 
stated that the United States gave Iraqi President Saddam Hussein approval to 
attack Iran: "It was also interesting to confirm that President Carter gave the 
Iraq a green light to launch the war against Iran through Prince Fand" of 
Jordan." j5 When Iraq invaded Iran, Carter called Iranian charges of American 
complicity "patently false". Carter's memoir, Keeping Faith, briefly mentioned 
this accusation: "Typically, the Iranians accused me of planning and 
supporting the invasion." Journalist Said K. Aburish claimed that Hussein 
visited to Amman, Jordan before the war, where he may have met with King 
Hussein and three CIA agents. Aburish believes that there is "considerable 
evidence that lie discussed his plans to invade Iran with the CIA agents".16 The 
records of the meeting that occurred on this date between American officials 
and King Hussein suggest that Saddam Hussein was not present and that the 
border disputes between Baghdad and Tehran were not discussed, but that joint 
efforts between Jordan and the United States to oppose Iran were discussed. 
Others have opposed this view, Eric Altennan in The Nation has called the 
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charge a "slander' and argued there is no credible evidence to back it up. 
Adam Tomkins wrote: "There were no diplomatic relations between the US 
and Iraq for seventeen year, until President Reagan restored them in 
1984".17American intelligence and logistical support played a crucial role in 
arming Iraq in the Iraq-Iran war, although Bob Woodward states that the 
United States gave information to both sides, hoping "to engineer a stalemate. 
According to the American Senate Banking Committee, the administrations of 
Presidents Reagan and George H. W. Bush authorized the sale to Iraq of 
numerous dual use items, including poisonous chemicals and deadly biological 
viruses, such as Anthrax and Bubonic Plague.'8  
The United States provided battle planning assistance to Iraq at a time when 
American intelligence agencies knew that Iraqi commanders would employ 
chemical weapons in waging the war. American officials publicly condemned 
Iraq's employment of mustard gas, Sarin, VX and other poisonous agents, 
especially after Iraq attacked Kurdish villagers in Halabja in March 1988. 
Sixty Defense Intelligence Agency officers were secretly providing detailed 
information on Iranian deployments, tactical planning for battles, plans for 
airstrikes and bomb-damage assessments for Iraq, however. In contrast, 
Secretary of Defense Frank C'. Carlucci said: "My understanding is that what 
was provided" to Iraq "was general order of battle information, not operational 
intelligence". "I certainly have no knowledge of US participation in preparing 
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battle and strike packages," he said, "and doubt strongly that that occurred." 
He added, "I did agree that Iraq should not lose the war, but I certainly had no 
foreknowledge of their use of chemical weapons." Secretary of State Colin 
Powell, through a spokesman, said the officers' description of the program was 
"dead wrong," but declined to discuss it."9 According to reports of the 
Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs of the US Senate, the 
United States sold chemical weapons, including anthrax, VX nerve gas, West 
Nile fever and botulism to Iraq until March 1992. The chairman of the Senate 
committee, Doti Riegle, said: "The executive branch of our government 
approved 771 different export licenses for sale of dual use technology to Iraq. I 
think it's a devastating record." In 2000, US Secretary of State Madeleine 
Albright expressed regret for that support.20 It is interesting that during the 
Iran- Iraq W 'ar, the United States applied the policy of dual containment which 
was special feature of power-block politics. The United States provided 
various legal as well as illegal supports to Iraqi government to counter the 
Iranian uprising in lraq~s neighboring region. At the same time it also 
supported Iran by supplying arms to Iranians in order to contain Soviet 
influence and other unspecified interest of the US and Israel. Support to Iran 
was given despite the fact that Iranian relations with US further deteriorated 
due to Hezbollah several anti-American attacks, including the April 1983 
United States Embassy bombing which killed 17 Americans, the 1983 Beirut 
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barracks bombing which killed 241 US peace keepers in Lebanon, in which 
the US held the Islamic Republic of Iran responsible.21  
Iran-Contra Affair: 
In the meantime of Iran-Iraq War, under the encouragements of United States 
the Iran—Contra affair took place in order to contain the communist activity in 
Nicaragua. The Iran—Contra affair was a political scandal in the United States 
that came to light in November 1986. During the Reagan administration senior 
US figures, including President Ronald Reagan, agreed to facilitate the sale of 
arms to Iran, the subject of an arms embargo. At least some US officials also 
hoped that the arms sales would secure the release of hostages and allow US 
intelligence agencies to fund the Nicaraguan contras. The affair began as an 
operation to improve US-Iranian relations. It was planned that Israel would 
ship weapons to a relatively moderate, politically influential group of Iranians, 
and then the US would resupply Israel and receive the Israeli payment. The 
Iranian recipients promised to do everything in their power to achieve the 
release of six US hostages, who were being held by the Lebanese Shia Islamist 
group Hezbollah. The plan deteriorated into an arms-for-hostages scheme, in 
which members of the Executive Branch sold weapons to Iran in exchange for 
the release of the American hostages. Large modifications to the plan were 
devised by Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North of the National Security Council 
in late 1985, in which a portion of the proceeds from the weapon sales was 
diverted to fund anti-Sandinista and anti-communist rebels, or Contras, in 
Nicaragua.22  
While President Ronald Reagan was a supporter of the Contra cause, no 
conclusive evidence has been found showing that he authorized the diversion 
of the money raised by the Iranian arms sales to the Contras. Handwritten 
notes taken by Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger indicate that Reagan was 
aware of potential hostage transfers with Iran, as well as the sale of Hawk and 
TOW missiles to "moderate elements" within that country. Oliver North, one 
of the central figures in the affair, wrote in a book that "Ronald Reagan knew 
of and approved a great deal of what went on with both the Iranian initiative 
and private efforts on behalf of the contras and he received regular, detailed 
briefings on both." Mr. North also writes: "I have no doubt that he was told 
about the use of residuals for the contras, and that he approved it 
enthusiastically." North's account is difficult to verify because of the secrecy 
that still surrounds the affair.23 However according to The New York Times, the 
United States supplied the following arms to Iran: 23  
August 20, 1985. 96 TOW anti-tank missiles 
2. September 14, 1985. 408 more TO% s 
3. November 24, 1985. 18 Hawk anti-aircraft missiles 
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4. February 17, 1Q86. 500 TOWs 
5. February 27, 1986. 500 TOWs 
6. May 24, 1986. 508 TOWs, 240 Hawk spare parts 
7. August 4, 1986. More Hawk spares 
October 28, 1986. 500 TOWs 
After the weapon sales were revealed in November 1986, Reagan appeared on 
national television and stated that the weapons transfers had indeed occurred, 
but that the United States did not trade arms for hostages.2 To this day, it is 
unclear exactly what Reagan knew and when, and whether the arms sales were 
motivated by his desire to save the US hostages. Notes taken December 7, 
1985, by Defense Secretary Weinberger recorded that Reagan said that "he 
could answer charges of illegality but he couldn't answer charge that 'big 
strong President Reagan passed up a chance to free hostages.' Investigations 
were compounded when large volumes of documents relating to the scandal 
were destroyed or withheld from investigators by Reagan administration 
officials. On March 4, 1987, Reagan returned to the airwaves in a nationally 
televised address, taking full responsibility for any actions that he was unaware 
of, and admitting that "what began as a strategic opening to Iran deteriorated, 
in its implementation, into trading arms for hostages.i26 Several investigations 
ensued, including those by the United States Congress and the three-man, 
Reagan-appointed Tower Commission. Neither found any evidence that 
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President Reagan himself knew of the extent of the multiple programs." In the 
end, fourteen administration officials were indicted, including then-Secretary 
of Defense Caspar Weinberger. Eleven convictions resulted, some of which 
were vacated on appeal. The rest of those indicted or convicted were all 
pardoned in the final days of the George H. W. Bush presidency, Bush had 
been vice-president at the time of the affair." intemationaI1y the damage was 
more severe. Magnus Ranstorp wrote, "US willingness to engage in 
concessions with Iran and the Hczbollah not only signaled to its adversaries 
that hostage-taking was an extremely useful instrument in extracting political 
and financial concessions for the West but also undermined any credibility of 
US criticism of other states' deviation from the principles of no-negotiation 
and no concession to terrorists and their demands."i9 This episode, however, 
failed to improve the relations between the US and Iran. 
In 1986, the Reagan administration helped sell weapons to Iran, using the 
profits to fund anti-communist Contras militants in Nicaragua. In 1988, the 
United States launched Operation Praying Mantis against Iran, claiming that it 
was retaliation for the Iranian mining of areas of the Persian Gulf as part of the 
[ran-Iraq war. The American attack was the largest American naval combat 
operation since World War 11.30 American action began with coordinated 
strikes by two surface groups that neutralized the Sassan oil platform and the 
Sirri oil platform of Iran. Iran lost one major warship and a smaller gunboat. 
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Damage to the oil platforms was eventually repaired. Iran sued for reparations 
at the International Court of Justice, stating that the United States breached the 
1955 Treaty of Amity. The court dismissed the claim but noted that "the 
actions of the United States of America against Iranian oil platforms on 
October 19, 1987 (Operation Nimble Archer) and April 18, 1988 (Operation 
Praying Mantis) cannot be justified as measures necessary to protect the 
essential security interests of the United States of Anterica.i31 The American 
attack helped pressure Iran to agree to a ceasefire with Iraq later that 
surier.52 ml  
Another incident which further complicated the matter between them 
happened on July 3, 1988, near the end of the Iran—Iraq War, when the US 
Navy guided missile cruiser USS Vincennes shot down Iranian Airbus 
A300B2, which was on a scheduled commercial flight in Iranian airspace over 
the Strait of Hormuz. The attack killed 290 civilians from six nations, 
including 66 children. USS Vincennes was in the Persian Gulf as part of 
Operation Earnest Will. The United States initially contended that flight 655 
was a warplane and then said that it was outside the civilian air corridor and 
did not respond to radio calls. Both statements were untrue, and the radio calls 
were made on military frequencies to which the airliner did not have access. 
According to the Iranian government, the attack was an intentional and 
unlawful act. Iran refused to accept the idea of mistaken identification, arguing 
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that this constituted gross negligence and recklessness amounting to an 
international crime, because the aircraft was not on a trajectory that threatened 
the Vincennes and had not aimed radar at it." The United States has expressed 
regret for the loss of innocent life but has not apologized to the Iranian 
government. 
Persian Gulf War, 1990 and the US-Iran Relations: 
The Persian Gulf War was a war waged by a U.N. -authorized coalition force 
from thirty-four nations led by the United States, against Iraq. The invasion of 
Kuwait by Iraqi troops that began on August 2, 1990 was met with 
international condemnation, and brought immediate economic sanctions 
against Iraq by members of the UN Security Council. A series of UN Security 
Council resolutions and Arab League resolutions were passed regarding the 
invasion of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein's Iraq. One of the most important was 
Resolution 678, passed on 29 November 1990, which gave Iraq a withdrawal 
deadline until 15 January 1991, and authorized "all necessary means to uphold 
and implement Resolution 660," and a diplomatic formulation authorizing the 
use of force if Iraq failed to comply. US President George H. W. Bush 
deployed American forces to Saudi Arabia and urged other countries to send 
their own forces to the scene. An array of nations joined the Coalition of the 
Gulf War. The great majority of the military forces in the coalition were from 
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the United States, with Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom and Egypt as 
leading contributors, in that order. Around US$40 billion of the US$60 billion 
cost was paid by Saudi Arabia." The initial conflict to expel Iraqi troops from 
Kuwait began with an aerial bombardment on 17 January 1991. This was 
followed by a ground assault on 23 February. This was a decisive victory for 
the coalition forces, which liberated Kuwait and advanced into Iraqi territory. 
The coalition ceased their advance, and declared a cease fire 100 hours after 
the ground campaign started. Aerial and ground combat was confined to Iraq, 
Kuwait, and areas on the border of Saudi Arabia. However, Iraq launched 
missiles against coalition military targets in Saudi Arabia. 
Iranian approach to this war was, more or less, of neutrality and caution, not of 
open support to the coalition forces. During the 1990s, relations between the 
United States and Iran remained contentious. Iran not only sought to assert 
itself as a regional power but also to protect itself from external threats and to 
spread Islamic revolution in the region. The United States sought to isolate 
Iran by banning trade and placing various sanctions on Iran. Commercial 
relations between Iran and the United States were restricted by American 
sanctions and consisted mainly of Iranian purchases of food, spare parts, and 
medical products as well as American purchases of carpets and food. Sanctions 
originally imposed in 1995 by President Bill Clinton were renewed by 
President Bush, who cited the "unusual and extraordinary threat" to American 
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tional security posed by Iran. The 1995 executive orders prohibit American 
mpanies and their foreign subsidiaries from conducting business with Iran, 
file banning any "contract for the financing of the development of petroleum 
sources located in Iran". In addition, the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 
96 (ILSA) imposed mandatory and discretionary sanctions on non-American 
mpanies investing more than $20 million annually in the Iranian oil and 
tural gas sectors. The ILSA was renewed for five more years in 2001. 
angressional bills signed in 2006 extended and added provisions to the act, 
n September 30, 2006, the act was renamed the Iran Sanctions Act (ISA), as 
.t no longer applied to Libya, and extended until December 31, 201 l.The act 
was denounced by the European Union as invalid, but it blocked some 
investment for Iran." 
In the late 1990s. relations began to normalize with the election of the 
moderate cleric Mohammad Khatami and victories by various reformist 
candidates in municipal and Parliamentarian elections. Shortly after taking 
office, Iran's new reformist president, Mohammed Khatami, in January 1999 
called for a "dialogue among civilizations with the United States on CNN, 
raising hopes of a thaw in US-Iranian relations. In the interview, Khatami 
invoked Alexis de Tocqueville's Democracy in America to explain the 
similarities between American and Iranian quests for freedom. American 
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright responded positively, and the countries 
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exchanged of wrestling teams. This also brought freer travel between the 
countries as well as an end to the American embargo of Iranian carpets and 
pistachios. Relations then stalled due to opposition from Iranian conservatives 
and American preconditions for discussions, including changes in Iranian 
policy on Israel, nuclear energy, and support for terrorism. Iran slowly 
reformed and changed, but relations between Iran and the US did not greatly 
improve. Congress continued sanctions on Iran, citing terrorism and opposition 
to the peace.36 Later in March 2000, the US Secretary of State, Madeleine 
Albright delivered a speech apologizing for America's role in the 1953 
overthrow of Mohammed Mossadigh (a democratically elected prime minister 
who threatened to nationalize Iran's oil fields) and acknowledged the coup, 
which installed the shah, was clearly a setback for Iran's political 
development." Because Albright's speech ended with a hectoring of Iran's 
domestic and foreign policies, the theocratic regime in Tehran responded with 
a denunciation of the goodwill gesture. On August 31, 2000, four United 
States Congress members, Senator Arlen Specter, Representative Bob Ney, 
Representative Gary Ackerman, and Representative Eliot L. Engel held 
informal talks in New York City with several Iranian leaders. The Iranians 
included Mehdi Karroubi, speaker of the Majlis of Iran (Iranian Parliament), 
Maurice Motancd. a Jewish member of the Majiis, and three other Iranian 
parliamentarians. On August 31, 2000, four United States Congress members, 
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Senator Arlen Specter, Representative Bob Ney, Representative Gary 
Ackerman, and Representative Eliot L. Engel held informal talks in New York 
City with several Iranian leaders. The Iranians included Mehdi Karroubi, 
speaker of the Majlis of Iran (Iranian Parliament), Maurice Motamed, a Jewish 
member of the Majlis, and three other Iranian parliamentarians. The same year 
in September, Albright and President Clinton were present at the UN's 
Millennium Summit and sat in the same room as President Khatami as he 
addressed the General Assembly. Albright later met with Iranian Foreign 
Minister Kamal Kharrazi as part of the Six-Plus-Two regional talks on 
Afghanistan. Also present were envoys from China, Pakistan, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Russia. The talks marked the highest 
diplomatic contact between the United States and Iran since the 1979 hostage 
crisis.' 
The US and Iran on Afghanistan War: 
Afghanistan provided to both US and Iran an opportunity to work together and 
settle their relations. It would be, therefore, convenient for this research work 
to have a glance on the Afghan War. The War in Afghanistan began on 
October 7, 2001, as the US military's Operation Enduring Freedom (OFF) that 
was launched, along with the other militaries of the alliance, in response to the 
9/11 attack on the US. The character of the war evolved from a violent 
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struggle against Al-Qaeda and its Taliban supporters to a complex 
counterinsurgency effort. June 7, 2010, marked the 104th month of US 
military engagement in Afghanistan, making it the longest war in the history of 
the United States (American involvement in the Vietnam War lasted 103 
months).38 Even before the 9/11, 2001 happened, US planned a covert 
operation in Afghanistan in January, 2001 to deny at Qaeda a safe haven there. 
The plan allegedly involved support for the Northern Alliance, air strikes, and 
the introduction of US special operations forces into Afghanistan. One day 
before the September 11, 2001 attacks, the Bush administration agreed on a 
plan to oust the Taliban regime in Afghanistan by force if it refused to hand 
over Osama bin Laden. The plan involved using escalating methods of 
applying pressure over a three year period. If the plan failed, "the deputies 
agreed that the United States would seek to overthrow the Taliban regime 
through more direct action."39 
Iran, following the emergence of the Taliban and their harsh treatment of 
Afghanistan's Shia minority, stepped up assistance to the Northern Alliance. 
Relations with the Taliban deteriorated further in 1998 after Taliban forces 
seized the Iranian consulate in Mazari Sharif and executed Iranian diplomats. 
Following this incident, Iran almost went to war with the Taliban regions of 
Afghanistan but intervention by the United Nations Security Council and the 
United States prevented an imminent Iranian invasion. Iranian suspicions of 
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the Taliban movement were present before the attacks, engendered by its 
origins in the radical Sunni seminaries of Pakistan and its close association 
with Islamabad's military and intelligence services. Their animosity was 
exacerbated by the rising tide of drugs and instability from Taliban-controlled 
Afghanistan that too frequently spilled across the Iranian border. For the 
Talibatt's part, their extreme ascetic doctrine reviled Shi'a Muslims as 
apostates, and its militants menaced Afghanistan's Shi'a minority. Therefore, 
tensions between the neighbors nearly escalated to direct contlict in August 
1998, after eleven Iranian diplomats were murdered in the Taliban takeover of 
a Shia city.40 As a result, Iran cultivated close ties to the opposition militias 
that were battling the Talihan, including the Northern Alliance. This history 
placed Iran in a good position to assist the US-led war on the Taliban regime 
in the fall of 2001. 
In US war against Taliban Iran's track record of support has been promising: 
Tehran continued to work with the US military effort in Afghanistan through 
the Northern alliance and among other activities, offered to allow American 
transport aircraft to stage from airfields in eastern Iran and agreed to perform 
search and rescue missions for downed American airmen who bailed out over 
Iran.4' The Iranian government was also instrumental in helping to forge a new 
coalition government. Although the Iranians (as mostly Shi'a Persians) had 
their problems with the Sunni Pashtuns, they were instrumental in bringing in 
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key Pashtun figures, such as former king, Zahir Shah, and incorporating them 
into the process. It was the United States and Iran, working together, that made 
the UN conference in Bonn- which gave birth to the Afghani interim 
government - a success. According to Americans who participated in the 
conference and the backroom negotiations, although the Pakistanis often took 
the credit, it was the Iranians who generally deserved it.42 
Since the overthrow of the Taliban's, the new government has engaged in 
cordial relations with both Iran and the United States. However the relations 
between the United States and Iran have grown strained due to American 
objections to Iran's nuclear program. Iran's strained relations with the United 
States have not prevented Tehran from strengthening its economic and trade 
cooperation with Kabul. It helped revive Afghanistan's economy and 
infrastructure.i3 It has restored some of its traditional sway in western, central, 
and northern Afghanistan where Persian-speaking Afghans predominate. It 
aided Northern Alliance figures that were prominent in the post-Taliban 
governing coalition, and Iranian companies have been extensively involved in 
road building and other reconstruction projects in western Afghanistan. Since 
2004, Iran's influence has wafted somewhat as its allies, mostly Persian-
speaking Afghan minority factions still referred to as the "Northern Alliance," 
have been marginalized in Afghan politics. But, many US politicians and 
military officials as well as some Afghan law makers believe that Iran is 
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meddling in Afghanistan by playing a double game. Iran usually denies these 
accusations, and the Afghan government under Hamid Karzai has denied these 
accusations as well, calling Iran a "helpful brother and partner to 
Afghanistan."" 
Iranian cooperation in Afghanistan has largely continued, and to date it has 
maintained its commitments towards Afghan reconstruction. Iran, along with 
the United States, Russia, and the countries bordering Afghanistan, attended 
U.N. - sponsored meetings in New York (the Six plus Two group) to try to end 
the conflict in Afghanistan. During the major combat phase of the post-
September 1! US-led war in Afghanistan, Iran offered search and rescue of 
any downed service-persons and the trans-shipment to Afghanistan of 
humanitarian assistance. In March 2002, Iran expelled Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, a 
pro-Taliban Afghan faction leader. Iran froze Hikmatyar's assets in Iran 
(January 2005).4' Whereas United States accused Iran of supporting "negative 
elements," such accusations are dubious and contradict Iran's positive record 
in Afghanistan.46 However, the West believes that the recent allegations of 
collusion between Al-Qaeda and Iranian hardliners are particularly dubious.' 
Iran's ambassador to the UN, Javad Zarif, has denied these accusations, 
stating, 'Iran has been vei_v (!clime in capturing, arresting, preventing the entry 
of al Qaeda Into Iran and once they enter Ira,,, in capturing them, arresting 
them and extraditing them to friend/t• governments. We have probable' 
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captured more a! Qaeila people in the past fourteen months that any other 
countrv.' 48 Such claims contravene both the Islamic Republic's 
accommodating stance toward the 2001 US military campaign in Afghanistan 
and the well-established track record of hostility between Iran and Al-Qaeda's 
ascetic strand of Sunni militancy. Al-Qaeda's ideology and worldview are 
unrelentingly opposed to the Shi'a brand of Islam, which its theologians brand 
as a heretical sect. Moreover the allegations of cooperation between Al-Qaeda 
and Iran are shrouded by the lack of much verifiable public evidence. 
Like nearly all world leaders, Ayatollah Khamenei condemned the attacks of 
9/11. Iran cooperated with the US and was helpful in overthrowing the Taliban 
Government and establishing the new one. Hopes for new ties and the 
cooperation between the US and Iran which emerged were foreclosed when 
President Bush in his 2002 State of the Union address labeled Iran as part of 
the 'Axis of Evil.' The speech caused outrage in Iran and was condemned by 
reformists and conservatives. Relations became more tensed as the US became 
more involved in the region, infringing on states" security and sovereignty. 
Cooperation by Iran in Afghanistan could not generate trust. Rather further 
events complicated the relationship. The US war with Iraq began in 2003. 
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The Iraq War and the US-Iran Relation: 
As with the Taliban, Iran's long track record of conflict with Saddam Hussein 
is well established. The eight year Iran-Iraq War was so bitter and exhausting 
that it did not end in a formal peace treaty and relations between the two 
countries did not fully resume for the ensuing sixteen years of Saddam's rule. 
Here too, Tehran and Washington found themselves improbably united by a 
common enemy, although the problematic history of US policy toward Iraq 
and the implicit threat of Iran's affiliation with its Shia majority added 
considerable layers of complexity and wariness. Moreover, during the Geneva 
talks on Iraq, it quickly became clear that the two countries had lost the spirit 
that they had during the Afghanistan war. By this point, both sides had 
reaffirmed their distrust of each other- through incidents such as Karine A and 
Bush's unexpected remarks in the State of the Union address in which he 
labeled Iran as part of an axis of evil.i49  
While Iran was not as helpful during Operation Iraqi Freedom, it should be 
noted that it was not unhelpful. The United States and Iran have many common 
interests in Iraq, which has provided a unique opportunity for Tehran and 
Washington to edge toward normalization. Tehran, like Washington, is keenly 
interested in avoiding a civil war and sustaining Iraq as a unitary state. Iranian 
elites support a democratic Iraq, fully aware that consensual arrangements for 
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power sharing among Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds are vital to Iraq's survival. 
Indeed, the Bush administration's satisfaction with January's parliamentary 
elections was echoed by Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, the reactionary head of the 
powerful Guardian Council, when he said: "Iraq is now going through its 
election cycle. The election results are very good."50 Moreover, Iran did not 
undertake any endeavor to cause problems for the US-led coalition, rather, it 
advised various Iraqi groups to participate in the US-led reconstruction 5' This 
was critical because many of the most important Shi'a groups, such as ad-
Dawa and the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), as 
well as key individuals such as famed guerrilla commander Al- 
Muhammadawi, all had support from Iran in one fashion or another during the 
1980's and 1990's. In addition, Iran offered early recognition to the precarious 
provisional government and quickly launched efforts to expand economic and 
cultural ties with Iraqis. 
Just as in Afghanistan, however, Iran's cooperation did not negate US 
concerns about its leaders' ultimate intentions. Thus, as casualties continue to 
mount, so too do US allegations of Iranian interference in Iraqi affairs. Paul 
Brcmrner. the chief US administrator in Iraq, has claimed that there is 
"incontrovertible" evidence of "rneddIing and interference" by Iran, whose 
leaders 'know they are doing it, they know we are unhappy about it and they 
ought to stop tt.i2 While the American Enterprise Institute scholar, Michael 
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Ledeen, has claimed that 'inside Iraq there are thousands of Iranian agents at 
work who had been 'committed' by Tehran to sabotage peace in post-Saddam 
Iraq in a 'brilliantly managed campaign to mobilize the Iraqi Shiites.'53 Such 
claims become more unconvincing when one scholar switches, within just a 
few sentences, from saying there are more than a hundred highly trained Arab 
militants,' that the Iranians have smuggled into Iraq, to claiming that 
'thousands of Iranian backed terrorists have been sent,' and adds that these 
terrorists are 'next to impossible to identify. 	These claims have also been 
highly doubted by observers on the ground, such as the British commander in 
charge of the Persian Gulf who, despite these American claims to the contrary, 
has said that he has seen no sign of Iranian meddling," and by Ahmad 
Chalabi, leader of the Iraqi National Congress, who has said that such 
allegations are *httsicaIlt• zrnformded. 56 
However, the tensions between Washington and Tehran have not been helped 
by some Iranian leaders who have taken advantage of the deteriorating security 
situation to intensify their condemnations of the US presence in Iraq. This 
represents a combination of political opportunism and authentic empathy with 
the plight of the Iraqi people and the manifest instability in the sacred Shia 
shrine cities of Najaf and Karbala. For example, Khameini's public 
condemnation of Operation Enduring Freedom'? (much to the bemusement of 
American officials) and the Revolutionary Guard Commander's recent 
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statement that 'given their political and military capabilities, Iran has the 
ability to obstruct and create problems for the American warmongering 
policies in the region 'could easily be taken as proof of bad intent.'e 
In the light of the events of recent years, it is clear that Washington has good 
reason to suspect a high degree of Iranian influence in Iraq. Yet there are some 
respects in which America's own policies have arguably exacerbated the 
tensions with Tehran over this issue. This is most obviously true because US 
condemnation of Iranian interference in Iraqi and Afghanistan affairs 
consciously overlooks the positive contributions made by the elected 
government and instead emphasizes only the negative actions of what 
Washington admits is merely `a minority' within its ranks. Inconveniencing 
the United States is one thing, sowing turmoil in Iran's own environs is quite 
another. In simply pragmatic terms, any partition of Iraq or outbreak of civil 
war could cause spillover effects, imperiling Iran's own stability. In fact, at the 
height of the tensions in Najaf, Iran dispatched a team of diplomats to mediate 
between US forces and the insurgent al Sadr forces.C9 Washington's approach 
has appeared all the more questionable while its allegations have remained 
unproven but such incidents of Iranian co-operation have never been in 
dispute. As one CIA officer has claimed, We are absolutely ) 00% positive 
that there are Iranian operatives in town. '60 But if such intelligence lay behind 
the charges of interference in Iraqi affairs leveled by Rumsfeld and other 
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senior administration figures, then it is also unclear why the mere `presence' of 
Tehran's agents had become synonymous with their interference'. 
Moreover, Rumsfeld's remarks (which are repeatedly echoed in Washington) 
that the United States would never allow an 'Iranian-style theocracy' to come 
about in Iraq is a red herring since neither Iraq's religious leaders nor its 
population favors clerical rule. Moreover, if Iraq stabilizes, the city of Najaf 
with its religious seminaries and shrines will re-assume its centrality in Shia 
religious thought. It will be Iraq that dominates [ran religiously, not the other 
way around. Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani commands a considerable following 
across the region- wider than that of any of Iran's ruling clergy. His quiet 
approach to clerical involvement in politics and reported aversion to Iran's 
theocratic system could create new Iranian adherents to the notion of 
separating religion from politics. Despite the fact that US and Iran shared 
number of interests in Iraq but their relations pertaining to war which is, ur 
some ways, still happening became more complicated and tensed both 
accusing one another for their suspicious role relating to them and Iraq war 
and the present messy situation there. However, the US continues to accuse 
Iran of trying to destabilize its military presence in Iraq with outcome that the 
instability in Iraq is fuelling the fires of extremism throughout the region 6' 
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US-Iran on Arab Israel Peace Process: 
The concerns of the United States are in response to Iran's foreign policy that 
seeks to assert itself as a regional power through the use of various means and 
development of weapons of mass destruction. It accuses that, Iran has 
supported radical Palestinian organizations and Hezhollah to attack Israel and 
disrupt efforts for peace in the West Asia.62 According to US State Department 
reports, Iran has also supported other violent organizations to challenge the 
American presence in Iraq, destabilize progress in Iraq, and maximize its 
influence in the nation and region.e3 In fact, it is believed that due to Iranian 
support for Palestinian groups, which is often conjured by both Tehran and 
Washington as critical to the current Intifada, the West Asia peace process 
broke down at the end of the 1990's. Here it would he helpful for this research 
to keep a glance on Arab-Israel conflict before going into detail about the 
peace process of the states under study. 
The Arab-Israel conflict is basically a fight over the land of historic Palestine 
and whether a Jewish state has legitimacy there. Israel's claims to the land are 
rooted in the Old Testament, whit; the Muslim and Christian Arabs known as 
Palestinians argue that they have lived there uninterruptedly ever since Biblical 
times. The conflict dates to the wake of World War I. Until then, the Ottoman 
Empire had ruled much of the West Asia for centuries, including what was 
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then called Palestine, comprising today's Israel and the Palestinian territories. 
Jews and Arabs coexisted there uneasily, with occasional violence breaking 
out between them. But the Ottomans were on the losing side of the war, 
leaving the European allies to carve up the Ottoman territories. Palestine was 
put under British mandate." 
In 1939 the Brits cut off Jewish immigration to Palestine, just as the Holocaust 
was making refugees of millions of European Jews. The local Arabs opposed 
Jewish immigration as an invasion of foreigners. The restrictions on 
newcomers provoked violent rebellion among Palestine's Jews, prompting the 
British in 1947 to bring Palestine's status before the United Nations. The UN 
approved a plan to partition the territory into two nations, one for Jews, and 
one for Arabs. The Jews accepted the plan, the Arabs rejected it. In 1948, in 
an attempt to prevent the establishment of Israel, the am ies of Egypt, Syria, 
Lebanon, Iraq and 'Iransjordan (today's Jordan) attacked the fledgling Jewish 
state. The two sides fought for months until a UN truce left Israel in control of 
most of the territory, with Jordan controlling the West Bank and Egypt the 
Gaza Strip.65  
The Arab states thought it was just a matter of time before they would remove 
the Jewish state from their midst. In 1967, the Israelis judged that Egypt, 
Jordan, Syria and Iraq were preparing to attack again. Israel struck 
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preemptively, devastating the Arab forces and conquering large parcels of 
land. Israel took the West Bank from Jordan, the Golan Heights from Syria, 
the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula from Egypt. In time, Israeli settlers 
began taking up residence in these places. In the war's aftermath, Yasser Arafat 
took over as leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization, based at first in 
Jordan, then in Syria and Lebanon, from which he stepped up guerrilla raids 
into Israel and eventually acts of terrorism on a global stage. Angered by 
Israel's reluctance to give back the conquered lands, Egypt and Syria in 1973 
attacked in the Sinai and Golan Heights nearly overpowered the Israeli forces. 
But at the end, the Israelis, with resupply assistance from the US, managed to 
push the Arab armies back before the US negotiated a ceasefire.66 
Egyptian President Anwar Sadat stunned the region in 1977 by visiting 
Jerusalem, ",here he pledged his willingness to live in peace with Israelis. That 
launched the Camp David peace process between Sadat and Israeli Prime 
Minister Menachem Begin, hosted by US President Jimmy Carter. Their talks 
produced the 1979 peace treaty between Israel and Egypt, Israel's first such 
accord with any Arab state, which led to Israel's return of the Sinai Peninsula 
to Egypt in 1982. 111 the same year, Israel invaded Lebanon in an effort to 
drive out the PLO. Israeli troops would occupy southern Lebanon until their 
withdrawal in 2000 as a result of resistance by the Shi'ite militia Hizbollah67. 
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In a spontaneous burst of pent-up frustration, the Palestinians in 1987 launched 
the first intifada, or grassroots uprising against Israeli occupation. Over time, 
the insurrection grew deadly. The resisters began using guns and bombs 
against Israeli soldiers and civilians, and to kill suspected Palestinian 
collaborators. The newborn militant Islamist group Hamas thrived in the 
climate of the intifada. With the uprising, the Israelis found it increasingly 
unpalatable to maintain the occupation, and in 1993, Israeli Prime Minister 
Yitzhak Rabin and PLO leader Arafat announced the first Oslo peace accord. 
It provided limited autonomy for the Palestinians in about half of the Gaza 
Strip and in the city of Jericho in the West Bank, with a promise of more 
territory to come. Arafat arrived in Gaza in 1994 and set up the Palestinian 
Authority. Subsequent agreements extended limited self-rule to the major 
cities of the West Bank." 
In 1995, an Israeli extremist opposed to the peace accords assassinated Rabin 
in Tel Aviv. In 1999, centrist Prime Minister Ehud Barak said he was 
determined to reach a deal with Arafat on the final status of the Palestinian 
territories, but talks at Camp David in July 2000 collapsed. In October, the 
Palestinians launched a second intifada, using suicide bombers69. In 2005 
nationalist prime minister Ariel Sharon pulled all Israeli settlers and soldiers 
out of the Gaza Strip. The following January, 1-lamas members were elected to 
a majority in the Palestinian parliament, bringing peace talks to a halt. In July 
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2006, after the Islamist Lebanese militia Hezbollah kidnapped two Israeli 
soldiers, fighting erupted, with Hezbollah rocketing the towns of northern 
Israel and Israel destroying much of south Lebanon and parts of Beirut. 
It is true that the Iranian leadership remains opposed to the peace agreement 
signed between the PLO and Israel, but that opposition is less to do with Iran's 
Islamic ideology than with national security considerations. Implicit in 
Washington's concern is that Iran's stance could puncture the agreement and 
thus render it unworkable. It can do so, it is argued, by lending political and 
propaganda support to the opponents (i.e. I lamas) 70 of the agreement who are 
prepared to wreck it. Cited as examples of attempts to puncture the agreement 
are the kidnapping by 1-lamas of an Israeli soldier in October 1994, and the 
killing a few weeks later of 24 Israeli civilians in Tel Aviv. But this argument 
is flawed on three accounts. First, it denies the existence of a genuine 
opposition to the agreement by various Arab and Palestinian leaders and 
movements, whether the Islamists or the secularists." A reading of the popular 
and academic literature published since the signing of the peace agreement 
between Yasser Arafat and Yitzhak Rabin would support the above assertion." 
Second, it ignores the real difficulties that both the Israelis and the PLO 
leadership have been experiencing in implementing die Oslo agreement. Third, 
although the Islamic Republic enjoys a degree of moral and philosophical 
influence over the Islamic movements in the Arab world, Washington, and 
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Israel and Egypt for that matter, are exaggerating, one would suspect for 
political reasons, Iran's assistance to or influence in these movements. This is 
borne out by the fact that, despite Iran's strong opposition to the peace talks 
over the long period, it has failed conspicuously to persuade the Arab 
governments to abandon the peace talks with Israel. Even the Syrians, Iran's 
closest friend in the Arab world, take a different stance from Tehran on the 
Arab-Israeli conflict. And there is little that Iran can do about it. In fact, 
President Rafsanjani is on record as saying that, if there was going to be a 
peace agreement between Israel and Syria which would make the latter 
content, then Iran would accept the outcome." 
The reality is that because of cultural, racial, historical and religious 
differences between the Arabs and the Iranians, neither cuts much ice with the 
other. The financial, political and military support that the Arab states (except 
Libya and Syria) gave to Iraq in its eight-year war against Iran is a measure of 
Iran's lack of influence in the Arab states. It is worth noting that shortly after 
the Gulf War of 1991, Iran improved its relations with the Gulf States and 
proposed a Gulf security arrangement of all the littoral states, but the Arab 
monarchies rejected the suggestion and instead signed security treaties with the 
United States. It could be argued that the Persian Gulf monarchies cannot feel 
comfortable with a 'revolutionary' government, but they did not feel at ease 
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with the Iranian monarchy either. "I'hey were as much at odds with the Shah as 
they are with the ayatollahs. 
Similarly, the Arabs have had little, if any, success in influencing Iranian 
politics. For example, they failed to persuade the Shah to withdraw Iran's de 
facto recognition of Israel, sever trade and technical relations and end the 
supply of oil to the Jewish state. Iran's relations with its other Muslim 
neighbors, namely Turkey, Pakistan and Afghanistan, have been friendlier than 
with the Arabs. Again, this was as true under the Pahlavis as it is under the 
ayatollahs. Also, Iran has had closer and more cooperative relations with its 
new neighbors, the Central Asian Republics, than with the Arabs. 
Notwithstanding the role played by foreign powers to create division between 
the Arab states and Iran, the fact remains that there are more things to divide 
them than there are to unite them. 
What is being argued here is that as political rhetoric it may he useful for the 
US to portray Iran as a dragon capable of breathing fire across the Persian Gulf 
into the defenseless sheikhdoms who are vulnerable to Iran's influence and 
coercive power. But in doing so, Washington should not lose sight of the 
historical facts briefly discussed above. In other words, it is wrong to assume, 
as the United States seems to, that Iran's acquiescence in the Arab-Israeli peace 
process will have much impact on the outcome of the negotiations. The 
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opponents of the agreements signed between the Arab states and Israel are not 
waiting for instructions from Teheran to take to the streets to show their anger 
against their governments. Such assumptions by the US administration refuse 
to recognize the authenticity and therefore the legitimacy of nationalist and 
independent movements in the developing world, believing that they were all 
inspired, directed and financed by Iran or others. 
As pointed out earlier, Iran's opposition to the PLO-Israeli agreement has a 
security dimension to it, which is perhaps more important than its Islamic 
dimension. They believe that one of the aims of the agreement has been to 
further isolate Iran and thus make it more vulnerable to outside pressure. At 
the time when the US, the world's only superpower, has almost total 
domination in the area, when both Washington and Tel Aviv view Iran as the 
only threat to the security of the region, and when Israel and the major Arab 
states and allies of the United States (i_e. Egypt and Saudi Arabia) show overt 
hostility towards Iran and are suspicious of its intentions in the Persian Gulf, 
the Iranians have reason to be apprehensive about and feel vulnerable to the 
overtures between the Arabs and Israelis. There has been for some time now a 
school of thought in Israel which believes that one way of making peace with 
the Arabs is to portray Iran and the radical Islam that it represents as the 
common enemy. There have been several statements by high-ranking Israeli 
officials and political analysts to that effect. For example, Israel's military 
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intelligence officers and Israeli commentators have argued that because of 
Israel's physical distance from Iran, Israel alone cannot win a conventional 
ground war against Iran which is 'considered the most threatening' of all 
Israel's enemies, which include Syria and Iraq. So one way of containing Iran 
or defeating it in a war, short of using nuclear weapons of course, is 'improved 
cooperation with some (of its) neighboring states'.74 
The late Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin, is quoted as saying that Muslim 
fundamentalists, led by Iran, are the greatest enemies of the peace process 
between the Arabs and Israel.75 Coupled with this is the statement by US 
Defense Secretary, William Perry, to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
that Iran poses a serious threat to Israel as well as to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and 
other Persian Gulf states, and that only a combined force of Israel, the United 
States, and the Persian Gulf states can stand up to Iran's military power and 
deter its threat.76 In short, the Israel-PLO agreement has created a de facto US-
Israel-Arab alliance which, Iran fears, has the potential of being turned into a 
vehicle for applying political, military and economic pressure on it and thus 
threatening its national security interests in the Persian Gulf. 
Therefore, as far the Arab Israel Peace Process is concerned there have been 
no improvements in US-Iran relations during the Bush Administration. In his 
State of the Union Address in 2002, President Bush labeled Iran as part of the 
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'Axis of Evil, outraging the Iranian leadership. Iran responded with a public 
statement: "the Islamic Republic is proud to be a target of the hate and anger of 
the world's greatest evil, we never seek to be praised by American officials."77 
However, in 2003, Iran did offer a proposal trying to ease strained relations 
between the two rivals. Iran put several different issues on the table including 
an offer, within the framework of the negotiations, to disarm Hezbollah and 
turn it into a mere political organization. Secondly, the offer included an end 
of all support for Islamic jihad and Hamas, and provisions that Iran would 
encourage the Palestinians to go a political route, rather than military route, in 
their dealings with Israel. The US rejected the offer. Overall, the rhetoric of the 
Bush administration has been that Iran is a threat to not only the United States, 
but also to the international community. 
In 2003, prior to the Iraq War, the Bush administration reportedly received 
overtures from the Iranian government. With help from the American Iranian 
Council, Iran purportedly proposed a "grand bargain", which would have 
resolved outstanding issues between the United States and Iran, including 
Iran's nuclear program and support for Hamas and Hezbollah.78 Bush 
administration officials, including Richard Armitage, thought the Khatami 
government and the Swiss ambassador in Tehran were "promising more than it 
could deliver". Others, such as `'ali Nasr and Gary Sick consider the lack of an 
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American response to be a missed opportunity. Lawrence Wilkerson, Colin 
Powell's chief of staff, said that "it was Cheney and Rumsfeld who made sure 
that Washington dismissed Iran's May 2003 offer to open up its nuclear 
program, rein in flezbollah and cooperate against Al-Qaedai79 There are a 
number of allegations against Iranian policy which disrupt Arab-Israel peace 
process. 
Iran's support for Palestinian militant groups has long concerned US 
Administrations, particularly since doing so gives Tehran an opportunity to try 
to obstruct Israeli-Palestinian peace prospects. In the 1990s, Khamenei called 
Israel a "cancerous tumor" and made other statements suggesting that he seeks 
Israel's destruction. In December 2001, Rafsanjani said that it would take only 
one Iranian nuclear bomb to destroy Israel, whereas a similar strike against 
Iran by Israel would have far less impact because Iran's population is large. 
Iran has sometimes openly incited anti-Israel violence, including hosting 
conferences of anti-peace process organizations (April 24, 2001, and June 2-3, 
2002).80 
On the other hand, during his presidency. Khatemi generally refrained from 
inflammatory statements against Israel and even conversed with Israel's 
president at the 2005 funeral of Pope John Paul II. The Iranian Foreign 
Ministry, considered a bastion of moderates, has repeatedly stated that Iran's 
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official position is that it would not seek to block any final Israeli-Palestinian 
settlement but that the peace process is too weighted toward Israel to result in a 
fair settlement for Palestinians. The State Department reports on terrorism for 
2005 (released on April 28, 2006) accuse Iran of providing "extensive" 
funding, weapons, and training to Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), the 
Al Aqsa Martyr's Brigades, and the popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC). All are named as foreign terrorist 
organizations (FTO) by the Stale Department for their use of violence against 
Israelis and efforts to undermine the Arab-Israeli peace process.8' 
Since the end of World War II, the US and other Western powers have deemed 
that they have a moral obligation to protect Israel. At the same time, Muslim 
rulers and clerics around the world have sought to mobilize Islam's believers 
against Israel. Iran has threatened Israel with nuclear weapons, and one of the 
key reasons why Al-Qaeda terrorists are carrying out attacks against the US 
and its allies is because of what they see as Washington's one-sided support of 
Israel. Without a solution to the Palestinian-Israeli dispute, there can never be 
a durable peace in the West Asia.82 Foremost among the issues of the region 
and for Muslims around the world is the establishment of a just and settlement 
of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Islamic Republic of Iran still has not 
recognized Israel's right to exist and has hindered the peace process in West 
Asia by arming militants, including Hamas, Hezbollah, and Palestinian Islamic 
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Jihad. This serves as a serious problem both for Israel and the US and might 
transform into a serious repercussion for the region. 
After 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran US has no diplomatic relations. They 
have rarely engaged in face-to-face talks since then. On April 24, 1981, the 
Swiss Government assumed representation of American interests in Tehran via 
an interests section. Iranian interests in the United States are represented by the 
Iranian Interests Section of the Pakistani Embassy in Washington, D.C. 
Obstacles to improved relations between the US and the Islamic Republic of 
Iran remains. In 2003, Jahangir Amuzegaran, Finance Minister and Economic 
Ambassador in Iran's pre-1979 government, identified several obstacles to 
"resumption of relations" between the two countries from the American 
perspective, 83 the obstacles according to him are: 
I. 	Iranian state sponsorship of international terrorism 
2. Pursuit of weapons of mass destruction 
3. Threats to neighbors in the Persian Gulf 
4. Repeated statements by the Iran's highest government officials that they 
wish "Death to America" and for Israel to "Vanish from the pages of 
time" 
5. Opposition to the Arab-Israeli peace process 
6. Violations of human rights 
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To this he adds that "in recent years, the last two issues seem to have lost some 
of their potency and are now only infrequently raised. On the other hand, a 
new accusation of Iran's harboring of al Qaeda operatives has recently been 
added to the list". Iran's original post-revolutionary list of demands required 
the United States to: 
Accept the legitimacy of the 1979 revolution 
	
1. 	Not interfere in Iran's internal affairs 
I. 	Deal with the Iranian regime on the basis of "respect and equality" 
Amuzegaran noted subsequent demands by Iran: 
1. Lifting American economic sanctions, 
2. Releasing frozen Iranian assets in the United States 
3. Ending the American military presence in the neighboring countries of 
Iraq and Afghanistan 
4. Removing the US Navy from the Persian Gulf 
5. Ending perceived one-sided support for Israel 
6. Formally apologizing for intervention in Iran, including the CIA-backed 
overthrow of Mohammed Mossadiqh in the 1950s 
Paying reparations for: 
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t. 	American companies assistance in developing Iraq's chemical weapons 
facilities during the Iran-Iraq war 
2. American support for anti-Iranian organizations (i.e. the People's 
Mujahedin of Iran [MEK]) 
3. USS Vincennes shooting down Iran Air Flight 655 
4. Economic damage caused by American sanctions and political pressure 
5. American unmanned aerial vehicle flights over Iran violating Iranian 
airspace since 2003 
6. America's human rights record 
The US objects to Iran's sponsorship of terrorism, its nuclear weapons 
ambitions, and its violations of human rights and the theocratic nature or the 
Government. Although the Islamic Republic of Iran has contributed to positive 
reconstruction efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, Tehran has also pursued 
policies to undermine stability in hoth countries. Additionally the US 
Government is concerned with the Islamic Republic of Iran's recent 
crackdown on human rights and detainment of civil society actors. Iran also 
continues to object to many of the US policies in the region and with respect to 
Iran as well. Moreover it also perceives a probability of US attack on Iran 
independently or with Israeli collaboration to weaken Iran and derail its 
nuclear program. Despite these obstacles, US-Iranian representatives have 
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discussed a number of issues of concern over the years. US and Iranian envoys 
cooperated during operations against the Taliban in 2001 and during the Bonn 
Conference in 2002, which established a broad-based government for the 
Afghan people under President Karzai. In 2007, representatives from the two 
countries met several times to discuss Iraq. But the created opportunities of 
cooperation could not normalize their relations. And the nation which was, 
before the Revolution, Iran's foremost economic and military partner today is 
the foremost adversary with the outcome that their relations are characterized 
by contentious speeches and statements. 
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Iranian 5Vuchear ftogramme 
and the 7)3- Iran &firtions 
IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAMME AND THE US-IRAN 
RELATIONS 
Iranian Nuclear Program during the last few years has become one of the 
burning issues for international community and a cause for confrontationist 
and adversarial relations between the US and Iran. It evokes concerns for 
many reflected in the diverse reactions and positions. The debates on the issue 
have been passionate and partisan, due in some part to the likelihood of war 
and its serious consequences. However, it is an obvious fact that more than 
anything else, it is this issue which has become most emblematic of the gulf 
between the two countries. Although it is clear from the previous discussions 
(Chapters) that the US-Iranian struggle for influence in the region of West 
Asia has been shaped by various issues, yet these have been overshadowed by 
the nuclear conflict, which is now widely seen as the dominant problem for 
both the rivals. Therefore, it is widely realized that in the present international 
political scenario, Tehran's nuclear program has become the most significant 
source of friction between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the West, 
especially the United States. It is true that at this point, Iran's policy is less 
ideologically driven than it may at first appear. The present President of the 
United States, Barack Obarna, unlike his predecessors, has offered to negotiate 
with Iran without preconditions over its nuclear ambitions.' Success, or even 
minimal progress, in this respect requires an understanding of the internal 
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dynamics of Iran's nuclear decision making. 'f his chapter endeavors to shed 
light on Iran's nuclear calculus. It is worth mentioning here that discussion in 
Iran on the country's acquisition of nuclear weapons has tended to focus on 
Iran's right to acquire the technology needed to develop an independent 
nuclear energy programme. US efforts to impede the flow of requisite 
technology have been cast by the Iranian as an attempt to keep Iran backward 
and dependent. US policy has been viewed as a hostile action toward an 
independent Iran. The principle of independence, of course, was one of the 
touchstones of the Iranian Islamic Revolution, and few Iranians of whatever 
political persuasion- nationalists, secularists, or advocates of a strict religious 
government would dissent from its importance? However, Iran's national 
perspective on its nuclear policy is shaped by a multiplicity of domestic, 
regional and global variables., Ever since 2002, when Iran's nuclear issue was 
elevated in the West as a growing threat to regional stability and the 
nonproliferation regime, the leadership of the Islamic Republic has couched 
the issue in terms of both its absolute rights under the Nuclear Non-
proliferation Treaty (NPT) and its right to engage in the research and 
development of all phases of peaceful nuclear energy.3  
The purpose of this Chapter (study) is to analyze some of the main factors that 
have shaped the evolution of [rap's national thinking for generating nuclear 
energy in the post-revolution era and to examine contemporary debates inside 
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as well as outside the country on the logic of its nuclear policy. The study is 
primarily concerned with the evaluation of US-Iran relation in the context of 
Iranian Nuclear Programme and their divergent stands on the issue along-with 
its effects on the foreign policies of both the nations and prescribing some 
probable future options for both the countries. Simultaneously, it is necessary 
to discuss briefly about the response of the neighboring countries of Iran on 
the nuclear issue as they are on the one way or the other connected with either 
of rivals. However, prior to enter into the depth of the US-Iran standpoints on 
this issue, it is as well required to have an overview of the Iranian Nuclear 
programme in order to make it convenient to comprehend the crisis. 
The Nuclear Crisis: An Overview 
Iran's relations with the world are multifaceted and complex. Within its 
region. Iran's policies are shaped by instabilities in neighboring countries and 
the West Asia in general, questions of Persian Gulf security, the Israeli 
Palestinian conflict and various contests for power and resources. Iran's 
relations with Europe, as well as with Russia, China, India and other actors in 
Asia, Africa and Latin America, have long been shaped by economic interests 
on the one hand and, particularly in the case of Europe, political differences on 
the other, in addition to the growing influence of the nuclear confl' ict.' Iran's 
bilateral relations with the United States are themselves far more intricate than 
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they sometimes appear. While the nuclear conflict has become central to it, 
there are host of bilateral issues that have also shaped this particular 
relationship. 'these include historical events such as the US-backed coup 
against Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadiqh in 1953 or the 1979-
Sl Hostage Crisis, disputes over frozen Iranian assets, Iran's dealing with 
organizations US deems terrorist, Iran's denial of Israel's right to exist, and 
more recently and increasingly, a serious geopolitical competition for pre-
dominance in the West Asia. 
As briefed in the Chapter Two that Iratcs pursuit of a nuclear capability goes 
as far back as the 1960s. In the initial period Iran's nuclear program was 
designed to build nuclear power plants, which are the units utilized to produce 
energy for industry. The US signed an agreement with Iran to help it acquire 
nuclear technology in 1966 for peaceful purposes.5 Therefore, the United 
States was the first country to help Iran gain nuclear technology. It supplied a 
five-megawatt research reactor to Iran that began operation in 1967. Iran 
signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968 and ratified it in 
1970.6  An analysis over the matter reveals that the Iranian nuclear program 
was ambitious from the beginning. Oil prices soared, especially after the 1973 
Arab- Israeli war, allowing the Iranian government to invest more in nuclear-
energy development. Under Shah Muhammed Pahlavi's administration, the 
Iranian government made deals with German and French contractors. 
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Germany's Kraftwerk Union (a subsidiary of Siemens) agreed to build two 
1,200-megawatt nuclear reactors at Busher, and a French company agreed to 
supply two 900-megawatt reactors. The Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
(MIT) also signed a contract with the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran 
(AEOI) to train the first cadre of Iranian nuclear scientists in 1975. Iran's 
domestic nuclear cycle included an advanced nuclear research center and the 
development of uranium mining and ore processing.' The United States also 
supported Iran's plans to build a nuclear-energy capacity. According to 
declassified confidential US government documents, the shah's government 
planned to purchase eight nuclear reactors from the United States for 
electricity generation purpose.8 In July 1978, only seven months before the 
Islamic revolution, the final draft of the US-Iranian Nuclear Energy 
Agreement was signed. This agreement was designed to facilitate Iranian-
American nuclear cooperation, including the purchase of equipment and 
material from the United States and help in the search for uranium deposits. 
The political upheaval preceding and following the revolution halted the 
Iranian nuclear program. I lowever, until 1979, beside technical support of the 
United States, some German and French companies, which were competent in 
the nuclear technology, also involved in the project of constructing a nuclear 
power plant in Busher. Iran declared that Busher power plant was designed for 
energy production but there were claims arguing that, even before the 
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revolution, Iran had the goal of obtaining nuclear weapons .9 By 1979, one 
nuclear reactor, Busher 1, was 90 percent complete, with 60 percent of its 
equipment installed, Busher 2 was 50 percent complete. 
The US authorities and European firms fulfilled their commitments until the 
Iranian Revolution took place, and when the revolution occurred, the nuclear 
facilities were half finished. Once the revolution broke out, cooperation 
between the contractors and Iran ceased, and the controversies regarding 
contracts between Iran and European companies have been an issue throughout 
the 1980s.10 The first prime minister after the revolution, Mehdi Bazargan, 
concluded that Iran did not need nuclear energy and discontinued the project." 
The pre-1976 history of Iranian nuclear issue has been discussed in the Second 
Chapter with a separate heading and therefore, it would not be elaborated here 
other than referring the matter whenever necessary. 
Iranian Revolution marked a new phase with regard to the Iranian nuclear 
program. After the revolution, Iran declared that it halted its nuclear program, 
but the commitment to this declaration seems a little bit ambiguous because of 
the facts observed in the following years.12 Iran's nuclear program remained as 
an issue, although in an unheated pace, during 1980's and in an increased pace 
in 1990's. Several Iranian attempts to complete Busher power plant in 19R0's 
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in cooperation with some European companies have been abortive because of 
the US pressure." 
There were/are others factors that prevented Iran from developing a nuclear 
capacity. In post-revolution Iran war happened. with Iraq in 1980 and ended in 
1988. This was a major factor. Iraq bombed Iran's nuclear reactors and 
research centers, hitting the two reactors under construction in Busher six 
times. That experience drove Iran to consider on the security of nuclear 
facilities against foreign attacks in its following initiatives to run a nuclear 
program. Almost all the nuclear activities of Iran in 1980s were related to 
Busher power Plant, although there has not been any progress recorded in that 
project either. Compared to other nuclear-related facilities of Iran, most of 
which were built after 1990, construction of Busher power plant has cost too 
much to Iran, because it has been half-built. ruined and rebuilt several times 
because of the attacks, change of the contractors, and incompatibility of the 
technologies of different contractors.14 
With the end of the war, Iran's need for electricity significantly expanded. 
According to the official Iranian line, this led President Hasherni Rafsanjani's 
government to review its policy and decide to continue with the quest for 
nuclear-energy projects. The Iranian government sought international technical 
assistance and collaboration to complete the nuclear facilities from Germany, 
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Argentina, Spain, the Czech Republic, Italy and Poland." However, these 
attempts were prevented by the United States as a part of the dual containment 
policy. The programme was later discontinued by Ayatollah Khomeini, only to 
be revived again under President Rafsanjani during the 1990s26  
In 1990's Iran gunned up its nuclear power plant building activities, this time 
with nonwestern countries, Russia and China.t 'These plants were essentially 
designed for energy generation and their construction was totally contracted to 
institutions in Russia or China. Russia also cooperated on uranium mining 
capabilities with Iran, and according to the contract between Russia and Iran, 
the fuel for the power plant contracted to Russia would also he procured by 
Russia." 
These attempts of the Iran to get nuclear technology have been blockaded by 
the US, however, the real concern of the United States has always been Iran's 
attempts to have nuclear indigenous technology which can he either utilized 
for peaceful or military purposes. West believes that besides trying to build 
nuclear power plants, Iran also began to establish its indigenous uranium 
enrichment capabilities in I 990's.19Yet these activities were not a major issue 
in the agenda of international community. 
In 1995, after long negotiations, an Iranian-Russian agreement over Iran's 
nuclear program was signed. It called for finishing the reactors at Busher, 
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which, Linder the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA), would have been capable of producing a maximum of 180kg of 
plutonium per year. According to the agreement, ' Busher V was supposed to 
be completed by 1999. But it remained unfinished and so Russia announced it 
will finish the Busher power plant in 2009, according to Reuters.'" The 
agreement also stipulated that Russia would provide further technical 
assistance and the training of Iranian nuclear scientists.21  
Russian completion of the Busher reactors was an immensely complex task. 
Back in the 1970s, the Kraftwerk Union did not provide any technical 
documents for the installation of the reactors. In addition, Russian and German 
reactors are significantly different technologically. The Iranian nuclear 
program is highly dependent on foreign technology transfer, and it seems that 
it will continue to he.22.\pother point that raised concern about Iranian 
intentions has been the rapid developments in Iranian missile delivery 
capabilities. Iran's middle-range ballistic-missile capabilities can reach all the 
West Asia and Eastern Europe. Israeli and American analysts, in particular, 
suggest that the development of these capabilities poses a security threat to the 
region. Iran's efforts to develop missile capabilities in parallel with its nuclear 
program have led many analysts to believe the latter is intended for military 
purposes rather than energy production. 
162 
The incident that triggered the debate and global attention directed toward 
Iran and its nuclear ambitions were started because of a leakage of information 
in 2002. The crisis was initiated in August 2002, when an Iranian exile 
opposition group, the National Council of Resistance (Mujahedin-e-IQralq), 
accused Tehran of hiding a uraniutn-enrichment facility at Natanz and a 
heavy-water plant at Arak.23 Soon, IAEA inspections also revealed that Iran 
undergoes an indigenous programme to advance its nuclear capability, and as 
the West alleged that some of the necessary equipments for nuclear facilities 
have been procured illegally from two countries and A.Q. Khan Network. 
According to NPT rules these activities and transfers are subject to IAEA 
safeguards and IAEA should have been notified, yet, these transfers between 
the foreign suppliers and Iran have not been reported to IAEA and were 
violation of NP! rules.24 
This was followed by Iran's announcement that its nuclear programme had 
peaceful aims and that it would allow IAEA inspections" In November 2003, 
Iran suspended its nuclear program and announced it would allow stricter 
IAEA inspections. The IAEA concluded that there was no evidence of the 
program, but the United States insisted that Iran ultimately aims to produce 
nuclear weapons, particularly as the country possesses enormous fossil-fuel 
reserves and does not need nuclear energy in the short and medium term. In 
addition, three other factors discredit the "peaceful nuclear energy argument: 
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(1) Iran kept its nuclear program secret until it was discovered in 2002, (2) 
there are alleged military connections and weaponization studies connected to 
the nuclear program as well as missile development, (3) and from an economic 
perspective, indigenous enrichment is not logical.26 
To mediate between Washington and Tehran, the foreign ministers of France, 
Germany and Britain (the EU3) visited Iran in October 2003. They asked Iran 
to stop enriching uranium and suggested that it sign an additional protocol to 
the NPT and provide full cooperation with the IAEA. The EU3 offered 
economic concessions, if these conditions were met. The rest of the world, 
including the United States, supported the EU3 initiative and it diplomatic 
solution to the problem. In August 2005, Iran rejected the proposal, and the 
talks were stopped. In fall 2005, Iran resumed uranium conversion at its 
Isfahan plant, and an IAEA resolution declared it in violation of the NPT. 
During fall 2005. Iran was encouraged to resume talks with the EU-3, to 
refrain from enrichment at other nuclear facilities and to halt enrichment at the 
Isfahan plant. 
In January 2006, Iran broke the IAEA seals at its Natanz facility, and the 
IAEA referred the matter to the UN Security Council (UNSC). Iran also 
declared that it had resumed its uranium conversion at Natanz. On March 30, 
2006, the UNSC demanded that Iran should suspend uranium enrichment 
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within 30 days. In April 2006, Ahmedinejad, the President of Islamic Republic 
of Iran announced that uranium enrichment had been successfully achieved. 
As a response, on December 23, 2006, the UNSC unanimously adopted 
Resolution 1737, imposing sanctions specifically on the Iranian nuclear 
program, calling for Iran to suspend all enrichment related and reprocessing 
activities, and to take all steps required by the IAEA to ensure that its program 
is for peaceful energy production only. Iran did not comply and has continued 
with its enrichment activities. On March 24, 2007, the UNSC unanimously 
accepted Resolution 1747 tightening sanctions against Iran and giving Tehran 
60 days to suspend its uranium enrichment program. Iran did not comply, 
declaring that it had begun "industrial scale" enrichment.27 As of early 2009, 
the IAEA estimates that industrial-scale enrichment involving about 4,000 fuel 
rods Is oIngolVg.28  
On October 1, 2009, Iran participated in a meeting with representatives of the 
so-called 'P5+1' (the United States, United Kingdom, Russia, China, France 
and Germany) in Geneva, at which an agreement was drafted under which a 
new Iranian nuclear facility would be opened to inspection and a major portion 
of the country's low enriched uranium (LEU) exported to Russia and France 
for processing into higher enriched fuel rods for the American built research 
reactor in Tehran. Even before this meeting took place, Iranian President 
Ahmadinejad demonstrated a willingness to engage with the international 
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community, including the United States, over the nuclear issue. For example, 
even though Iranian officials had repeatedly stated that they would not accept 
any deadlines for talks on Iran's nuclear programme, they still submitted a 
proposal just in time for the meeting of the P5+1 in September, which in turn 
made the October meeting possible. Iranian policymakers had also previously 
stated that they would discuss their nuclear file only with International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) and not the P5+1, but still submitted their proposal to 
the representatives of P5+1 six countries.29 
The draft agreement, which the international community and Iran seemed very 
close to signing after the Geneva meeting, was certainly the most creative 
proposal in many years. If implemented, the agreement would not have ended 
the nuclear conflict outright, but could have become a game changer. For the 
first time since the Paris agreement of November 2004, under which Iran had 
agreed to a voluntary suspension of enrichment activities while further 
negotiations took place, there was a chance to rebuild some trust over the 
nuclear issue. Any transfer of Iranian LEU to Russia for processing would 
have reduced Iranian stockpiles of a material which, at least in theory, could be 
further enriched to bomb grade. Perhaps more importantly, the agreement 
would have inaugurated a form of multi lateralization of the fuel processing 
that European policymakers and the IAEA have repeatedly proposed and 
which Iran has never explicitly rejected. Moreover, such an agreement would 
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have allowed Iran to claim that the international community had finally, at 
least implicitly, accepted its successful enrichment activities as a legitimate 
part of a peaceful nuclear programme. ` 0 
In a nutshell, Iran is still a member of the NPT and, under the terms of this 
agreement, member states have the right to develop a nuclear programme for 
peaceful purposes, including enrichment. This is why Iranians repeatedly 
emphasize that they are simply doing what they are allowed to do enrichment. 
However, the fears of the United States, the EU and regional actors are not all 
groundless. As the IAEA has confirmed, Iran maintained a secret enrichment 
program for 18 years, until it was discovered in 2002. Even though Iran has 
categorically denied allegations that its programme is for producing nuclear 
weapons, Iranian officials have not convinced others, most of all the United 
States. 
The completion of the Busher power plant has given confidence and 
experience to Iran in dealing with nuclear technology that has diminished the 
international pressure on Iran to stop its nuclear research.;' On the other hand, 
the fuel spent in the power plant seems to continue to he a cause of concern. 
Since the spent fuel is a kind of substance that could be reprocessed in order to 
produce plutonium, the scrutiny of international community will continue and 
IAF.A would keep the nuclear activities of Iran under contro132 
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Currently, the situation has escalated to its highest point to date, as the 
Security Council deliberates on the possible diplomatic options and strategies 
to pursue in order to dissuade Iran from its goal of domestic uranium 
enrichment 33 While events advance at a dizzying pace, one element that has 
remained constant throughout the nuclear crisis is a clear effort by both sides 
to manipulate public and international perceptions. During the course of the 
crisis, both nations have made tangible efforts to manipulate both their own 
image, and that of the other side. Within this phenomenon, Iran has largely 
been represented internationally as irrational, duplicitous and dangerous. In a 
similar vein, within Iran and sympathetic nations, the United States has been 
portrayed as a self-serving imperialist intent on advancing a destabilizing and 
war-like agenda.J4 In essence, misperception within the nuclear issue is both 
conducted, and capitalized upon. 
Iranian Position on the Nuclear Issue: 
Since the revelation of the Iranian nuclear programme, Iran has made a 
consistent public position that its nuclear goals are peaceful in nature. As it has 
stated on many occasions. Iran's objective is to develop a viable nuclear 
energy infrastructure. While most security analysts maintain the primacy of 
weapons manufacture in Iran's agenda, much European and US analysis 
overlooks Iran's considerate economic and social objectives in seeking nuclear 
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power. In pursuing this agenda. Iran is attempting to fulfill several long- 
standing economic goals. these involve the diversification of the Iranian 
economy away from a reliance on oil, the reduction of domestic oil 
consumption (thereby increasing foreign exports), the stimulation of economic 
growth in peripheral industries, and finally, diversification of Iran's energy 
infrastructure in the face of staggering demographic trends.35 Iran also has a 
legal basis in its position, as from the perspective of international law, Iran is 
within their rights to pursue these aims. Iran is a Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty (NAT) signatory and possesses the right under Article 4 of the treaty to 
pursue and develop peaceful nuclear energy. To reinforce this position, it 
should be noted that at present no direct evidence has been found that clearly 
illustrates the actual construction of a nuclear weapon 36 
However, despite these facts, it appears that Iran has conducted questionable 
activities within the scope of its nuclear programme, and it is within this field 
that the real roots of the issue are to be found. In every sense, the Iranian 
nuclear crisis is a crisis of confidence, as both the IAEA and many nations are 
not secure in believing that Iran is pursuing a peaceful nuclear agenda. The 
tally of evidence which has propelled the crisis is quite long, and for most this 
is of sufficient quantity to justify such a lack of confidence. One notable 
example is the existence of the Natanz facility itself, as the case has been made 
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that the construction of such a facility (being underground). combined with 
evidence of undeclared nuclear research, is a clear violation of the NPT.;' 
Furthermore, Iran has also failed to provide an explanation behind 
Ahmadinejad's public assertion that Iran was conducting research with P- I and 
P-2 centrifuge method, a technology Iran had previously declared had been 
abandoned38. The lack of international confidence towards Iran also sterns 
from political differences between Iran and much of the rest of the world. In 
particular, the election of President Ahmadinejad and the abrupt change in 
Iran's foreign policy position to a more confrontational stance does not present 
the international community with a positive image of Iran. Nor has the 
president's hard-line rhetoric provided much hope for successful negotiations. 
This dubious image of Ahmadincjad's Iran was further reinforced by the 
unusual nature of Iranian bilateral diplomacy taken prior to the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) referral vote, which saw Iran make 
threatening statements to its immediate neighbors as well as to the US itself.39 
These statements, combined with the perceived unwillingness of Tehran to 
work towards a compromise with the main concerned parties, namely Russia 
and China have confirmed to many the futility of pursuing diplomatic 
initiatives with the new government in Tehran.4°  
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Within the field of popular perception, the present situation has provided the 
Iranian government with a very useful opportunity to mobilize the domestic 
population. While the existence of contradictions, as well as the dangers posed 
by the changes in Iranian foreign policy is evident to many within Iran they are 
factors which are not given any attention in official public media. In reacting 
to the crisis, the Iranian government has managed to effectively redirect 
popular attention towards the nuclear program into different channels. To do 
so, the Iranian government has framed its nuclear policy within a framework 
of highly appealing popular nationalism. Within this context, the government's 
foreign policy actions are based on a steadfast commitment to pursue Iran's 
national rights, as well as resisting malicious foreign agendas. This message is 
also conveyed abroad with the intention of gaining support from likemninded 
populations and governments. A notable example is Ahmadinejad's 2005 UN 
speech, where he accused the west of "trying to enforce a system of nuclear 
apartheid."t t  
In application, this policy has proved to he successful. By linking the progress 
of the nuclear programme to cultural attitudes of national pride, the 
government has garnered an incredible amount of support from the population. 
Telling evidence in this regard is the massive outpouring of support within Iran 
following the president's statement that Iran had successfully enriched 
uranium42.'fhrough this endeavor, the Iranian government has also successfully 
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presented highly defined and highly negative representations of the concerned 
parties on the other side of the crisis, such as Germany, France, Britain and the 
United States. Often the public position emphasizes the baseless nature of their 
statements, while committing to continued compliance with IAEA inspectors 
and safeguards (despite continued non-compliance)." 
Iranian Interest and Politics in the Nuclear Development: 
The Iranian state has two primary interests: to protect its territorial integrity 
and the Islamic regime, and to become the leading power in the region. 
However, it can be argued here that Iran perceives American influence as the 
greatest threat to the survival of its regime and uses its nuclear program to gain 
leverage in its relations with the world. Moreover, Iran has some geopolitical 
advantages. It has access to the world's two energy rich regions, the West Asia 
and the Caspian Basin. North-South and East-West control of energy transit 
lines and the ability to control the Strait of Hormuz increase Iran's leverage 
over other actors. Its great land mass and inhospitable terrain is of enormous 
advantages against foreign military penetration. 
In addition, Iran holds the world's second-largest oil reserves (1 1.4 percent of 
the total reserves), as well as gas reserves (15.5 percent). In 2006, Iran was the 
fourth-largest producer of oil and natural gas in the world, while current oil 
production is estimated to he 4.3 million barrels per day (about 5.4 percent of 
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global output). Its reserves of oil and gas have not yet been revealed.'a Despite 
an underdeveloped technological capacity in production and a lack of adequate 
investment, Iran has the ability to influence world energy markets. The third 
factor that gives Iran an advantage is its young and comparatively well 
educated population: two-thirds of its near about 85 million inhabitants are 
under the age of 30.45 The weakness of the Iranian population is its multiethnic 
character. For example, about a quarter of it is ethnic Azeri, mostly in the 
north.46 Foreign influences can use ethnic groups to interfere with the Islamic 
regime. Finally, Iran's long history as a nation and its bureaucratic competence 
make the regime stronger. It is opportunistic and flexible. The economy is the 
regime's weak point. 
The United States regards Iran as the greatest threat to its regional interests. 
According to the Bush administration, Iran supports terrorism, denies its 
people human rights, seeks to acquire WMDs, destabilizes the region and is a 
serious threat to Israel. To eliminate this "threat," Iran must be saved from the 
current authoritarian regime, and a democracy must be established that would 
be integrated politically and economically with the rest of the world. If Iran 
were to produce nuclear weapons, its military capabilities would insure the 
Islamic regime from attack. Iran perceives acquiring a nuclear weapons 
capability as the only way to eliminate the American threat. The problems 
between the United States and Iran are all intertwined with the nuclear issue. 
173 
For the United States, the real aim is regime change: however, to achieve that, 
Iran must first be prevented from producing nuclear weapons. Iran is trying to 
acquire a nuclear capability to thwart US aims, just as North Korea did.47  
Israeli Threat Perception: 
Even though the playing out of the protracted dispute between primarily the 
United States and Iran over the latter's nuclear programme is rife with 
implications for non-proliferation in both regional and global terms, its most 
direct relevance has, for a number of reasons, remained to the case of Israel. 
One of the multifarious consequences of the 1979 Revolution in Iran was a 
complete reversal in the country's equation with Israel. Iran during the Shah 
era was one of the only two Muslim majority countries in the world (together 
with Turkey) to have established diplomatic relations with Israel soon after the 
latter's creation in 1948. But, the Revolution, given its Islamic bedrock, 
changed all that. Israel thereafter was, and continues to be, placed by Iran as 
one of its top-most enemies. In its new state of avowed hostility toward Israel, 
post-Revolution Iran has continued to maintain bitter opposition to Tel Aviv's 
nuclear-weapon stockpile. Important as that plank of Iran's regional approach 
did remain even before the countries own nuclear programme became 
controversial, the same premise has taken the centre stage of its political 
position in the controversy with the IAEA.48  
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Iran would thus highlight the duality inherent in the actual implementation of 
the NPT, particularly the role of the major Western powers in that regard, 
where nothing has been seen objectionable about Israel's nuclear arsenal even 
as Tehran's demonstrably peaceful nuclear programme has been made such a 
big issue of The fact that Israel is not a signatory to the NPT is also cited to 
strengthen the argument. Not only that, Tehran would also bring out how some 
of the permanent members of the UN Security Council, in disregard of their 
nonproliferation obligations, have actively helped Israel in the development of 
its weapon-oriented nuclear programme. At the same time, the fiery rhetoric 
against Israel employed frequently by President Ahmadinejad since his coming 
into power in August 2005 has anything but helped to ease apprehensions of 
his country's ongoing nuclear programme in Western capitals as also in Tel 
Aviv. 
Nevertheless, the strong Western and Israeli response to such pronouncements 
would, if nothing else, further accentuate the Tehran-Tel Aviv nuclear co-
relationship — an outcome no doubt to President Ahmadinejad's likings. All 
said and done, therefore, even as observers all over the world would wonder at 
the desirability of Iran adding to its difficulties vis-a-vis the Western powers 
over the nuclear question through such anti- Israel pronouncements, it has in 
fact strengthened Iran's case. Also relevant in this regard has been the 
possibility of a military strike against Iran either by Israel and/or America 
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hinted at periodically by both.49 Israel had started hurling threats of an attack 
on Iran much before President Ahmadinejad's assumption of office that would 
have contributed to his country's resolve not to cave in to the combined US-
Israeli pressure for dismantling its nuclear programme. That, for the sake of 
record, was happening during the tenure of the moderate President Khatami in 
Iran. Such aggressive Israeli talk solicited an understandably harsh Iranian 
response. 
Israel and its supporters in the United States, in order to keep Iran under 
constant pressure, saw to it throughout the protracted process of international 
negotiations on the Iranian nuclear issue that no compromise solution was 
reached by the interlocutors. Together with its influence on the US policies in 
the region, Israel's consistent raising of the ante against Iran thus effectively 
both scuttled the chances of a negotiated settlement and gave added reason for 
Tehran not to buckle down. Israel also considered it expedient to keep 
sounding alarm bells on Iran's nuclear programme. A US 'National Intelligence 
Estimate', as reported by the Washington Post on August 1, 2005, concluded 
that "Iran is ten years away from developing a nuclear weapon". Israel warned 
that Iran could have the weapon much sooner: "Israeli military chief General 
Aharon Zeevi says US estimates that Iran is 10 years from producing a nuclear 
bomb are inaccurate. Barring an unexpected delay, Iran is going to become 
nuclear capable in 2008 and not in 10 years,' General Zeevi adds.'•so 
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The American Position on Iran's Nuclear Programme: 
In parallel with Iran, the American position within the nuclear crisis has 
generated positive and negative attitudes both domestically and internationally. 
Much of the criticism towards US strategy is linked with the Bush 
administrations failures in Iraq, both in improperly assessing the threat posed 
by Saddam Hussein, and in committing the United States to a prolonged and 
destructive conflict based on specious evidence. During the 2004-2005 
Iranian-European negotiations, the Bush administration drew heavy criticism 
for not participating in the negotiations. This criticism was further heightened 
as media reports detailing potential plans for nuclear strikes within Iran 
intertwined with latent fears of overly militaristic trends within the American 
goveinment.'1 
The interest that the United States has in blocking the Iranian nuclear program 
is not a new phenomenon. Since its inception, the Bush administration had 
made a concerted effort to isolate and act against Iran. The current policy 
climate has largely emerged from the ashes of past failures, such as a prior 
effort to bring Iran to the Security Council in 2003. Furthermore, the position 
that the United States has taken with regard to the Iranian nuclear program is 
also a continuation of its policy of isolating and '`containing" so-called "rogue 
states," a policy which it has pursued in numerous forms for over a decade.52  
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In the current crisis, however, the United States has been measured in its 
approach to Iran. Despite criticism for non-involvement, the US has supported 
the European negotiations and did so until the talks were discontinued. Upon 
their failure, the US then placed its full support behind the office of the IAEA 
in assessing the threat posed by Iran and the possible responses. Furthermore, 
in its public statements the US has consistently emphasized a diplomatic 
solution. In a statement, President Bush re-iterated this position, stating that 
"the diplomatic options are just beginp ng".'3 However, it should be noted that 
the United States has tempered such statements with vague implications 
towards a more forceful position, such as their assertion of a unity among 
many countries on a basic principle that "Iranians should not have a nuclear 
weapon, the capacity to make a nuclear wt•eapon, or the knowledge of how to 
make a nuclear iieapon." 4 In manipulating perceptions of its foreign policy, 
the United States has closely followed past actions. One notable element being 
the steadfast refusal of the United States to acknowledge the Iranian economic 
motives behind nuclear energy, stating instead that Iran has no need for 
additional forms of energy 
While there has been much speculation regarding military action (to which the 
United States has ambiguously replied that "all options are on the table 6 ) 
they have not yet taken an overt position of hostility towards Iran on the 
nuclear issue, although that may very well change in the near future. At the 
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moment, the United States is putting its faith and effort into international 
institutions. While doubtless it is concerned about the threat that a nuclear Iran 
would pose to both regional stability and US interests, the US approach to Iran 
is largely dictated by the overarching concern of sustaining the viability of the 
NPT treaty. Within this context, the US administration sees Iran's actions as a 
threat against the NPT regime and the established system of nuclear order. As 
the NPT regime has come under pressure from numerous proliferation 
instances in the recent past, '' the Iranian nuclear issue is being approached 
with the intention of gaining a victory for the NPT regime and maintaining the 
status quo in the face of defiance. Also by taking a strong stance in defense of 
the NPT, the United States has so far managed to redirect or avoid further 
criticism (particularly from internal sources) of its own failures to reduce its 
nuclear stockpile in accordance with its NPT commitments.58  
To many in the US government, the IAEA, and other concerned parties, this 
approach is both legitimate and necessary. A lingering fear within the United 
States and other western nations is the future transference of nuclear 
technology (particularly towards countries of questionable international 
record). Further diplomatic moves by Tehran have served to heighten this 
proliferation anxiety, with Iran's recent offer of nuclear exchange to Sudan 
being a case in point.59 Regarding the larger American strategy, the United 
States seems to be focusing on diplomacy while analyzing potential military 
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options. Attuned to the high amount of international anxiety surrounding the 
program and well aware of the difficult situation it has found itself in Iraq, the 
United States seems confident it can create a multilateral response to Iran. In 
many ways, this would be a coup for the United States, as it has been trying to 
undertake such an initiative for some time. However, with the high level of 
concern surrounding the nuclear crisis, the opportunity may have finally 
presented itself This position was best described by R. Nicholas Bums, the 
under secretary of state who has led the diplomatic negotiations for the 
administration. According to Burns, "what they have done is created a 
coalition against them, they have forced a dynamic where they will have some 
action against there, whether it is in the Security Council, or outside the 
Security Council by likeminded nations.' 60  
US Interests and Policies: 
Although the current crisis between the United States and Iran seems to he 
about the latter's nuclear program, the actual problem stems from the 
conflicting interests in the West Asian region. According to the National 
Security Strategy of the United States of America, 2006, the major interests of 
United States are (1) providing security for the oil and gas supply, (2) 
eliminating threats from terrorist organizations, (3) preventing the spread of 
WMDs, and (4) maintaining Israel's existence and qualitative military 
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advantage. Successive American administrations have claimed that a major US 
goal is to promote democracy and economic liberalization in the region. 
However, even if this is the case, it can only be as a means to achieve these 
four genuine security-oriented goals above. They are truly intertwined losing 
out in one of them can induce serious costs in others. For example, the spread 
of WMDs would make terrorist threats more critical. Similarly, terrorism is a 
threat to both energy security and Israel. Therefore, interests must be 
considered together. 
A striking fact about US-Iranian relations is that these four US interests 
conflict with Iran's goals. First and foremost, Iran is not under US influence 
when it comes to oil and gas production and transportation. In fact, Iran is 
capable of interrupting the transport of oil from the Hormuz Strait and making 
its own energy- export deals with Russia, China and Turkey (and perhaps also 
the EU in the future). Second. Iran is alleged to be the greatest supporter of 
Hamas and Hezbollah in the region. Third, the United States claims that Iran is 
meddling with Iraqi Shia groups and preventing the stabilization of Iraq, and 
represents the biggest obstacle to thwarting radical Islamic groups in the 
region. Meanwhile, the harsh rhetoric used by these groups and the Iranian 
regime against Israel also goes against the American desire to protect Israels 
security. Lastly, the possibility that Iran could produce nuclear weapons is a 
nightmare for the United States. It would give Iran an enormous strategic tool, 
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secure the Islamic regime's survival, threaten Israel, and fuel a nuclear arms 
race in the region while holding the potential to be transferred to terrorist 
groups. As a result, Iran's influence in the region would increase immensely, 
shifting the precarious balance of power.61  
Reality of Iranian Threat to US Interests: 
It is widely accepted that secure extraction and flow of oil is the most obvious 
interest of the United States. The problem begins when many analysts do not 
show any hesitation while saying that Iran threatens the US oil related interests 
in the region. Would really the secure flow and extraction of oil be something 
that Iran like to sabotage? Given the Iranian economy's heavy dependence on 
oil revenues it is not wise to imagine that Iran would he a threat to US interests 
on oil flow. In contrast, Iran would really like to benefit from both extraction 
and flow of oil. On the other hand, Iran extremely needs the investment in its 
oil fields which suffers from the old technology and blockade of US, actually, 
White argues that Iran looks for American investment more than that of any 
other country.62 Meanwhile, Vakil argues that Iran looks to west not to east 63 
So why people fear that a strong Iran would threaten the US interest in expense 
of undermining its own economy? The answer is nothing but the perception 
about its Islamic identity. The equation goes like this line, Islamic politics is 
anti-American. Its adherents are blind and the only thing that should be 
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expected from them is destruction of the American/western civilization. They 
cannot cooperate! Cooperation would embolden them. Do whatever you can to 
stop its rise! Iran has a regime oriented on political Islam. Block it whenever 
you can! Isolate it! Don't let it go nuclear! If it acquires nuclear weapons, it 
would not make rational political calculations. It would act differently from 
any other nation. What it would do is blindly attacking to US interests. This is 
the line of the thinking about Iran which causes the people to think that Iran is 
a threat to secure flow of oil. When closely examined neither the facts support 
this line of the thinking nor there is a claim of Iran saying that if Iran go 
nuclear it would directly blockade the flow of oil, nor Iran's nuclear capability 
would be able to do this blockade, the only thing that this capability would 
serve is deterring other states from attacking on it, because it could be able to 
harm the attackers seriously with nuclear weapons.b' 
An interest of US is supposed to be Israel's survival and its qualitative military 
superiority in the region.6  Many sources accept the survival of the Israel as a 
primary interest of the United States without questioning. However, first of all, 
it should be noted that Israel has not a status that would never be discarded by 
the United States, even when Israel's interests contradict with those of the 
United States. The United States is a global player while Israel is a regional 
player.`'`' :1s once the US dismantled its special relationship with France and 
showed it can dismantle with Britain, it can also dismantle with Israel. This 
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needs to be expressed in order to avoid misconceptions. It is not proposed that 
the US should break its relations with Israel. However it is to say that Israel is 
not a national interest of the US. Even if in a particular period of time, in the 
cold war period, Israel's survival has been accepted as an interest of the US, it 
should be expressed that it was situational not perpetual. For a fair and stable 
future for both Israel and other regional countries, Israel needs to pave the way 
of survival by employing policies other than reliance on special relationship 
with US. An Israel which only relies on the security measures would not be 
able to protect its security, Israel needs to develop less problematic relations 
with its neighbors and thus prevent them to use an anti-Israel discourse. 
Furthermore, Israel's heavily reliance on military approach was something that 
goes beyond reliance on Israel's own capabilities.67 
Second, there is no evidence that Iran is the enemy of the Jews, and is not so 
irrational to attack Israel. Iran is not the enemy of Jews because there is a wide 
community of Jews who has not left Iran until now.68 There is a bias that Iran 
would launch a nuclear attack if it acquires the weapons, because it is a 
fundamentalist' state.69 Iran would not launch a military attack because Israel 
and US had an absolute nuclear advantage compared to Iran. If Iran attacks 
first then it will be the end of Iran. Moreover, there is Iranian rapprochement to 
Israel, including Israel-Palestine and WMD issues.70 Considering these fact, it 
seems that, the fear of Israel is not justified on the technical and political 
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grounds, and the current considerations need to be reviewed in light of the new 
world political conditions. 
Third. Iran uses anti-Israel language because it plays a regional role and it has 
to voice its existence, because Israel's actions in the region influence whole of 
the regional politics, which almost none of the states in the region embrace. 
The reason behind the view of some authorities that Iran would use these 
weapons is because of the bias against the Islamic politics. It is believed 
Islamic politics is blind and would cause irrational moves. However, it is 
interesting, when analysts examine the Iranian retaliation in a case of the 
American or Israeli attack, they really rationally think in their analyses, and 
say, for example, that Iran doesn't use its cards now, but if it is attacked then it 
will use its cards. This is a very rational reasoning, and reveals that Iran is not 
so lunatic to use every kind of violence in any case, it would use violence if 
when it is under pressure. So if Iran would not be attacked then it will not use 
those weapons and may manage very well like it manages its cards today, 
regarding its proxy violent groups in the region. Fourth, in the global play 
today between US, China and Russia, Israel has little to offer, while Iran has 
much to offer to the US.7' 
West Asian perception of Iranian Nuclear Programme: 
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC): The six member state of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) in the immediate eastern and south-eastern 
vicinity of Iran has suggested that the Gulf region should be free of weapons of 
mass destruction. A report carried by the Forbes magazine on December 2, 
2005 quoted Sheikh Abdu Rahman al-Attiyah, GCC Secretary General, as 
"calling on NATO 'to exercise direct pressure to eliminate WMDs (weapons of 
mass destruction) from our region, without exception.' The GCC, Secretary 
General Attiyah, who was speaking on the sidelines of a conference in Qatar 
on NATO's role in Gulf regional security, said 'we do not want our region to 
be sandwiched by arms here and arms there."72 Heba Kandil and Andrew 
Hammond of the Reuters reported at the conclusion of the summit meeting on 
December 19: "US-allied Gulf Arab leaders called on Monday for a nuclear 
weapons free West Asia, but singled out only Israel, not Iran, despite having 
voiced alarm at hehran's nuclear ambitions during their two-day meeting. In a 
final statement, the six-nation Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) focused on 
Israel's failure to join the nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which Iran 
has signed. GCC Secretary-General declined to explain why the statement did 
not mention Tehran. But one Gulf official said it was because the GCC wanted 
to keep diplomatic channels open. 'They (GCC leaders) are very worried about 
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Iran's nuclear programme. They opted for diplomacy so as not to alienate 
Tehran,' the official told Reuters."" 
The Arab NN'orld and the Iranian Nuclear Programme: 
Arab countries have in the course of the controversy had no hesitation in either 
calling for the banishing of weapons of mass destruction from the entire region 
of West Asia or making a specific demand for denuclearization of Israel. And, 
that is where the real effectiveness of Iran's targeting Israel in the context of 
the Western uproar over its nuclear programme has come to light. Egypt, for 
instance, minced no words in this regard when the US vice president visited 
Cairo in early 2006. According to a Reuters dispatch on January 18, '`Egypt 
told US Vice President Dick Cheney it supported efforts to stop the spread of 
nuclear weapons in the West Asia but slammed the West for turning a blind 
eye to Israel's atomic program. one official said. Cheney was in Cairo as part 
of a West Asia tour that includes Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. He held talks 
with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak on several subjects including a 
standoff between the West and Iran over Tehran's nuclear programme. The last 
thing we need in West Asia is a nuclear weapon arms race,' presidential 
spokesman Suleiman ANvad said. 'But we cannot ignore Egyptian and Arab 
world public opinion (that refuses) to make all this fuss about the Iranian 
nuclear program while turning a blind eye and a deaf ear to the Israeli nuclear 
187 
program and arsenal." 7' Syria, which has come to develop a close alliance 
with Iran, especially since President Ahmadinejad's assumption of office, has 
been the most forthright supporter of Tehran's nuclear programme as also the 
opponent of Tel Aviv's nuclear weapons.?  
Even as the United States and its West European allies were enlisting 
international support for their opposition to the Iranian nuclear programme, 
Tehran too mustered the backing of the Arab countries in particular for its 
right to the peaceful use of nuclear technology. Iranian vice-President for 
Legal and Parliamentary Affairs Ahmad Mousvi took a tour of Tunisia, 
Morocco, Egypt, Libya, Algeria and Jordan for the purpose in January 2006. 
Although the degree of support he could get varied from case to case, Ahmad 
Mousvi was largely successful in his mission. The divergence of positions on 
the Iranian nuclear programme as between the GCC member countries and 
most of other Arab states was highlighted by Diana Elias of the Associated 
Press ahead of a summit meeting of the 22-member Arab League (or, the 
League of Arab Nations) held in the Sudanese capital of Khartoum in late 
March 2006. In a dispatch filed from Kuwait on March 22, she observed: 
This tiny Gulf country is increasingly nervous --- as are some of its neighbors 
about Iran's controversial nuclear program, right across the water. But heading 
into a key summit. Arab leaders are divided, and publicly squabbling, over 
how to defuse a crisis that has caused the West to haul Iran before the UN 
Security Council.76 Countries close to Iran, including Kuwait and the United 
Arab Emirates, have focused on safety issues, the threat of a possible regional 
arms race and the possibility that a crisis with the West could spill onto other 
nations. Iran's nuclear program 'still poses a big worry,' Sheik Abdullah bin 
Zayed Al Nayyan, the foreign minister of the United Arab Emirates, said this 
month. But Arab countries farther away from Iran have insisted that the 
United States and Europe should not pressure Iran over its program unless they 
also push for an end to Israel's nuclear program. In January, the secretary-
general of the Arab League, Amr Moussa, an Egyptian, quarreled publicly 
with the Emirates' foreign minister after Moussa sent a message to the Gulf 
Cooperation Council summit, urging the leaders of the UAE, Kuwait, Saudi 
Arabia, Oman, Bahrain and Qatar to focus on Israel, not Iran. 
Moussa repeated his stance, saying at one Arab meeting: 'We should avoid 
double standards. As they head into next week's Arab League meeting in 
Sudan, both Iran's program itself, and the fight over it, have many in the Gulf 
nervous. "Accidents happen in developed countries. What would reassure us 
that they won't happen in a Third World country?' asked Kuwaiti strategist 
Sami al-Faraj. tit's Kuwait Center for Strategic Studies is advising the Kuwaiti 
government as well as the secretariat-general of the Gulf Cooperation Council, 
on how to prepare for any nuclear accidents in Iran, he said. The country's first 
nuclear reactor, expected to go online this year, is in Busher in southern Iran, 
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just 150 miles across the Persian Gulf from Kuwait. Iran is seismically 
unstable, and an earthquake could cause an accident that would be more 
disastrous for Gulf countries than for Iran. 
'A catastrophe that kills 200,000 people could mean wiping out half of 
Bahrain,' he noted. In addition, any pollution of the Gulf would shut down the 
six water desalination plants on the Arab shore, he said. But it's not just safety 
issues that concern the Gulf States. Leaders also worry about a possible 
regional arms race, and fear the dispute with the West might prompt US or 
Israeli air strikes against Iran, something sure to rile Shiite Muslim 
communities in the largely Sunni Muslim Gulf countries. During a Gulf 
Cooperation Council summit in December, a government-run think tank, the 
Emirates Center for Strategic Studies, warned Gulf states against maintaining 
'silence' over the nuclear issue, saying they will pay the price for any 
escalation between Iran and the West. Gulf nations utterly refuse any idea that 
Iran should own a nuclear weapon, and they want Iran to stop uranium 
enrichment except under international control,' said Dawood al-Shirian, a 
Saudi Arabian analyst. He said a nuclear-armed Iran would be a 'justification' 
for foreign countries to keep their forces in the Gulf longer to protect their oil 
interests."'' 
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Iran, of course, is not a member of the Arab League, but its nuclear 
programme did form one of the agenda items to be discussed at the Khartoum 
summit meeting. Secretary- General A:nr Moussa set the tone in this regard in 
his opening speech at the summit meeting on March 29 by asking the Arab 
countries to develop their own nuclear programs as well: "As the UN Security 
Council debates how to confront Iran over its nuclear activities, the head of the 
Arab League called on the world's Arab states to pursue 'peaceful nuclear 
energy programs. Amr Moussa, the secretary-general of the 22-nation bloc, 
said Arab states should 'enter into the nuclear club and make use of nuclear 
energy for peaceful purposes with all speed and momentum,' according to wire 
service reports from Khartoum" "Moussa, on a number of occasions, has 
publicly supported Tehran, saying that the West was employing a double 
standard by pressuring Iran while taming a blind eye to Israel. (Israel, which 
has not signed the NPT, is believed to possess nuclear weapons but has never 
officially confirmed this.) Nonetheless, Moussa's call in Khartoum came as a 
surprise, since the Arab League is not united over Iran and the nuclear issue. "7e 
In the event, member states of the Arab League decided to send out a call for 
elimination of Israel's nuclear arsenal. 
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Future Options: 
It is in the debate over potential responses to the crisis where the 
misperceptions on both sides end up influencing the course of events. Both 
Iran and the United States have moulded their positions round ingrained 
cultural and strategic misperceptions, and both are likely to act within their 
respective contexts. For the United States, the Cold War goal of containment 
and isolation is still the desired objective, particularly on a multilateral basis, 
as this in turn fulfils the goal of preserving an American led international 
system. For Iran, the objective is the opposite, as the Iranian approach largely 
falls on a history of aggressive self-reliance in the face of collective sanction. 
This drive, and its nationalistic framing, can be seen in h•anian public 
statements over the course of the crisis. For instance, President Ahmadinejad's 
response to the threat of security council resolutions, where he stated that ` the 
Iranian nation won't give a damn about such useless resolutions," as well as 
the statements of government ministers emphasizing Iran's strength in the face 
of adversity, gives insight into this line of reasoning" 
Regarding the future course of events, the current state of affairs is precarious 
and largely depends on how the Security Council decides to proceed in the 
medium and long term. Should Iran be clearly indicted as being in default, and 
should future diplomatic options he exhausted, then it is likely that there will 
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be a motion before the Security Council to undertake disciplinary action. 
Based on the IAEA vote in March, a rough consensus currently exists 
regarding the need for some measures to be taken.80 It is in this form of action 
that much controversy exists. At present, there are two main options: Sanctions 
and Military Action. 
It is in the sanctions option that much of the past experience in approaching 
Iran comes into effect. In keeping with Iran's long-standing pariah status, 
numerous sanction options have been floated within the IAEA that largely 
emphasize containment and other isolating measures. As for sanctions, there 
are two likely courses that will be proposed. The first are "light sanctions" and 
mainly involve coercive measure designed to limit Iran's accessibility to its 
neighbor's and vice versa. This option would involve travel bans to certain 
countries, limits on Iranian citizens travelling abroad, the removal of Iran at 
international events (particularly sporting events), and other general 
restrictions that would reduce Iran's international interoctioH,St A stronger 
approach would likely focus on denying Iran conventional military equipment 
and "dual use technology (civilian technology easily converted to military 
applications) and cutting off international lending to Iran.92  
Should the situation escalate to require strenuous action, the option of 
economic sanctions could be much more destructive. Despite official Iranian 
193 
statements by Ahmadinejad and other government officials who emphasize the 
resolute nature of the Iranian economy, Iran's economic foundations are 
particularly vulnerable to any form of collective action by the western powers. 
This is due to the present system of buy-back contracts Iran uses in its oil and 
gas industry. The nature of this system allows for foreign companies to 
construct and operate installations for a set number of years, following which 
the facility would be taken over by Iran H3 While this ensures Iranian control 
over its oil fields, it presents a special weakness as it forces Iran to depend on 
external sources to apply the necessary technology to create the necessary 
infrastructure. Should a set of sanctions be comprehensive enough to target 
and restrict technology transfers, the damage to the Iranian economy would be 
extreme (it should be noted that this is an option the IAEA has considered 
recommending). However, while containment has always been presented as a 
desired goal, questions still remain regarding its effectiveness. Iran has been a 
nation with a startling ability to "go it alone " in the past and succeed and the 
failures of multi-lateral sanction regimes are well documented.8' 
While sanctions options are being considered, there is still much speculation 
regarding potential military action. However, at present, the realistic options 
regarding a military strike are limited. Any viable strike against the Iranian 
nuclear program would have to be an airborne campaign, amongst which the 
United States would be the main participant.85 However, such an air campaign, 
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even if limited, would also be a major undertaking requiring a significant 
political and logistical commitment by concerned nations. While the United 
States does have the military potential to meet such a challenge (and Iran lacks 
the ability to stop them), there are several re-enforcing facts that preclude such 
a decision. Those being: that such an action would be unable to completely 
halt the program, Iran is in a very good position to create further difficulties in 
Iraq, and that the United States political position in the region is already quite 
precarious. 
With few military options available on both sides, the likely course of action 
will involve more diplomacy, political maneuvering and media manipulation. 
In many ways, the US-Iranian conflict is very much a war of words and 
images, where great investment is made by both nations in the hope that the 
consistent application of soft power will yield some tangible results in the 
future. Such hopes are not inconsequential, as there seems to be little 
possibility for an immediate solution to the crisis. The effort of simultaneous 
demonization and self-justification further complicates the crisis, as both 
nations have legitimate concerns behind their positions. Unfortunately, the 
legitimacy of these concerns, and any means of rational dialogue in addressing 
them, are often drowned out on both sides by the weight of history, popular 
opinion, and entrenched political interests. As both have larger ambitions of 
regional influence and potential hegemony, the whole scale manipulation and 
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use of political attitudes will perpetuate, and will likely perpetuate the present 
conflict for years to come. 
Iran's nuclear program and the prolonged international debate over what to do 
about it are certain function of the irreconcilable interests of the United States 
and Iran in West Asia. The characteristics of US-Iran relations since revolution 
do not seem to be very promising for a resolution of the issue. Since the 
Islamic revolution in Iran, the United States has chosen to isolate and contain 
it. It is difficult to argue that this policy has worked effectively towards the US 
security goals in the West Asia: energy security, prevention of terrorism and 
the spread of WMDs, and Israel's security. On the contrary, an isolated Iran 
has defied the United States on each of these four issues. In fact, the effort to 
develop a nuclear-weapons capability is the result of Iran's own need for 
security, its desire for legitimacy at home, and its increasing influence in the 
region. 
No analyst can accurately know what Iran aims to achieve with its nuclear 
program. Given the limitations on information channels and the regime's lack 
of transparency, most researchers try to infer Iran's specific goals. Is Iran's 
ultimate aim to develop nuclear weapons at all costs or is it using the nuclear 
issue as a bargaining chip to end its international isolation? From our research 
and interviews with area experts, we conclude that for the time being, Iran's 
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major aini is to develop its nuclear capacity as soon as possible. Whether Iran 
will use technological advancements as a base for nuclear weapons is a 
decision for the future. The following analysis about Iran's short term goals is 
illustrative: Iran's leaders do not yet need to make a decision about whether to 
produce nuclear weapons. They can wait until the fissile material is produced 
to decide if and when to develop the physics package needed for a weapon. 
What Iran has certainly decided is to acquire the technical capability to 
produce fissile material. Its nuclear hedging strategy is designed to bring the 
country right up to the threshold of a break-out capability while remaining 
within the legal limits of the NPT. 
Developments in late 2008 seem to confirm the view that Iran has advanced its 
nuclear program to a Great degree. In September 2008, an IAEA report 
confirmed that Iran had significantly developed its nuclear capacity and did 
not allow required IAEA inspections. As to the nuclear weapons 
experimentation plan allegedly found in an Iranian diplomat's computer, the 
report indicated that the IAEA has obtained information indicating that the 
experimentation described in this document may have involved the assistance 
of foreign expertise."86 For the first time in its report, the IAEA mentioned 
possible "foreign" technical assistance for weapons technology development in 
Iran. 
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As early as 2009, the crisis over Irans nuclear program seems to have reached 
an equilibrium that favors Iran. Except for the least likely scenarios — regime 
change from within and a military strike — all other options favor Iran. 
Acquiring the technical capability to make the bomb, making the bomb or 
getting assurances from the West and breaking its international isolation are all 
good results for Iran. On the other hand, except for the regime-change 
scenario, all other scenarios challenge US interests in the West Asia. 
Therefore, the best option for the United States might be to engage Iran 
diplomatically to try to prevent the development of a weapons program. The 
Obama administration may be able to give assurances to Iran about regime 
survival, which would enable the more pragmatic Iranian position to prevail. 
This could lead Iran to cooperate with the international community on the 
issue. If the Obama administration cannot achieve what the Clinton 
administration did with North Korea in 1994, time will favor Iran. Regardless 
of whether or not it is developing a nuclear weapon, this protracted crisis 
increases the popularity of the Islamic regime in the eyes of people and 
nongovernmental groups in the West Asia, may spill over into a conflict with 
Israel, can create a security dilemma for other regional powers like Egypt or 
hurkey, and would damage the four major American interests in the region. In 
November 2008, an IAEA report confirmed that Iran had made 630 kilograms 
of low-grade uranium, which many experts consider adequate to make an 
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atomic bomb.87 Whether to convert this material and technology into the 
world's deadliest weapon and begin a new era in the West Asia is a decision in 
the hands of the Islamic regime's elite. 
The question of whether and how an Iranian leadership can manage to open 
political routes to Washington may eventually be more important for its 
domestic legitimacy than the number of centrifuges spinning in Iranian nuclear 
facilities. And the fact that former US President George W. Bush named Iran 
as one of the two greatest threats to the United States may well have pleased 
the Iranian president.88 Iranian policymakers often tend to see the United 
States as the only counterpart worth dealing with on equal terms.89 
Commentators trying to find a single doctrine or underlying driver to explain 
Iran's regional and international policies, as well as its nuclear programme, 
have traded various possibilities, including Persian imperialism, the export of 
the revolution, or the religious zeal of Iran's ruling elite. None of these 
explanations are convincing. Rather, Iran's regional, international and even 
nuclear policies are driven by a combination of ambition and fear for the 
Western civilization. 
Whatever the fact may be laid here, it cannot be denied that Iran's struggle for 
nuclear technology intensifies the crisis between the US and some other 
Western countries with Iran. Iran offers its own reasons for accessing nuclear 
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CONCLIVSI05vs 
CONCLUSION 
In the region of West Asia the US has been very actively engaged. This 
engagement has become more active and penetrative in the post-second World 
War periods. The relationship with some of them was cordial and friendly. 
While with some others it was not. "I'he determining factor in relationships was 
the US-Soviet Cold War. Though the US has a history of relationship with 
Iran, it actively got itself engaged with it after the beginning of the Cold War. 
in 'Jest Asia Iran is a country with rich and glorious history. It has been a 
prominent regional power. A vast land area, rich resources and strategic 
location impart to it a special standing in political calculations and greater 
scope to attain a genuine position as a regional power as compared with other 
countries, like Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. Moreover, Iran's aeo-politics. which 
links Asia to the West Asia, Central Asia to the Persian Gulf and serves as a 
connecting point of four sub-regions, is a strong point that can-not be denied 
by any regional and global power. This situation has long invited the 
interference and competition from extra-regional powers seeking to extend 
their respective influence in the region. 
By studying Iran in historical perspective, it becomes interesting to see how 
Iranians have usually felt deeply affiliated to their national, social, ethnic and 
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religious heritage. Iran's political and social movements in its contemporary 
history have been concentrated on keeping national sovereignty and 
independency. So, on one hand Iran's geopolitical and geo economic position 
move it toward the great powers, but on the other hand, the Iranian orientation 
is to avoid their influence. Iran's contemporary history fairly demonstrates 
how its intellectual and religious movements shaped around this kind of 
resistance. 
The US and Iran have a history of relationship which goes back to 19th 
century. Up to the beginning of 20th century it was socio-cultural and 
diplomatic in nature. It was in twentieth century during the concluding periods 
of World War 11 that the US engaged in political relations with Iran. Later in 
the period it built up a strategic relationship with it. The geo-strategic location 
of Iran and its potential as a regional power led to the United States building it 
into one of the "strategic pillars" of US strategy in West Asia. Up to Iranian 
revolution in 1979 Iran sought United States as a protector and friend. During 
the period Iran became dependent on US protection, support, and aid. This was 
quite a patron- client relationship, and in partnership relations the U. S. was the 
senior partner. Iran served as an ally of US in the region. The situation 
underwent a change after the revolution in Iran. Both the allies became 
adversary. 
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The Islamic Revolution of Iran created an unprecedented opportunity for its 
leaders to utilize Iran's strategic significance in such a way as to enable the 
people eventually to control their own destiny freely and play a major role on 
the world stage. This hostility largely drew from the events of 1980s, when 
Iran humiliated the US in the hostage crisis of 1979- 1981. The images of the 
hostage crisis, combined with subsequent confrontational policies such as 
attacks on Persian Gulf shipping in the mid 1980s and woeful tales of internal 
repression, solidified the image of Iran as that of 'a crazy outlaw nation whose 
acts were illet`zal, unpredictable and irrational. The effects of such 
characterizations run deep within the US policy, every President from Ronald 
Reagan to Barrak Obama have vilified Iran. 
The post- Islamic Revolution relationship between the United States and Iran 
stems from decades of complex historical and political events. Many Iranians 
believe that the US has long dominated their country, removing its elected 
Prince Minister Mossadiyh in 1953, sustaining the Shah in the decades that 
followed and then imposing sanctions and various forms of containment on the 
Iranian economy ever since the 1979 revolution besides encouraging Iraq to 
attack Iran in September 1980. The US is also seen as protecting and 
subsidizing the state of Israel, in its suppression of Palestinian national rights. 
The Iran-Iraq War throughout 1980s further strained US-Iran relations. While 
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the United States supplied both Iraq and Iran with weapons, it tended to favor 
Iraq and also established diplomatic relations with the nation. It applied the 
policy of dual containment which was special feature of power-block politics. 
The United States provided various legal as well as illegal supports to Iraq to 
counter and weaken Iran. At the same time it also supported Iran by supplying 
arms to it, the subject of an arms embargo, allegedly to contain the Soviet 
influence and to secure the release of hostages from Lebanon and to fund the 
Nicaraguan contras, This became a famous/infamous Iran Contra affair. 
During the 1990s, relations between the United States and Iran remained 
contentious. Iran not only sought to assert itself as a regional power but also to 
protect itself from external threats and to spread Islamic revolution in the 
region. The United States sought to isolate Iran by placing various sanctions 
on it. Sanctions originally imposed in 1995 are continuing even today 
hampering their relations. In the late I990s, relations began to normalize when 
Iranian president, Mohammed Khatami, in 1998 called for a "dialogue among 
civilizations" with the United States. Relations were stalled due to opposition 
from Iranian conservatives and American preconditions for discussions, 
including changes in Iranian policy on Israel, nuclear energy, and its support 
for terrorism. Moreover the US apologized in 2000 for its role in 1953 
overthrow of Mossadiqh, a democratically elected prime minister of Iran. The 
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same year in September, the US and Iran met as part of the Six-Plus-Two 
regional talks on Afghanistan. These talks marked the highest diplomatic 
contact between the United States and Iran since the 1979 hostage crisis. 
Afghanistan provided to both US and Iran an opportunity to work together and 
normalize their relations. Hopes for new ties and the cooperation which 
emerged between them were foreclosed when President Bush in his 2002 State 
of the Union address labeled Iran as part of the 'Axis of Evil." Relations 
became more tensed as the US became more involved in the region, infringing 
on state's security and sovereignty. Cooperation by Iran in Afghanistan could 
not generate trust. Other events further strained and complicated the 
relationship. 
The US war with Iraq began in 2003 which also complicated and tensed the 
relationship as both accused one another for their suspicious role relating to 
continued US presence in Iraq and the present messy situation there. 
According to US Iran has supported violent organizations to challenge the 
American presence in Iraq, destabilize progress in there, and maximize its 
influence in the nation and region. The US also continues to accuse that Iran 
has supported/supports the radical Palestinian organizations and Ilezbollah to 
attack Israel and disrupt efforts for peace in the West Asia. 
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The United States has vital interest in the region. To protect them it has to deal 
with the countries of the region. And Iran is one which cannot be bypassed or 
overlooked because of position in the region. The US has to face Iran either as 
a friend or adversary if it wishes to impose a regional order or to establish 
itself as a strategic, military and economic power both in West and Central 
Asia. In all of this, US finds itself faced with the power of Iran, a country that 
has been, on and off, a hegernonic power in the region for three thousand years 
and which in the post-1979 period has regional goals incompatible with those 
of the US. This political conflict between Iran and the United States is 
compounded by the high degree of suspicion and animosity on both sides, the 
belligerency demonstrated by each in statements about the other. 
Moreover the Islamic Republic of Iran has emerged as the de facto leader of 
the West Asian region, which also includes Syria and prominent non-state 
actors such as llamas and llezbollah that created anti-American camp. The 
region seems deeply divided between two camps. On one side of this divide 
are those states willing to work in various forms of strategic partnership with 
the United States, with an implied acceptance of American hegemony over the 
region. This camp includes Israel, those Arab states that have made peace with 
Israel (Egypt and Jordan), and other so-called moderate Arab states (for 
example, Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Gulf Cooperation Council). On the 
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other side of this divide are those states and non-state actors that are unwilling 
to legitimize US hegemony over the region. This division creates a Cold War 
like situation to contain and deter Iran. At the same time the changed strategic 
scenario due to the collapse of the traditional Arab- Israeli peace process, the 
9/11 terrorist attacks, the US invasion and occupation of Iraq, the rise of 
Hezbollah and Hamas as political actors in national and regional contexts, the 
Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and subsequent Israeli military campaigns in 
Lebanon and Gaza is increasingly perceived in West Asia as a decline in US 
relative power and influence. The Islamic Republic was able to take advantage 
of these developments to effect a significant boost in its own regional standing. 
But notwithstanding these strategic gains, Iran continues to face serious 
national security and foreign policy challenges, both regionally and 
internationally. The geographical location of Iran at the heart of the Eurasian 
continent, its size, economic stature and military muscle give it the potential 
to play a leading role in a number of regional configurations: the Persian Gulf, 
Greater Central Asia and the Caspian basin, and in the West Asia. The 
concerns of the United States are in response to Iran's foreign policy that seeks 
to assert itself as a regional power through the use of various means and 
development of weapons of mass destruction 
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Iranian Nuclear Program is a contentious issue. The program as such is not a 
post-revolution issue. Iran has been pursuing this program since 1960s. And 
the United States was the first country to help Iran gain nuclear technology. 
The program was, however, halted due to implications of 1979 revolution and 
Iran's war with Iraq. It restarted the work on the program this time with the 
help of Russia and China. And in the post-revolution US-Iran relations, 
nuclear program became the central issue. Moreover, over the years both have 
not reached to any promising level for the resolution of the issue. So it remains 
a serious issue between them and others as well which might blow up into a 
serious conflict in the region. 
Moreover about its nuclear program, Iran has made a consistent public position 
that its nuclear goals are peaceful in nature. Whatever be the fact, Iran's 
struggle for nuclear technology intensified the crisis between the US and some 
other Western countries. Iran offers its own reasons for accessing nuclear 
technology and the US has its own perceptions and fears. The US has to play a 
vital role in this crisis. And in this regard, the United States has chosen to 
isolate and contain the post-revolutionary Iran. This policy of US has been 
successful is questionable with respect to the US interest in West Asia: energy 
security, prevention of terrorism, the spread of WMDs and Israel's security. 
On the contrary, an isolated Iran has openly defied the United States on each 
217 
of these four issues. The crisis over Iran's nuclear program, however, reached 
to an equilibrium that favors Iran. Except for the least likely scenarios — 
regime change from within and a military strike — all other options favor Iran. 
On the other hand, except for the regime-change scenario, all other scenarios 
challenge US interests in West Asia. Therefore, the best option for the United 
States might be to engage Iran diplomatically to try to prevent the development 
of a weapons program. And for the success of this option the US has to stop its 
blind support to Israel which has quite adversarial relations with Iran and most 
of West-Asian states. 
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